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Abstract	
This	study	investigates	the	impact	of	corporate	governance	practices	on	the	performance	of	commercial	banks	in	Nepal.	Specifically,	the	analysis	focuses	on	the	relationship	between	corporate	governance	mechanisms	and	financial	performance.	 It	 explores	 the	 influence	 of	 corporate	 governance	 policies,	guidelines	and	directives	issued	by	the	central	bank,	Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	and	self-initiatives	implemented	by	the	commercial	banks.		
The	 research	 undertaken	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 important	 to	 stimulate	 economic	growth	 and	 to	 encourage	 a	 more	 equitable	 sharing	 of	 growth.	 The	 lack	 of	proper	 development	 of	 corporate	 governance	 and	 monitoring	 of	 financial	systems	results	in	a	failure	to	capitalise	on	growth	opportunities	when	they	arise.	 A	 lack	 of	 capital	 is	 a	 major	 inhibitor	 to	 development,	 and	 enhanced	governance	will	be	a	major	fillip	in	promoting	investor	confidence,	leading	to	a	deeper	and	more	efficient	capital	market	in	Nepal.	There	are	many	untapped	opportunities	in	Nepal	and	a	well-developed	capital	market	will	attract	more	local	 and	 foreign	 investors.	 An	 improved	 capital	 market	 will	 alleviate	unemployment,	and	the	balance	of	payments	deficit,	help	to	restrain	the	brain	drain	 and	 help	 foster	 financial	 stability,	 strengthen	 risk	 management	 and	ultimately	contribute	to	a	strong	financial	system.	
A	significant	portion	of	Nepalese	people,	variously	estimated	to	be	around	30	per	cent,	do	not	have	access	to	formal	financial	services	and	rely	on	informal	service	 providers.	 There	 are	 many	 providers	 who	 take	 advantage	 of	 high	interest	 rates,	with	 financial	 frauds	 gaining	 recurring	 coverage	 in	 the	 news	
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media.	These	issues	are	not	specific	to	the	informal	sector;	they	also	occur	in	the	 formal	 financial	 sector.	 There	 have	 been	 several	 corporate	 governance	failures	in	Nepali	banks	including	the	Nepal	Development	Bank	Limited,	the	first	Commercial	Banks	of	Nepal-Nepal	Bank	Limited,	Nepal	Bangladesh	Bank,	Lumbini	Bank,	Gurkha	Development	Bank,	United	Development	Bank,	giving	rise	to	demands	for	greater	transparency	and	accountability	in	the	way	banks	are	controlled	and	managed.		
Good	corporate	governance	builds	the	platform	for	a	smooth,	faster,	easier	and	reliable	 financial	 system,	 clarifying	 responsibilities,	 fostering	 transparency	and	fairness	to	encourage	greater	individual	accountability.	Although	various	corporate	governance	mechanisms	have	evolved	in	developed	countries,	their	applicability	in	a	low-income	country	such	as	Nepal	may	not	be	efficacious	due	to	 differences	 in	 political,	 cultural,	 social	 and	 economic	 factors.	 Hence	 this	thesis	addresses	the	requirement	for	an	evidence-based	study	that	evaluates	the	 best	 fit	 corporate	 governance	 mechanisms	 applicable	 for	 the	 Nepalese	banking	sector.	
Panel	data	were	collected	from	all	commercial	banks’	annual	reports,	central	bank	reports	and	world	development	indicators.	The	time	period	for	the	study	commences	in	2003,	after	the	period	of	Maoist	insurgency,	and	ends	in	2012,	prior	 to	 the	 devastating	 earthquake.	 The	 analysis	 proceeds	 using	 quantile	regression,	which	is	appropriate	given	the	distributional	properties	of	the	data.		
This	thesis	contributes	to	the	existing	literature	of	corporate	governance	and	bank	performance	in	several	ways.	First,	 it	contributes	with	a	precis	of	how	
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corporate	 governance	 developed	 in	 Nepal	 during	 severe	 political	 turmoil,	including	civil	wars.	Second,	the	method	used	is	more	robust	than	approaches	reported	 in	 prior	 research	 and	 the	 careful	 diagnostics	 potentially	 provide	useful	guidance	for	other	low-income	country	studies.	Third,	the	present	study	recommends	 possibilities	 to	 improve	 corporate	 governance	 practices	 of	financial	 institutions	 in	 Nepal	 by	 formulating	 good	 policies,	 processes	 and	robust	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 systems.	 These	 improvements	 will	ultimately	 lead	 to	 strengthening	 institutional	 structures,	which	 in	 turn	will	foster	 various	 opportunities	 for	 sustainable	 development,	 not	 only	 in	 the	banking	sector	but	the	economy	as	a	whole.			
The	 findings	 indicate	 that	 corporate	 governance	 does	 affect	 the	 financial	performance	of	commercial	banks	in	Nepal.	The	results	indicate	that	corporate	governance	 structures,	 e.g.,	 board	 size,	 existence	 of	 CFO,	 percentage	 of	minority	 directors	 and	 the	 percentage	 of	 female	 directors	have	 statistically	positive	effects	on	performance,	while	the	percentage	of	external	directors	has	a	negative	impact	on	bank	performance.		
The	findings	from	this	study	provide	guidance	to	assist	with	policy	formulation	by	highlighting	the	key	areas	that	foster	good	governance,	which	in	turn	can	improve	the	financial	performance	of	the	Nepali	banks.	The	formulation	and	implementation	 of	 laws,	 regulations	 and	 policies	 by	 the	 government	 and	central	 bank	 will	 enhance	 financial	 capability,	 reduce	 banking	 failures	 and	build	trust	amongst	depositors	to	help	and	develop	more	sustainable	sources	of	financing.		
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1. Chapter	One	
1.1 	Introduction	
This	 thesis	 investigates	 the	 impact	of	 corporate	 governance	 on	 commercial	banks'	performance	 in	Nepal.	 Specifically,	 the	research	question	pursued	 in	this	study	is:	Does	corporate	governance	drive	performance	in	Nepalese	banks?	This	question	is	important	because	it	examines	the	most	contemporary	issues	in	corporate	governance	from	a	Nepalese	context,	but	has	wider	implications	beyond	 this	 one	 country.	 The	 research	 is	 empirical	 and	 sophisticated	statistical	 techniques	 that	 are	 suitable	 to	 the	data	are	used,	 and	 robustness	checks	are	undertaken	to	ensure	the	veracity	of	findings.	
The	 research	 provides	 insights	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 corporate	governance	and	the	banking	sector.	In	all	economic	systems,	banks	have	the	leading	role	in	planning	and	implementing	financial	policy.	The	difference	lies	with	 prioritizing	 goals	 and	 their	 methods	 of	 achievement.	 Corporate	governance	research	has	been	receiving	attention	from	academics	and	policy	makers	ever	since	the	Enron	and	Worldcom	scandals.		On	the	other	hand,	the	financial	crisis	of	2008,	and	the	way	the	governments	chose	to	save	the	banks	by	 laying	 the	burden	on	 taxpayer	 shoulders,	 triggered	a	 cycle	of	discussion	over	many	crucial	issues.	Corporate	governance	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	most	 critical	 factors	 influencing	 firm	 performance.	 Therefore	 the	 present	study	 deems	 corporate	 governance	 in	 the	 banking	 sector	 is	 particularly	important	given	the	important	role	the	banking	sector	plays	in	the	economic	system	 of	 a	 country	 and	 in	 particular	 from	 Nepalese	 context.	 Thus,	 the	
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corporate	 governance	 arrangements	 of	 banks	 are	 very	 important	 for	 the	business	of	the	banks	and	their	business	customers.	
Hence,	 this	 study	 is	 motivated	 by	 an	 ever-increasing	 literature	 concerning	corporate	governance	and	performance	and	a	hope	this	might	contribute	to	the	improved	well-being	of	people	in	the	low-income	country	of	Nepal.		
1.2 Motivation	for	study		
The	banking	industry	plays	a	critical	role	in	the	efficient	allocation	of	capital	in	an	economy.	It	also	promotes	monetary	and	financial	stability	in	the	economy	as	 a	 whole.	 The	 potential	 to	 improve	 corporate	 governance	 in	 Nepal	 is	 a	primary	motivational	driver	for	this	study.	Being	a	developing	country,	most	of	 the	 opportunities	 prevailing	 in	Nepal	 are	 yet	 to	 be	 capitalised.	 A	 lack	 of	capital	is	a	major	inhibitor	to	development,	and	enhanced	governance	will	be	a	major	fillip	in	promoting	investor	confidence,	leading	to	a	deeper	and	more	efficient	 capital	 market.	 There	 are	 many	 untapped	 opportunities	 in	 the	country,	 and	 a	 well-developed	 capital	 market	 will	 attract	 many	 local	 and	foreign	investors.	This	will	help	to	solve	the	current	problem	of	unemployment,	reduce	 the	 deficit	 balance	 of	 payment	 and	 brain	 drain,	 and	 contribute	 to	fostering	 financial	 stability,	 strengthening	 risk	 management	 and	 ultimately	contributing	to	a	strong	financial	system.	
Very	little	research	has	been	conducted	into	Nepalese	corporate	governance	and	 firm	 performance.	 On	 the	 completion	 of	 this	 study,	 I	 will	 have	 good	insights	into	the	corporate	governance	practices	that	may	best	benefit	Nepal.	
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Also,	after	the	completion	of	this	research	on	corporate	governance,	I	will	have	proper	insight	into	the	best	corporate	governance	practices	prevailing	in	New	Zealand	 and	 globally.	 This	 will	 help	 to	 inform	 the	 formulation	 of	 good	governance	practices	with	business	organisations	and	with	the	government	of	not	 only	 Nepal,	 but	 also	 similar	 developing	 countries.	 The	 research	 skills	developed	during	this	period	will	help	me	to	conduct	independent	research	for	various	 organisations	 such	 as	 World	 Bank,	 and	 Asian	 Development	 Bank	(ADB).		
Corporate	governance	is	about	monitoring	and	controlling	the	activities	of	the	managers	and	owners	of	a	company	to	ensure	transparency,	accountability,	protection	of	the	minority	of	shareholders,	and	mitigating	conflicting	interest	between	managers	and	owners,	also	known	as	agency	cost	(Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	1976).	Cadbury	(1992)	defines	corporate	governance	as	the	system	by	which	companies	are	directed	and	controlled.	Becht,	Bolton,	and	Roell	 (2003)	define	corporate	governance	by	dividing	 it	 into	two	major	categories:	 the	 first	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 behavioural	 patterns,	 such	 as	 capital	markets,	legal	rules	and	regulations,	and	boards	of	directors;	and	the	second	on	the	basis	of	a	normative	framework	which	includes	manager	expertise	and	a	large	number	of	outside	shareholders.	
An	important	question	is	whether	improved	corporate	governance	will	lead	to	an	 improved	 financial	 performance	 in	 firms.	 Prior	 empirical	 research	 has	reported	 conclusive	 evidence	 (Ahrens,	 Filatotchev,	 &	 Thomsen,	 2011).	Additionally,	 the	 relationship	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 a	 firm’s	
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performance	 is	 mainly	 affected	 by	 the	 institutional	 differences	 among	countries	(Aguilera,	Filatotchev,	Gospel,	&	Jackson,	2008).	Further,	there	is	a	lack	of	perfect	estimation	of	methods	(Bhagat	&	Bolton,	2008).	Due	to	these	issues,	 this	 research	 studies	 the	 role	 of	 corporate	 governance	 in	 the	performance	of	financial	institutions	in	Nepal.	
1.3 Research	question	and	Hypothesis		
The	main	research	question	set	out	to	this	study	is:	
Does	corporate	governance	drive	performance	in	the	Nepali	banks?	
Based	on	the	research	questions,	the	background	of	the	study	in	Chapter	Two	and	the	review	of	literature	presented	in	Chapter	Three,	the	study	proposes	to	test	the	following	research	hypotheses:	
H1. :	There	is	no	relationship	between	board	size	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		H2. There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	the	existence	of	CFO	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		H3. There	is	a	negative	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	minority	directors	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		H4. There	 is	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 the	 percentage	 of	 outside	directors	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		H5. There	is	no	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	female	directors	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		
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1.4 Significance	of	the	study	
This	 research	 examines	 the	 nature	 of	 corporate	 governance	 practice	 and	financial	performance	of	financial	institutions	in	Nepal,	considering	potential	changes	 to	 introduce	 improvement.	The	work	 is	 significant	as	 it	 is	 the	 first	empirical	 investigation	of	 the	 link	between	governance	and	performance	of	banks	 in	 Nepal.	 	 	 There	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 studies	 of	governance	and	banking	in	recent	years.		The	failure	of	several	banks	during	and	after	 the	global	 financial	 crisis	has	acted	 as	an	 impetus	 for	accelerated	research	 in	 the	 area.	 	 	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 there	 were	 80	 bank	 collapses	between	2007	and	2009	(Hoque,	Islam,	&	Ahmed,	2013).		Similarly,	CEO	frauds,	a	 high	 rate	 of	 loan	 default,	 bank	 insolvency	 and	 bank	 failures	 increased	concerns	 of	 governments	 and	 central	 banks,	 with	 the	 latter	 moving	 to	promulgate	Basel	3	and	 increase	regulation	 in	their	respective	countries.	 In	the	 context	 of	 Nepal,	 one	 development	 bank	 of	 Nepal	 was	 liquidated,	 the	central	bank	took	over	the	management	of	two	commercial	banks,	and	issued	warnings	to	more	than	two	development	banks	within	this	decade.	The	causes	for	these	difficulties	stem	from	the	vested	financial	interests	of	the	promoters	and	the	directors	of	the	banks	(Kumar	&	Upadyaya,	2011).		
Financial	 institutions	 can	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 promoting	 	 growth	 and	efficient	capital	allocation	(Paganetto,	Phelps,	&	Pagnetto,	2003).	 	Corporate	governance	of	banks	may	be	considered	to	be	more	important	when	compared	to	other	industries	because	the	banking	industry	plays	a	pivotal	intermediary	role	in	finance.		Not	surprisingly,	banks	are	subject	to	extensive	regulation	and	
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oversight	but,	even	given	the	notional	strength	of	the	regulatory	environment,	low	performance	has	not	been	eradicated.		Poor	corporate	governance	of	the	banks	 can	 drive	 the	 market	 to	 lose	 confidence	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 bank	 to	properly	manage	its	assets	and	liabilities,	including	deposits,	which	could	in	turn	trigger	a	liquidity	crisis	which	might	lead	to	economic	crisis	in	a	country	and	 pose	 a	 systemic	 risk	 to	 the	 society	 at	 large	 (García-Marco	 &	 Robles-Fernández,	2008).	 	Furthermore,	the	economy	with	a	well-established	and	a	profitable	banking	sector	is	capable	of	withstanding	negative	economic	shocks	(Dietrich	&	Wanzenried,	 2011).	 Corporate	 governance	 reforms	 are	 of	 great	significance	for	developing	countries	like	Nepal	to	gain	a	sustainable	effort	to	attract	Foreign	Direct	Investment	and	Foreign	Portfolio	Management,	and	to	mobilize	 greater	 savings	 through	 the	 capital	 market	 (Maskay,	 2004).		Therefore,	the	regulators	in	underdeveloped	countries	like	Nepal	may	need	to	be	more	concerned	about	the	governance	and	financial	health	of	their	banks.		
Prior	 studies	 indicate	 that	 corporate	 governance	 mechanisms	 for	 banking	firms	 differ	 from	 those	 of	 non-financial	 corporations.	 The	 significant	difference	 is	 explained	 through	the	 regulatory	environment	where	 they	are	subject	 to	 various	 regulatory	 requirements	 (Hadi	 Zulkafli	 &	 Abdul	 Samad,	2007).	The	role	of	a	bank’s	board	of	directors	is	one	component	of	the	issue	and	the	oversight	of	the	central	bank	is	another	key	component.		Where	there	are	 government-owned	 banks	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 various	 government	ministry	suggestions/interference,	the	picture	is	more	murky.		The	monitoring	and	oversight	of	the	regulators	and	the	compliance	of	banks	with	regulatory	requirements	provides	an	alternative	governance	mechanism	which	is	absent	
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in	 the	 non-financial	 industries	 (Fahy,	Weiner,	 &	 Roche,	 2005).	 Apart	 from	monitoring,	central	banks	intervene	in	the	management	of	banks	in	terms	of	number	of	members	on	the	board	of	directors,	CEO	qualifications,	numbers	of	minority	directors	and	their	responsibilities.		
There	 is	 also	 the	 possibility	 of	 moral	 hazard	 in	 bank	 operations,	 through	expropriation	of	bank	 resources	 in	 the	 form	of	 transfer	pricing,	 theft,	 asset	stripping,	and	credit	allocation,	which	can	enhance	bank	insiders	but	hurt	the	bank.	 	Furthermore,	banks	are	exposed	to	information	asymmetry	problems	that	 require	 a	 higher	 disclosure	 of	 information	 to	 their	 shareholders	 and	creditors	(depositors)	(Hadi	Zulkafli	&	Abdul	Samad,	2007).	 	Therefore,	 the	regulators	 in	 an	 underdeveloped	 country	 such	 as	 Nepal	 have	 to	 be	 more	concerned	about	the	governance	and	financial	health	of	the	banks	than	those	in	developed	markets.		
There	 has	 been	 very	 limited	 research	 on	 the	 relationships	 between	 bank	governance	and	bank	performance,	particularly	in	developing	countries	such	as	Nepal,	an	emerging	South	Asian	country,	where	the	regulatory,	 legal	and	institutional	environment	differs	from	those	of	developed	economies.		
1.5 Structure	of	the	thesis	
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 structured	 in	 chapters:	 Chapter	 Two:	Background	of	the	study;	Chapter	Three:	Corporate	governance	mechanism;	Chapter	 Four:	 Literature	 review;	 Chapter	 Five	 :	 Hypotheses	 and	 empirical	model	 development;	 Chapter	 Six:	 Data	 collection	 and	 research	 method;	
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Chapter	 Seven:	 Corporate	 governance	 and	 bank	 performance	 in	 Nepal:	 An	empirical	investigation;	and	Chapter	eight	:	Summary	and	conclusion.		
1.5.1 Chapter	Two:	Background	of	the	study		
Chapter	 Two	 presents	 an	 overview	 of	 Nepal,	 including	 its	 background,	geography,	history,	political	system	and	economic	system.	It	also	provides	a	brief	history	and	introduction	to	the	Nepali	financial	system,	its	growth,	use	of	technology,	political	interference	in	the	banking	sector,	followed	by	corporate	governance	 in	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 finishing	 with	 the	 corporate	 social	responsibility	of	the	banking	sector.		
1.5.2 Chapter	Three:	Corporate	Governance	Mechanism	
Chapter	Three	provides	an	overview	of	 the	 internal	 and	external	 corporate	governance	mechanism.		It	also	provides	a	brief	overview	and	development	of	corporate	governance	practices	in	Nepal	including	its	supervisory	framework,	the	various	acts	and	directives	of	central	banks	and	the	legal	framework	for	dealing	with	problems	in	banks	and	financial	institutions.	
1.5.3 Chapter	Four:	Literature	Review		
Chapter	Four	explores	 the	 literature	 in	 relation	 to	the	 theories,	models	and	research	articles	on	various	aspects	of	corporate	governance.	 In	doing	so,	 it	brings	relevant	literature	in	the	context	of	this	study	to	formulate	a	concept	and	an	effective	methodology,	draw	conclusions	and	provide	effective	policy	advice.	The	ultimate	objective	of	this	review	is	to	identify	the	potential	for	this	
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study	 and	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 corporate	 governance	practices	in	Nepal.			
1.5.4 Chapter	Five:	Hypotheses	and	Empirical	Model	Development	
Chapter	Five	examines	the	relationship	between	governance	and	performance	of	 banks	 in	 Nepal	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Three.	 	 Several	 hypotheses	consistent	with	an	underlying	agency	theory	of	governance	are	proposed	and	empirically	tested.		
1.5.5 Chapter	Six:	Data	Collection	and	Research	Method	
Chapter	 Six	 covers	 the	 data	 collection	 process,	 the	 empirical	 model	 and	research	 techniques	 used	 to	 investigate	 the	 research	 question.	 Various	methods,	used	in	prior	research,	have	been	considered	as	potentially	suitable	for	this	analysis	in	the	Nepali	context.	A	panel	data-based	regression	approach	is	used	to	identify	associations	between	governance	and	bank	performance.	
1.5.6 Chapter	 Seven:	 Corporate	 governance	 and	bank	performance	 in	
Nepal:	An	empirical	investigation	
This	chapter	presents	 the	data	analysis	 techniques,	reports	 the	relationship	between	the	corporate	governance	variables	and	bank	performance	variables	by	using	panel	data	techniques.	Then	it	discusses	the	regression	model	used	in	the	study	and	its	findings.		
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1.5.7 Chapter	Eight:	Summary	and	Conclusion	
This	chapter	provides	a	summary	of	empirical	findings,	reported	in	Chapter	eight	regarding	the	corporate	governance	practices	and	banks	performance	in	Nepal.	 	 The	 findings	 are	 based	 on	 the	 various	 theoretical	 perspectives	 and	empirical	studies	of	the	relationship	between	governance	practices	and	bank	performance	 in	both	developing	and	developed	countries.	Additionally,	 this	chapter	 discusses	 the	 relationship	 between	 governance	 practices	 and	 bank	performance	in	Nepal	and	its	policy	implications.	Finally,	the	limitations	of	the	study	and	recommendations	for	future	research	are	summarised.	
1.6 Conclusion	
This	chapter	covered	the	background	of	the	study,	its	objectives,	significance	and	the	motivation	for	it.	Having	presented	the	structure	of	the	thesis,	the	next	chapter	will	provide	the	background	of	the	study	from	a	Nepalese	perspective.	
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2 Chapter	Two	
2.1 Introduction	
This	chapter	presents	an	overview	of	Nepal;	 its	geography,	history,	political	and	economic	systems.	It	also	provides	a	brief	history	and	introduction	of	the	Nepali	financial	system,	its	growth,	use	of	technology,	political	interference	in	the	banking	sector,	 followed	by	corporate	governance	 in	 the	banking	sector	and	finally	the	corporate	social	responsibility	of	the	banking	sector.		
2.2 Nepal:	Background	
The	geography,	the	history	and	people	of	Nepal	create	a	unique	environment	which	 impacts	 on	 banking	 and	 many	 other	 aspects	 of	 commercial	 life.	Understanding	 the	 background,	 current	 political	 situation,	 economic	conditions,	banking	history	and	prevailing	social	responsibility	practices	will	provide	a	clear	picture	of	the	country.	It	is	useful	to	know	exactly	which	stage	it	is	currently	in	and	how	the	political	process	is	being	developed.	This	chapter	will	 help	 to	 provide	 an	 understanding	 of	 Nepal	 and	 analyse	 the	 scenario	accordingly.	
Nepal	 is	a	relatively	small	and	sparsely	populated	country	 in	South	Asia,	as	shown	in	Figure	2.1.		The	Himalayas	run	the	length	of	the	country	adding	to	its	remoteness	 and	 presenting	 challenges	 for	 government,	 commerce	 and	connectedness	 to	 embrace	 a	 sustainable	 future	 of	 growth	 and	 greater	prosperity.	 	 An	 appreciation	 of	 aspects	 of	 Nepal’s	 geography,	 legal,	 social,	
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ethnic	and	religious	background	is	an	important	precursor	to	considering	the	governance	of	financial	institutions	of	Nepal.		
	
Figure	2-1:	Map	of	Nepal	
Source:	Worldatlas,	2017.	Retrieved	from	http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/np.htm	Reprinted	with	permission	
	Nepal,	 officially	 the	 Federal	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Nepal,	 is	 a	 landlocked	multi-religious,	multi-ethnic,	multilingual	 country	 in	 South	 Asia.	 It	 is	 small,	especially	 when	 compared	 to	 its	 southern	 neighbour	 India,	 and	 northern	eastern	border	neighbour	the	People's	Republic	of	China.	It	occupies	only	0.03	per	cent	of	total	global	land	area,	and	0.3	per	cent	of	Asia.	It	has	a	land	area	of	147,181	square	kilometres	(56,827	sq	mi)	and	a	population	of	approximately	27	million	(Central	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2012).	Kathmandu	is	the	capital	city	and	the	country's	largest	metropolitan	city.			
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Nepal	is	rich	in	culture,	religion	and	natural	beauty,	presenting	diversity	in	its	religion,	 architecture,	 craft,	 language,	 literature,	music,	 dance,	 festivals	 and	foods	(Dhakal,	2000).	There	are	various	temples,	monasteries,	churches	and	religious	buildings	in	several	places	of	Nepal.	There	are	four	castes	and	thirty-six	different	ethnic	groups	with	multiple	languages	and	religions.	The	religion	in	 Nepal	 is	 a	 system	 of	 social	 coherence	 based	 on	 certain	 rituals	 and	 the	binding	 force	that	 ties	all	people	together.	The	main	religions	are	Hinduism	(81.3%),	Buddhism	(9.0%),	 Islam	(4.4%),	Kirat	 (3.1%),	Christianity	 (1.4%),	and	 others	 (0.76%).	 Although	 the	 majority	 of	 people	 in	 Nepal	 are	 Hindu,	respect	is	given	to	all	other	religions	(Central	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2012).	
2.2.1 Nepal:	Geography	
Nepal	 is	 topographically	 divided	 into	 three	 geographical	 regions:	 The	Himalayas	 to	 the	 north,	 the	 middle	 hills,	 and	 the	 Terai	 to	 the	 south.	 The	Himalaya	 (mountain)	 region	 is	 situated	 4,000	 metres	 above	 sea	 level.	 It	includes	the	highest	peak	in	the	world,	Mount	Everest,	and	another	seven	of	the	world’s	 ten	 highest	 peaks.	 This	 region	 is	 popular	 for	 the	 habitat	 of	 the	mythical	creatures	such	as	Yeti	or	abominable	snowman.	 It	occupies	16	per	cent	of	total	area	of	Nepal,	but	only	6.75	per	cent	of	the	population	live	there.		
The	hilly	region	 is	 situated	 south	of	 the	mountain	 region,	 and	 it	 lies	mostly	between	1,000	to	4,000	metres	above	sea	level.	This	region	includes	the	major	range	 of	 hills	 of	 Nepal:	 Mahabharat	 Lekh,	 Churia	 Range	 and	 several	intermountain	valleys.		This	region	also	has	various	lakes	and	beautiful	valleys.	The	climatic	condition	of	this	region	is	magnificent	when	compared	with	other	
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regions.	This	region	includes	the	capital	city	Kathmandu,	covers	67	per	cent	of	total	land	area	and	has	about	43	per	cent	of	Nepal’s	entire	population.		
In	topographical	contrast	with	mountain	and	hill	regions,	the	Terai	region	is	the	 lowland	tropical	region	of	Nepal	 that	 lies	between	70	and	1,000	metres	above	sea	level.	This	region	lies	on	the	Nepal-India	border	and	hilly	region.	The	Terai	 region	has	 several	 valleys	 including	Rapti	Valley	 (Chitwan)	 in	 central	Nepal,	and	Surkhet	and	Dang	Valleys	in	western	Nepal.	It	is	the	most	fertile	and	most	productive	region	of	Nepal	in	terms	of	agricultural	products.	Although	this	region	covers	only	17	per	cent	of	the	total	land	area,	it	has	more	than	50	per	cent	of	the	total	population.		
The	 altitude	 variation	 and	 its	 unique	 geographical	 position	 have	 enriched	Nepal	with	 huge	 biodiversity.	 Probably,	 it	 is	 the	 only	 country	 in	 the	world	where	it	is	possible	to	travel	from	70	metres	above	sea	level	to	the	peak	of	the	world,	 and	 with	 temperatures	 varying	 from	 +400	 to	 -400	 Celsius	 within	 a	period	of	only	two	weeks.		
The	 country	 is	divided	 into	 five	administrative	development	 zones:	Eastern	Development	 Region,	 Central	 Development	 Region,	 Western	 Development	Region,	 Mid-Western	 Development	 Region	 and	 Far-Western	 Development	Region.	 The	 country	 is	 further	 divided	 into	 75	 administrative	 districts	 and	districts	 are	 sub-divided	 into	 smaller	 units,	 called	 Village	 Development	Committees	(VDCs	–	total	3915)	and	Municipalities	(58).	The	VDCs	are	rural	areas,	 and	 municipalities	 are	 urban	 areas	 of	 the	 country.	 According	 to	 the	National	Population	Census	2011,	the	annual	growth	rate	of	the	population	is	
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1.35	per	cent,	and	the	total	population	of	the	country	in	2011	reached	about	26.5	million	with	a	sex	ratio	1.04	male(s)/	female.	About	one	quarter	of	the	population	(25.16	per	cent)	lives	below	the	poverty	line	according	to	the	Nepal	Living	Standards	Survey	2010/11,	and	the	Gini-Coefficient,	which	indicates	an	inequality	in	income	distribution,	is	0.328	(Central	Bureau	of	Statistics,	2012).	
Nepal	occupying	only	0.03	per	cent	of	the	Earth	is	home	to:	
• 2	per	cent	of	all	the	flowering	plant	species	in	the	world;	
• 8	per	cent	of	the	world's	population	of	birds	(more	than	848	species);	
• 4	per	cent	of	the	mammal	species	on	earth;	
• 11	of	the	world's	15	families	of	butterflies	(more	than	500	species);	
• 600	indigenous	plant	families;	and		
• 319	species	of	exotic	orchids.		(Caltech.edu,	2017)	
2.2.2 Nepal:	History	
Nepal's	 recorded	 history	 begins	 in	 the	 seventh	 century	 BCE	 (before	 the	Common	 Era)	 centred	 in	 the	Kathmandu	 Valley.	 The	 first	 settlers	 in	 Nepal	seem	 to	 have	 been	 the	 people	 from	 the	 north.	 The	 legend	 of	 Manjushree	coming	 from	 China,	 draining	 away	 of	 the	 Kathmandu	 Valley	 Lake	 and	 the	subsequent	 rehabilitation	 of	 people	 provides	 some	 clues	 to	 the	 earliest	settlement	by	the	people	from	the	north.	At	the	similar	time,	the	ethnic	groups	of	 the	 Indian	 origin	 fleeing	 from	 the	 powerful	 enemies	 and	 political	persecution	entered	Nepal	and	stayed	(Kansakar,	1973).	However,	the	origin	of	the	native	peoples	of	the	hilly	region	such	as	Gurungs,	Newars,	Magars,	Rais,	
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Limbus,	Jirels	and	Chepangs	remains	unclear.	The	Sherpas,	the	Bhotiyas,	the	Thakalis,	the	Manangbas	and	the	Lepchas	seem	to	have	migrated	from	Tibet	(Hagen,	1961).			
The	 Lichhavis,	 who	 were	 ruling	 over	 Baisali	 (modern	 Muzaffarpur),	 after	suffering	defeat	by	the	Raj	Griha	seem	to	have	migrated	into	Nepal	around	250	Central	Era	(CE)	(Shrestha	&	Singh,	1972).	They	overthrew	the	Kirat	Kings.	In	the	 sixth	 century	 BCE,	 Siddhartha	 Gautama	 was	 born	 in	 Kapilavastu,	near	Lumbini,	and	he	later	became	known	as	Buddha.		The	Buddhist		religion	grew	up	and	became	the	dominant	religion	of	Nepal	and	was	followed	by	the	Rai	and	Limbus	of	Kiratis	(Gefont,	2008).	During	the	Kiratis'	rule,	Nepal	not	only	 developed	 its	 relationship	 with	 India,	 China	 and	 Tibet	 but	 also	 made	Nepal	a	trading	route	for	commerce	between	India	and	China.		
The	Malla	rule	started	in	Nepal	in	the	twelfth	century	with	Ari	Malla,	and	they	ruled	 the	 country	 for	 centuries	 crumbling	 the	country	 into	 small	 territories	which	 were	 later	 known	 as	 Baisi	 (which	 means	 22	 principalities)	 and	 the	Chaubisi	(which	means	24	principalities)	Rajya.	In	1743	CE,	Prithvi	Narayan	Shah	(the	ninth	generation	descendant	of	Dravya	Shah	who	was	the	founder	of	ruling	house	of	Gorkha)	succeeded	to	the	throne	of	Gorkha;	he	started	to	unify	the	63	small	principalities	including	three	Kathmandu	Valley	kingdoms,	the	Baisi	 and	Chaubisi	principalities	which	ultimately	gave	birth	 to	modern	Nepal.	 In	 1769,	 Prithvi	 Narayan	 Shah,	 who	 had	 united	 all	 the	 small	 states	within	Nepal	into	one	country,	declared	Kathmandu	as	the	capital	of	modern	Nepal	(Gefont,	2008).	
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The	War	with	British	–	During	1814,	when	the	country	was	ruled	by	King	Girvana	Yuddha	Biktram	Shah	and	Bhimsmen	Thapa	was	the	Prime	Minister,	the	British	 attacked	 the	Nepali	 forces	 at	Nalapani,	 the	westernmost	part	 of	Nepal.	 Although	 the	 British	 had	 superior	 weapons,	 the	 Nepalese	 wreaked	heavy	losses	on	the	British	army	and	evacuated	the	areas	west	of	the	Mahakali	River	which	was	captured	by	British.	The	war	continued	for	two	years	and	in	1816	the	Sugauli	Treaty	was	signed	with	Britain.	Nepal	faced	loss	in	this	treaty	as	a	large	chunk	of	Terai	land	was	taken	by	the	British	and	the	rivers	Mahakali	and	Mechi	were	fixed	as	the	country's	western	and	eastern	boundaries.	Having	seen	the	brave	fighting	of	the	Nepali	(Gorkha	army)	during	this	war,	Britain	and	other	 countries’	 armies	 later	started	 to	 recruit	Nepali	 soldiers	 for	 their	armed	forces.		
During	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	there	was	a	famous	conspiracy	called	“Kot	Massacre”	where	the	high	powered	Shah	Queen	was	assassinated	and	which	resulted	 in	 instability	in	 the	country.	 	At	 that	time,	 Jung	Bahadur	Rana,	 a	 key	 plotter	 of	 the	massacre,	 seized	 control	of	 the	 country	with	 the	strong	backing	of	 the	British	Empire.	Rana	declared	himself	prime	minister	and	began	the	Rana-rule	by	making	the	Shah	King	a	nominal	figurehead.	He	also	declared	the	prime	minister	 to	be	a	hereditary	title.	After	104	years	of	autocratic	 rule,	 the	Rana	Oligarchy	was	 ended	 at	 1950	 through	 a	 first-ever	popular	movement.	However,	the	political	power	was	again	snatched	by	Shah	King.	 King	Tribhuvan	 became	 the	 first	 constitutional	monarch	 in	 twentieth	century	Nepal.	King	Mahendra	succeeded	his	father	and	was	crowned	in	1955.	Due	 to	 his	 ambitious	 intentions	 for	 political	 power,	 the	 newly	 introduced	
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multi-party	 system	 did	 not	 last	 a	 decade.	 King	 Mahendra	 dismissed	 the	government	and	suspended	the	parliamentary	system.	He	declared	the	new	constitution	 in	1962	which	banned	political	parties	and	mass	organisations,	including	trade	unions,	and	he	enforced	the	one-party	autocratic	rule	known	as	the	Panchayat	system.	This	system	ended	in	1990	by	popular	movement;	at	that	 time	 his	 son,	 Birendra,	 had	 been	 on	 the	 throne	 since	 1972	 (Federal	Research	Division,	2005).		
In	 1990,	 a	 new	 constitution	 was	 set	 up	 and	 the	 multi-party	 system	 was	implemented.	The	first	democratic	election	was	held,	the	Nepali	Congress	won,	and	Girija	Prasad	Koirala	became	the	democratically	elected	prime	minister.	On	1	June	2001,	again	another	massacre	took	place	where	King	Birendra	along	with	his	entire	family	and	some	relatives	were	killed.	After	that	the	brother	of	Birendra,	 Gyanedra	 Shaha	 became	 the	 new	 King	 of	 Nepal.	 Like	 his	 father	Mahendra,	Gyanendra	dissolved	the	parliament	and	captured	all	power	and	introduced	absolute	monarchy	in	February	2005.			
In	 September	 2005,	 Maoist	 insurgents	 declared	 an	 autonomous	 cease-fire,	which	 ended	 in	 January	 2006	 with	 a	 peace	 accord.	 Then	 in	 April,	 big	democracy	protests	organised	by	seven	opposition	party	Maoists	took	place	which	resulted	in	reinstating	the	parliament.	On	28	May	2008,	the	parliament	declared	Nepal	as	a	federal	democratic	republic,	making	Gyanendra	Shah	the	last	king	of	the	Shah	Dynasty	as	well	as	of	Nepal	(Infoplease,	2014).		
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2.2.3 Nepal:	Political	System	
As	with	other	countries,	Nepal	has	gone	through	rapid	political	changes	in	its	history.	The	monarchy	system	was	prevailing	in	the	country	until	1990,	where	the	King	used	to	hold	the	executive	power	of	the	nation.	However,	due	to	the	great	Communist	movement	against	the	King,	in	1990	the	political	system	was	changed	to	a	parliamentary	monarchy	where	King	Birendra	was	the	head	of	state	and	the	democratic	prime	minister	was	the	head	of	government.	There	have	 been	 23	 governments	 since	 the	 introduction	 of	 democracy	 in	 1990	because	no	government	was	able	to	survive	for	more	than	two	years	due	to	either	internal	collapse	or	parliamentary	dissolution.	On	April	2006,	there	was	a	change	in	the	nation’s	governance:	an	interim	constitution	was	promulgated	with	 the	 King	 giving	 up	 the	 power,	 and	 an	 interim	 constitution	 and	government	were	formed	along	with	the	Maoists.		
On	 April	 10,	 2008,	 the	 first	 election	 was	 conducted	 for	 a	 constitutional	assembly.	Although	 the	Maoist	party	 led	 the	election,	 they	 could	not	gain	a	parliamentary	majority.	As	a	result,	a	coalition	government	was	 formed.	On	December	 10,	 2007,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	Maoists,	 a	 Bill	was	 passed	through	 the	 interim	 parliament	 to	make	 Nepal	 a	 federal	 republic	 with	 the	prime	minister	 being	 the	 head	 of	 state.	 Then	 again	 on	 28	 May	 2008,	 they	declared	Nepal	to	be	a	republic	by	eliminating	239	years	of	the	royal	monarchy	system	and	Girija	Prasda	Koirala	became	the	Prime	Minister	of	Nepal.		
On	July	19,	2008,	voting	for	first	president	and	vice-president	took	place	in	the	constitution	assembly,	 and	Parmanand	 Jha	was	nominated	as	 the	 first	 vice-
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president	 of	 Nepal.	 However,	 being	 unable	 to	 get	 the	 minimum	 298	 votes	needed	to	be	elected	by	the	two	presidential	frontrunners;	Ram	Baran	Yadav	(Congress	Party)	and	Ram	Raja	Prasad	Sing	(Maoist	Party),	another	election	was	 held	 on	 21	 July	 2008.	 During	 that	 election,	 Dr	 Ram	 Baran	 Yadav	 was	elected	as	the	first	president	of	Nepal	by	getting	308	out	of	590	votes.		
Similarly,	on	August	15,	2008,	Pushpa	Kamal	Dahal	(Prachanda	of	Maoist)	was	elected	 as	 the	 first	 Republic	 Prime	 Minister	 of	 Nepal.	 Then	 under	 his	leadership,	the	first	constitutional	assembly	election	was	conducted.	However,	due	to	various	issues	and	conflicts	continuing	within	and	among	the	parties,	there	were	four	changes	of	prime	minister,	and	they	were	unable	to	draft	the	constitution	 by	 the	 deadline	 of	 May	 27,	 2012.	 	 For	 the	 second	 time,	 the	constitutional	assembly	election	was	conducted,	on	November	19,	2013,	and	the	Nepali	Congress	became	the	majority	party	 followed	by	Communist	and	Maoist	parties,	and	Sushil	Koriala	became	the	Prime	Minister	of	Nepal.	In	the	constitutional	 assembly,	 there	 are	 601	 independent	 members	 who	 are	responsible	 for	drafting	 the	new	constitution	 for	 the	 country,	 and	 they	also	serve	as	the	parliament	of	the	country.		
The	political	instability	present	since	1990	is	likely	to	have	contributed	to	the	World	 Bank	 Governance	 Indicators,	 which	 rank	 Nepal	 below	 the	 fortieth	percentile	in	every	category:	voice	and	accountability	(33.5),	political	stability	and	 the	 absence	 of	 violence	 (16.2);	 governmental	 effectiveness	 (13.5);	regulatory	quality	(25.0);	rule	of	law	(26.9);	and	control	of	corruption	(35.6)	(World	Bank,	2016b).	
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2.2.4 Nepal:	Economy		
Nepal	 is	 one	 of	 the	 least	 developed	 nations	 of	 the	world	with	 a	 per	 capita	income	of	US$743.32	per	annum	and	a	GDP	of	US$	21.195	Billion	(World	Bank,	February,	 2015a).	 It	 ranks	 144	 out	 of	 187	 countries	 in	 the	 Human	Development	 Index	ranking.	The	overall	 inflation	of	 the	country	was	10	per	cent	 during	 the	 FY16	 (Konema,	 2016).	 Foreign	 aid	 is	 vital	 to	 the	 economy.	Agriculture	is	the	backbone	of	the	Nepalese	economy;		it	provides	employment	for	65.7	per	cent	of	the	population	yet	it	contributes	only	33.1	per	cent	to	the	nation’s	 GDP	 (Ministry	 of	 Agricultural	 Development,	 2015).	 There	 are	 37	public	enterprises	operating	in	Nepal;	among	them,	14	are	operating	at	net	loss	(Ministry	of	Finance,	2016).	Out	of	the	total	land	area,	25	per	cent	is	cultivable,	33	per	cent	is	forest,	and	the	remainder	is	terrain	region.	The	staple	foods	in	Nepal	are	rice	and	wheat,	and	most	of	it	grown	in	the	Terai	region.	With	the	major	 dependence	 on	 agriculture,	 the	 economic	 growth	 of	 the	 country	 is	influenced	by	annual	monsoon	rain.		
	
	
Figure	2-2:	Contribution	to	GDP	from	various	sectors	-	2003	-	2017	Source:	(World	Bank,	2017,	p. 	13)	
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Figure	2.2	shows	the	contributions	to	GDP	from	various	sources.	The	major	industries	of	Nepal	are	the	processing	of	agricultural	products,	including	jute,	pulses,	sugarcane,	grain,	tobacco,	and	small	industries	like	handicrafts,	carpet	textile	 and	 cigarettes.	 Nepal	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 trade	with	 India.	 The	major	products	exported	 from	Nepal	 are	 textiles,	 ferrous	metals,	 chemicals,	rubber,	 plastic,	 crops,	 beverages,	 tobacco	 products,	 vegetables,	 fruits,	 nuts,	food	products,	minerals,	tea,	coffee,	and	leather	products.	The	major	products	that	are	imported	into	Nepal	are	petroleum	(its	import	was	over	Rs.	100	billion	during	the	last	fiscal	year),	electronic	goods,	coal	products,	chemicals,	rubber,	plastics,	ferrous	metals,	machinery	and	equipment,	mineral	products,	textiles,	transport	equipment,	food	products,	motor	vehicles	and	parts,	and	metals.	The	total	trade	deficit	of	Nepal	was	6,388.6	USD	million	(around	30	per	cent	of	GDP)	during	 the	 year	 2015/16.	 However,	 improvements	 in	 the	 service	 incomes,	grants	 and	 remittance	 inflows	 exceeding	 28.5	 per	 cent	 of	 GDP	 have	contributed	 to	 a	 surplus	 in	 the	 current	 account.	 The	 overall	 balance	 of	payments	has	registered	a	surplus	for	the	last	several	years	and	has	remained	at	USD1.779	billion	in	2015/16	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017b).	
Hydropower	is	the	main	source	of	electricity	in	Nepal,	and	it	has	huge	potential	for	development	with	an	estimate	of	40,000	MW	commercially	 feasible,	but	only	about	1.53	per	cent	of	 the	current	capacity	 is	used,	due	to	the	political	uncertainty,	 lack	 of	 proper	 policy	 for	 foreign	 investment	 and	 other	bureaucratic	 delays.	 Although	 Nepal	 is	 bestowed	 with	 remarkable	hydropower	 capacity,	 only	 40	 per	 cent	 of	Nepal's	 population	 has	 access	 to	electricity.	
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Nepal	 has	 a	 flourishing	 tourism	 industry.	 Tourism	 and	 remittances	 are	 the	major	sources	of	foreign	currency	in	Nepal.	The	contribution	of	remittances	to	GDP	is	25.5	per	cent.	(The	South	Asian	Association	for	Regional	Cooperation	2014).	The	strong	revenue	growth	and	subdued	capital	spending	have	led	to	a	budget	surplus	during	the	last	four	years.		This	has	led	to	a	steady	decline	in	public	debt	and	an	accumulation	of	large	cash	balances	in	the	central	banks.	External	public	debt	 stood	at	16.9	per	 cent	of	GDP	 (US$3.6	billion)	by	end-2015/16.	The	World	Bank	and	Asian	Development	Bank	(ADB)	accounts	for	87	per	cent	of	the	external	debt,	while	Japan	is	the	largest	bilateral	creditor	followed	 by	 South	 Korea,	 India	 and	 China.	 Similarly,	 domestic	 public	 debt	stood	at	10.4	per	cent	of	GDP	at	the	end	of	2015/16,	compared	to	9.3	per	cent	a	year	previously	(International	Monetary	Fund,	2017,	p.	2).	
In	recent	years,	lack	of	political	consensus,	delayed	national	budgets,	growing	population	and	deforestation	have	significantly	affected	the	country.		
2.3 Nepalese	Financial	System:	Background	
The	Nepalese	 financial	system	consists	of	banking	and	non-banking	sectors.	The	banking	sector	includes	the	central	bank,	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	(NRB),	and	commercial	banks.	The	non-banking	sector	consists	of	few	cooperatives	and	non-government	organisations	undertaking	limited	banking	activities	under	the	regulations	and	supervision	of	Nepal	Rastra	Bank.	 In	 the	same	way,	 the	financial	 system	 also	 comprises	 non-banking	 financial	 institutions	 such	 as	provident	 funds,	 for	example,	Employee	Provident	Fund	 (EFP)	and	pension	fund	 –	 Citizen	 Investment	 Trust	 (CIT)	 operating	 under	Ministry	 of	 Finance	
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regulations,	 the	 Nepal	 Stock	 Exchange	 Ltd	 (NEPSE)	 under	 the	 regulatory	jurisdiction	of	Security	Exchange	Board	of	Nepal	(SEBON),	cooperatives	under	the	 Department	 of	 Co-operatives,	 and	 insurance	 companies	 under	 the	regulatory	jurisdiction	of	the	Insurance	Board.			
2.3.1 Nepalese	Banking	System:	History	
The	formal	banking	history	of	Nepal	began	after	the	establishment	of	the	first	commercial	bank,	Nepal	Bank	Limited	(NBL),	in	1937	under	the	Nepal	Bank	Act	1937.	 	This	bank	was	established	on	a	public-private	partnership	model	with	 52	 per	 cent	 government	 and	 48	 per	 cent	 public	 ownership.	 Until	 the	establishment	of	Central	Bank	of	Nepal,	 the	 foreign	exchange	reserve	of	 the	country	was	held	in	India,	and	in	return,	Nepal	used	to	receive	Indian	currency	which	was	fully	convertible	in	Nepal.	Nepalese	people	had	more	confidence	in	Indian	currency	than	Nepal’s	own	currency.	(At	that	time,	Nepalese	currency	used	to	be	issued	by	the	Treasury	authority	named	Sadar	Muluki	Khana	and	the	notes	used	to	be	printed	by	the	Indian	Security	Press	in	Nashik	(Revolvy,	2017)).		
Formal	 laws	 to	 govern	 the	 financial	 institutions	 in	 Nepal	 began	 after	 the	enactment	 of	 the	Nepal	Bank	Kanoon	 (Law)	1936.	 Eighteen	 years	 after	 the	establishment	of	Nepal	Bank	Limited,	the	independent	authority	to	govern	the	bank	and	financial	institutions,	the	Central	Bank	of	Nepal,	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	(NRB)	came	into	existence	under	the	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	Act	1955.	Various	acts	were	developed	to	govern	the	financial	institutions	such	as	the	Banijya	Bank	Act	1963,	Rastriya	Banijya	Act	1964,	Commercial	Bank	Act	1974,	Bank	and	
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Financial	 Institutions	 Ordinance	 2004,	 which	 are	 renewed	 time	 and	 again	(Niroula,	2007).		
The	 history	 of	 financial	 institutions	 in	 Nepal	 can	 be	 studied	 under	 three	different	phases	by	different	milestones	(Maskay	&	Subedi,	2009).			
The	 first	 phase	 begins	 with	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	 formal	 domestic	 banking	system	in	Nepal	up	to	the	establishment	of	NRB.	The	establishment	of	Tejarath	Adda	in	1880	can	be	considered	the	starting	point	for	credit	mobilisation	in	Nepal.	However,	this	institution	neither	provided	credit	to	the	general	public	nor	collected	deposits	from	them.	The	government	provided	the	credit	facility	for	only	their	staff	and	landlords.	So,	during	that	period,	even	in	urban	areas,	money	lenders	were	involved.	It	was	only	after	the	establishment	of	NBL	that	the	formal	banking	system	was	established	in	Nepal.		
The	second	phase	begins	with	the	establishment	of	NRB	continuing	until	2002.	After	its	inception,	various	rules	and	regulations	were	developed	and	financial	liberalisation	 policy	 was	 formulated.	 Three	 joint	 venture	 banks	 were	established	during	this	period	–	Nepal	Arab	Bank	Limited	(later	named	Nabil	Bank	Ltd.)	in	1984;	Nepal	Indosuez	Bank	(later	named	Nepal	Investment	Bank)	in	1986;	and	Nepal	Grindlays	Bank	(now	Standard	Chartered	Bank	Nepal)	in	1987.	During	this	period,	major	policies	were	changed,	such	as	the	shift	from	controlled	 to	 deregulated	 framework	 of	 interest	 rates;	 emphasis	 on	 open	market	 operations	 as	 the	 main	 policy	 tool;	 direct	 to	 indirect	 methods	 of	monetary	 control;	 permitting	 a	 market-determined	 exchange	 rate	 of	 the	Nepalese	currency	against	convertible	currencies;	and	full	convertibility	of	the	
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Nepalese	 currency	 in	 the	 current	 account.	 At	 this	 period,	 three	 different	institutions	were	established	by	the	Government	of	Nepal.	The	first	was	Nepal	Industrial	 Development	 Corporation	 (NIDC	 in	 1959,	 with	 the	 objectives	 of	mobilising	 capital	 to	 the	 industrial	 sector	 and	 facilitating	 industrial	development	 in	 the	 private	 sector);	 the	 second	was	 Rastriya	 Banijya	 Bank	(RBB	 in	 1966	with	 the	 objective	 of	 providing	 banking	 services	 throughout	Nepal	and	contributing	to	 the	socio-economic	development	of	 the	country);	and	 the	 third	was	 Agriculture	 Development	Bank,	 Nepal	 (in	 1968	with	 the	objective	of	providing	banking	services	throughout	Nepal	and	contributing	to	the	 socio-economic	 development	 of	 the	 country).	 After	 the	 formulation	 of	three	different	acts	(Finance	Company	Act	(1985),	Company	Act	(1964)	and	Development	 Bank	 Act	 (1996)),	 nine	 development	 banks,	 51	 finance	companies,	 11	 micro-credit	 development	 banks,	 16	 savings	 and	 credit	cooperatives,	 and	 35	 non-government	 organizations	 (NGOs)	 for	 limited	banking	transactions	were	established.		
The	third	phase	begins	with	the	formulation	of	NRB	Act	2002	(later	amended	in	2006)	replacing	NRB	Act	1955.	This	act	provides	more	autonomy	for	central	banks	 to	 formulate	 various	 monetary	 and	 foreign	 exchange	 policies	 and	monitor,	 regulate	 and	 control	 the	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	of	Nepal.	Later,		the	Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act	(Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act),	 2006	 was	 established	 by	 classifying	 all	 the	 banks	 and	 financial	institutions	into	four	different	categories	on	the	basis	of	their	responsibilities.	The	 four	 categories	 are	 commercial	 banks	 (group	 A),	 development	 banks	(group	B),	finance	companies	(group	C)	and	microcredit	development	banks	
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(group	D).	However,	they	have	not	categorised	saving	and	credit	cooperatives	and	non-government	organisations	(NGOs)	even	though	they	perform	limited	banking	transactions	as	per	the	specific	directives	and	guidelines	provided	by	central	bank	NRB.		
In	 mid-January	 2017,	 there	 were	 169	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions:	 28	commercial	banks	under	Group	A;	57	development	banks	under	Group	B;	36		finance	 companies	 under	 Group	 C;	 and	 48	microcredit	 development	 banks	under	Group	D.		There	were	15	savings	and	credit	cooperatives	and	25	NGOs,	both	being	allowed	by	NRB	for	undertaking	limited	banking	transactions,	26	insurance	companies	(Insurance	Board	Nepal,	2016),	one	employee	provident	fund,	one	citizen	investment	trust	and	one	postal	saving	bank.	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017d).		
	 	
28		
Table	2-1:	Number	of	banks,	financial	and	other	institutions	in	mid-July	
2013	 Type	of	Financial	Institution	 Number			Commercial	Banks	(A)	 28	Development	Banks	(B)	 57	Finance	Companies		(C)	 36	Micro-Finance	Institutions	(D)	 48	
Sub-Total		 169	NRB	permitted	Cooperatives	(with	limited	banking	activities)		 10	NRB	permitted	NGOs	(with	limited	banking	activities)		 26	Insurance	Companies		 25	Employees	Provident	Fund		 1	Citizen	Investment	Trust		 1	Postal	Saving	Bank		 1	
Total		 233	Source:	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017d)	
Despite	 the	 number	 of	 financial	 institutions	 noted	 above,	 there	 are	 few	informal	sectors	that	conduct	the	financial	transactions	for	informal	groups,	such	as	Dhukuti	which	pools	 the	savings	of	 the	group	and	provides	a	credit	facility	to	its	members,	money	lenders	and	individuals.		
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Figure	2-3:	Total	number	of	branches	and	their	concentration	(2017)	Source:	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017d)	
Until	 mid-July	 2013,	 there	 were	 2492	 branches	 of	 bank	 and	 financial	institutions	 in	Nepal;	among	them	were	1486	group	A	 financial	 institutions,	784	 group	 B,	 and	 242	 group	 C.	 Among	 them,	 665	 branches	 (26.7%)	 were	operating	in	Kathmandu	valley,	779	in	the	hilly	and	mountain	region	(31.3%)	and	1048	(42.1%)	in	the	Terai	regions.	Due	to	this,	more	than	60	per	cent	of	total	deposits	and	44	per	cent	of	total	loans	are	disbursed	in	the	Kathmandu	Valley	only.	The	private	sector	commercial	banks	hold	39.3	per	cent	shares	of	total	 bank	 branches,	 followed	 by	 state-owned	banks	 (20.3%),	 development	banks	(30.6%)	and	finance	companies	(9.7%).		
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Table	2-2:	Number	of	banks	and	branches	
Bank	Branches	
Total	
Shares	
%	
Shares	
In	17	
Districts	
%	
Shares	Commercial	Banks	 State	Owned	 506	 20.3	 25	 53.2	Others	 980	 39.3	 17	 36.2	Development	Banks	 764	 30.6	 4	 8.5	Finance	Companies	 242	 9.7	 1	 2.1	Total	 2492	 100	 47	 100		
Despite	the	high	number	of	branches,	17	districts	of	Nepal	(out	of	75	districts),	particularly	 in	 remote	 areas,	 are	 still	 a	 large	 distance	 away	 from	 formal	financial	services.	Although	almost	all	of	the	financial	indicators	of	the	overall	banking	sector	show	an	encouraging	trend,	 the	growth	of	assets,	credit	and	other	indicators	are	yet	to	be	improved	to	match	other	emerging	South	Asian	and	Asian	 countries.	As	of	mid-July	2013,	 the	share	of	 total	deposit	 to	GDP	reached	73.6	per	cent	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2013).		
The	central	banks	listed	below	are	institutions	that	have	helped	to	formulate	various	standards	to	ensure	compliance	of	the	financial	institutions	in	Nepal.			
• Rural	Micro-Finance	Development	Company	(RMDC)	
• Centre	for	Micro-Finance	Limited	
• Microfinance	Bankers'	Association	of	Nepal	
• Microfinance	Institutions'	Association	of	Nepal	
• Nepal	Bankers'	Association	
• Nepali	Federation	of	Savings	and	Credit	Cooperatives	Union	Ltd.	
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• Insurance	Board	–	the	regulator	for	the	insurance	industry	
• Securities	and	Exchange	Board	of	Nepal	(SEBON)	
• Development	Bankers	Association	
• Nepal	Finance	Companies	Association		
2.3.2 Growth	and	Performance	of	Nepal	
The	aggregate	economic	growth	of	Nepal	is	presented	in	Figure	2.4	below		
	
Figure	2-4:	Annual	growth	rate	of	GDP	of	Nepal	2007	-	2016	Source:(Trading	Economics,	2017)	
The	annual	growth	rate	of	GDP	is	very	low	compared	with	other	South	Asian	countries.	The	highest	GDP	growth	rate	was	7.5	per	cent	during	the	year	2016	and	the	lowest	was	on	0.4	per	cent	during	2015.	
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Inflation	Rate	
The	inflation	rate	indicates	the	general	increase	in	the	price	level	of	goods	and	services.	It	is	good	for	the	economy	to	have	lower	inflation	rate	and	higher	growth	rate.	Figure	2.5	below	demonstrates	the	inflation	rate	of	South	Asian	countries	and	shows	Nepal’s	inflation	rate	to	be	the	highest	of	all	the	countries.	Nepal	has	more	than	double	the	inflation	rate	compared	to	the	South	Asian	average,	and	the	economic	growth	rate	is	also	no	more	than	inflation,	which	is	not	good	for	the	economy.	
	
Figure	2-5:	Inflation	in	South	Asia:	2015-2016	Source:	(Chalise,	2016).	
Interest	Rate	
The	91	day	interest	rate	of	Nepal	(see	Figure	2.6)	fluctuates	greatly	throughout	the	period.	The	highest	interest	rate	was	9.68	per	cent	on	5	January	2010,	and	the	lowest	interest	rate	throughout	this	period	was	0.0004	per	cent	on	15	July	2014.		
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Figure	2-6:	Ninety-one	day	interest	rate;	July	2007	-	July	2017	Source:	(Nepal	Rastra	bank,	2017c)	
Unemployment	Rates	Figure	 2.7	 below	 shows	 that	 for	 low	 income	workers	 there	 is	 30	 per	 cent	female	unemployment	and	17	per	cent	male	unemployment,	while	this	rate	is	53	per	cent	for	females	and	33	per	cent	for	males	in	the	middle-income	group,	and	48	per	cent	for	females	and	32	per	cent	for	males	in	the	high-income	group	in	Nepal.	These	data	show	that	unemployment	rates	for	both	male	and	female	workers	increase	from	low	income	through	middle	to	higher	income	groups	for	both	male	and	 female	workers.	Also,	most	of	 the	 low-income	group	are	engaged	in	agriculture,	and	say	that	they	are	involved	in	the	agricultural	sector,	which	is	only	seasonal,	so	most	of	the	time	they	are	unemployed.	Overall,	the	female	employment	rate	 is	 lower	than	that	of	 the	males	 in	all	 three	 income	groups.	This	is	for	cultural	reasons.	Even	today,	many	families	do	not	want	to	
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send	their	daughters	and	daughters-in-law	out	to	work	and	instead	make	them	engage	in	household	chores	only.		
	
Figure	2-7:	Labour	force	participation	rate	by	sex	(percentage	of	
population	aged	over	15)	-	2016	Source:	(World	Bank,	2016a)	
Gross	National	Income	Per	Capita	
The	trend	line	in	Figure	2.8	below	shows	the	GNI	per	capita	income	of	Nepal	is	far	 lower	when	compared	 to	other	South	Asian	 countries,	 from	1985	 to	 till	2015.		Nepal	has	the	lowest	per	capita	income	in	South	Asian	regions.	However,	it	has	started	to	increase	slowly	since	2005.	
		
Figure	2-8:	GNI	per	capita	of	Nepal	Source:	(World	Bank,	2015)	
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Balance	of	Payment	
The	data	in	Table	2.3	show	Nepal	has	a	balance	of	payment	surplus	and	the	total	balance	is	increasing.	An	alarming	observation	is	Nepal	exported	$703.9	million	worth	of	goods	while	importing	$7092.5	million	during	the	fiscal	year	2015/16	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017b).	Remittances	received	play	a	very	large	role	in	maintaining	the	balance.		
Table	2-3:	Balance	of	Payments	of	Nepal:	2014	-	2017		 	 	 	 	 	 (USD	Million)	
Particulars	 2014-2015	 2015-2016	 2016-2017	
Percentage	Change	in	first	
month	
1st	Month	 Annual	 1st	Month	 Annual	 1st	Month	 2015/2016	 2016/2017	Goods	Export	FoB	 77.6	 988.1	 71.6	 703.9	 70.7	 -7.8	 -1.2	Goods	Import	FoB	 588.2	 7657.6	 596.2	 7092.5	 645.3	 1.4	 8.2	Trade	Balance	 -510.6	 -669.5	 -524.6	 -6388.6	 -574.5	 2.8	 9.5	Total	Trade	 665.8	 8645.6	 6678.8	 7796.3	 716	 0.3	 7.2	Current	Account	Balance	 12.8	 1067.3	 79.5	 1338.8	 -21.6	 -	 -	Travel	Credit	 22.7	 536.7	 23.6	 392.7	 33.7	 -14.7	 42.7	Remittance	 434.9	 6192	 520.1	 6253.4	 484.6	 19.6	 -6.8	BOP	(-Surplus)	 -28.6	 -1437	 -46.6	 -1779.8	 19.8	 -	 -	Source:	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017b)	
	
• Foreign	exchange	reserve	Total	foreign	exchange	reserves	of	Nepal	show	an	increasing	trend.	The	foreign	exchange	reserve	of	Nepal	reached	its	low	of	US$	983	million	in	Nov	2002	while	it	reached	all	time	high	of	US$	8.7		billion	in	May	2017.	Recent	 reports	 from	 NRB	 revealed	 that	 Nepal's	 Foreign	 Exchange	Reserves	equalled	11.0	Months	of	 Import	 in	May	2017.	 Similarly,	 its	Money	 Supply	M2	has	 increased	 by	 17.5	 per	 cent	 on	 a	 year-on-year	basis.		
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Similarly,	Nepal's	Domestic	Credit	has	reached	to	19.4	USD	billion	in	the	same	period,	which	 represents	an	 increase	of	22.8	per	 cent	year-on-year.	(CEIC	Data,	2017b)	
	
	
Figure	2-9:	Nepal	Foreign	Exchange	Reserve	(USD	in	billion):	2001	-	
2017	Source:	(CEIC	Data,	2017a)	
2.3.3 Use	of	technology	in	the	banking	sector	in	Nepal	
The	use	of	technology	in	banking	is	increasing	tremendously	and	has	improved	all	 the	operations	of	 the	banking.	Not	more	 than	 two	decades	ago,	 it	would	tentatively	 take	 around	 two	hours	 to	withdraw	 funds	 from	 the	 banks.	 This	gives	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 banking	 sector	 in	 Nepal	 during	 those	 days.	 The	technological	development	in	Nepali	banking	sector	started	crawling	forward	after	the	establishment	of	the	first	joint	venture	banks,	for	example,	the	Nepal	Arab	 Bank	 Limited	 (now	 Nabil	 Bank)	 in	 1984.	 Until	 that	 time,	 the	 banks	maintained	their	records	by	a	manual	system.		They	brought	the	computerised	software	system	to	record	and	maintain	the	client	information.	Alongside	the	computerised	 software,	 the	Nabil	Bank	 further	 contributed	 to	 technological	
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development	by	introducing	credit	cards	in	Nepal	in	the	early	1990s	(Khanal,	February,	2017).		
2.3.3.1 Credit	Card	The	 credit	 card	 facility	 was	 limited	 to	 only	 high	 net-worth	 customers	especially	 those	 residing	 in	 the	 capital	 city	 (Kathmandu)	 having	 significant	minimum	balances	 in	 their	 accounts	or	 for	 the	employees	working	 in	 some	international	 organisations.	 Today	 many	 commercial	 banks	 are	 providing	credit	cards	to	52,014	customers	residing	at	various	places	 in	Nepal	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016a).			
2.3.3.2 Debit	Card		Today	all	the	commercial	banks	are	providing	a	debit	card	that	can	be	used	to	withdraw	money	from	ATMs	and	for	EFTPOS	valid	only	 in	Nepal	and	India.	However,	 the	 number	 of	 debit	 card	 holders	 in	 Nepal	 has	 decreased	 from	4,146,237		in	2014	to	4,142,390		(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016a)	in	2016	due	to	various	fraud	cases	during	the	year		(Ekantipur,	May,	2017;	Himalayan	Times,	(November),	2016;	Nepali	Times,	(May),	2000).		
2.3.3.3 Prepaid	Card	Some	 Nepalese	 commercial	 banks	 also	 provide	 prepaid	 cards,	 which	 is	especially	 popular	 with	 customers	 who	 are	 travelling	 abroad.	 Its	 use	 is	increasing	 year	 by	 year.	 As	 of	 June	 2015,	 there	 were	 82,797	 prepaid	 card	holders	in	Nepal.	
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2.3.3.4 Automatic	Teller	Machine	(ATM)			Another	joint	venture	bank	of	Nepal,	Himalayan	Bank	Limited,	was	the	pioneer	in	introducing	the	Automatic	Teller	Machine	(ATM)		in	1995	(Shrestha,	April,	2013).	 Today,	 all	 the	 commercial	 banks	 have	 installed	 ATMs	 in	 various	locations	across	the	country.	There	are	1,661	ATMs	installed	in	Nepal	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016a).	In	the	same	way,	another	step	of	modern	banking	tele-banking	was	also	introduced	by	Himalayan	Bank	in	the	same	year	(Himalayan	Bank	Limited,	February,	2017).		
2.3.3.5 Internet	Banking	Moving	forward,	Kumari	Bank	was	the	first	private	sector	bank	of	Nepal	and	it	also	took	the	lead	in	establishing	internet	banking	in	2002.	After	that,	slowly	and	 gradually	 all	 the	 commercial	 banks	 have	 provided	 internet	 banking	facilities	to	their	customers.	As	of	mid-July	2016	there	were	489,835	internet	banking	 users	 in	 Nepal.	 With	 internet	 banking,	 the	 banks	 provide	 various	services	 such	 as	 funds	 transfer	within	 and	 between	 selected	 banks	 only	 in	Nepal,	account	statements	and	utility	payments	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016a).	Although	people	may	have	registered	themselves	for	internet	banking,	many	people	may	not	be	confident	enough	to	use	it.			
2.3.3.6 Mobile	Banking	In	2004,	after	two	years	of	implementing	internet	banking	in	Nepal,	another	commercial	bank	of	Nepal,	Laxmi	Bank	Limited,	introduced	mobile	banking	for	the	 first	 time	 in	 Nepal.	 Initially,	 it	 started	 with	 the	 SMS	 banking	 for	notifications	of	transactions,	but	these	days	it	provides	other	services	as	well	such	 as	 balance	 enquiry,	 mini-statements,	 last	 transactions	 information,	
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chequebook	enquiry/request,	interbank	and	intra-bank	fund	transfers,	mobile	banking,	utility	banking	and	so	on.		As	of	mid-July	2016	there	were	1,6	04,578	mobile	banking	users	in	Nepal.		
2.3.3.7 Branchless	Banking		During	 the	 period	 of	 Maoist	 insurgency,	 the	 Maoists	 robbed	 various	 bank	branches	by	coming	to	the	branch	at	night	or	during	the	evening.	So,	during	this	period	to	provide	facilities	to	rural	people	without	establishing	branches	in	the	villages,	some	of	the	banks	started	the	branchless	banking	services,	and	many	 banks	 are	 continuing	 it.	 In	 branchless	 banking,	 they	 provide	 services	through	the	point	of	transaction	machine	with	the	help	of	smart	cards.	They	provide	 the	 facilities	 for	 deposit,	 withdrawal,	 balance	 enquiry	 and	 fund	transfer.	 As	 of	 July	 2016,	 there	 are	 812	 branchless	 banking	 centres	 and	213,084	branchless	banking	customers	in	Nepal	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016a).		
Table	2-4:	Electronic	Banking	in	Nepal:	2012	-	2016		SN Particulars Mid-July 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	1)	 Number	of	branchless	banking	centers	 74	 205	 504	 503	 812	2)	 Number	of	branchless	banking	customers	 76	 30383	 1,51,066	 1,97,493	 2,13,084	3)	 Number	of	mobile	banking	customers	 1,63,246	 4,52,909	 7,68,424	 9,97,463	 16,04,578	4)	 Number	of	Internet	banking	customers	 1,44,763	 2,86,732	 3,28,434	 3,96,362	 4,89,835	5)	 Total	number	of	ATM	machines	 1054	 1239	 1303	 1483	 1661	6)	 Number	of	debit	card	holders	 23,55,976	 31,93,137	 36,41,960	 41,46,237	 41,42,390	7)	 Number	of	credit	card	holders	 27921	 38587	 57898	 43895	 52014	8)	 Number	of	prepaid	card	holders	 46083	 57453	 66204	 69322	 82797	Source:	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016a)	
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From	the	information	given,	it	seems	that	Nepal	is	also	good	at	using	modern	technology	 in	 banking	 on	 a	 par	with	 other	 developing	 countries.	 However,	most	of	 these	 services	 are	 present	 and	 used	mostly	 by	 the	 customers	who	reside	in	the	major	cities	of	Nepal.		The	Nepal	Telecommunications	Authority	(2017)	notes	that	55.82	per	cent	of	people	have	access	to	the	internet	either	through	 mobile	 GPRS	 or	 through	 ISPs.	 However,	 only	 around	 1	 per	 cent	(199,272)	of	 the	population	have	subscribed	to	the	 internet	 through	an	ISP.	Although	people	have	connected	the	internet	via	mobile	service	provider,	they	mainly	use	it	for	Facebooking.	There	are	around	21.04	per	cent		monthly	active	users	of	the	overall	population	in	Nepal	(Neupane,	February,	2016).			Many	 people	 still	 lack	 trust	 in	 internet	 banking	 in	 Nepal.	 	 Through	media	stories,	 the	public	are	aware	of	cases	where	the	customers	are	said	to	have	tried	 to	 withdraw	 money	 via	 an	 ATM,	 and	 the	 sum	 is	 deducted	 from	 the	balance	in	their	accounts	but	no	cash	is	dispensed.	 	 	Incidents	like	this	have	hindered	the	growth	of	ATM	users	in	Nepal.	To	restore	customer	confidence,	banks	now	provide	an	SMS	alert	on	cash	withdrawal	 for	a	nominal	price	to	customers.	It	is	proposed	that	the	central	banks	prepare	a	policy	to	require	all	banks	to	offer	such	a	service	free	of	cost	(Subedi,	November,	2016).			Internet	banking	is	popular	only	in	major	cities	such	as	Kathmandu,	Pokhara	and	Biratnagar,	and	more	than	50	per	cent	of	internet	banking	users	are	inside	the	Kathmandu	Valley	(Khatri	&	Dhungel,	2013).		It	would	be	good	if	central	banks	and	the	government	introduced	a	policy	for	the	banks	to	implement	and	
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provide	education	about	internet	banking	to	reach	the	people	living	in	remote	areas	who	have	to	walk	for	hours	to	access	their	banks.		
However,	with	 the	development	and	 implementation	of	modern	technology	like	ATM,	EFTPOS,	debit	 and	credit	cards,	 internet	banking,	mobile	banking	and	so	on,	today	the	banking	sector	is	more	systematic,	managed,	modernised	and	robust	than	in	the	last	decade.	
2.4 Political	interference	in	banking	sector	of	Nepal	
The	worldwide	 governance	 indicators	 published	 by	World	 Bank	 show	 that	corporate	governance	in	Nepal	is	very	poor,	sitting	between	the	16.19	to	35.58	percentiles.		Also,	the	two	indicators,	governance	effectiveness	and	regulatory	quality,	decreased	to	the	13.46	and	25.00	percentiles	in	2015	compared	to	the	22.44	and	34.31	percentiles	respectively	during	the	year	2005	(World	Bank,	February,	2015b).	This	 clearly	shows	 that	 the	government	 is	not	governing	effectively	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 regulatory	 rules	 and	 regulations	 is	lacking.	This	 is	not	 in	only	one	sector	but	 in	almost	all	 industries,	 including	banks.		
In	accordance	with	the	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	Act	(2002)	section	14,	the	board	of	the	central	banks	of	Nepal	consists	of	seven	members	including	the	governor,	appointed	 by	 the	 Government	 of	 Nepal,	 Council	 of	Ministers.	 	 As	 these	 are	mainly	political	 appointments,	 indirectly	 they	are	 linked	and	obliged	 to	 the	political	party,	and	hence	there	are	strong	grounds	for	political	interference	in	financial	institutions	in	Nepal.		
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Additionally,	the	Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act,	2006	requires	the	banks	to	have	a	board	of	directors	of	from	5	to	9	members;	among	them,	one	board	member	must	be	appointed	to	the	board	from	the	list	of	a	professional	experts	maintained	by	the	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	(BAFIA,	2006).	This	policy	seems	to	be	quite	 justifiable	 if	 it	 is	 implemented	properly.	However,	 it	also	provides	the	grounds	for	political	interference	on	the	board	of	every	commercial	bank,	as	they	are	indirectly	appointed	by	the	central	bank’s	board	which	is	formed	by	the	government	(political	parties).		
For	 the	 public	 sector	 banks,	 there	 is	 high	 political	 influence,	 including	 the	appointment	of	 the	CEO	and	management,	 lending	decisions,	budgeting	and	planning.	It	has	even	been	noticed	that	there	were	some	people	on	the	banks’	boards	of	directors	without	any	banking	background.	Also,	even	in	middle	and	lower	level	employees,	there	are	several	unions	affiliated	to	several	political	parties	which	exercise	strong	influence	over	the	management	and	board.	This	has	resulted	in	lower	ROE	for	those	banks.		
Political	interference	had	started	before	1985.	There	was	a	serious	problem	of	government	intervention	in	the	financial	sector	of	Nepal	as	two	public	sector	banks,	RBB	and	NBL,	had	more	than	70	per	cent	of	the	total	assets	and	there	was	also	weak	supervision	by	the	central	banks	(Ozaki,	2014).		
Due	to	the	deep	economic	crisis	in	1985,	the	government	requested	help	from	international	donors	and,	for	the	first	time,	it	signed	a	credit	agreement	with	the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 for	 the	 economic	 establishment	program.	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 the	 government	 entered	 into	 the	 Structured	
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Adjustment	Program	(SAP)	with	the	World	Bank	of	which	the	main	objective	was	to	reduce	government	intervention	in	the	economy.		There	were	two	SAPs.	The	financial	sector	reforms	were	implemented	in	the	second	SAP	(1989-1992)	which	developed	the	infrastructure	and	helped	to	formulate	the	key	financial	legislation.	Additionally,	some	technical	assistance	was	provided	to	NRB	for	effective	 supervision	 and	 inspection.	 Even	 then,	 it	 did	 not	 improve	 the	management,	 operations	 and	 portfolio	 quality	 of	 two	 public	 sector	 banks	(Ozaki,	2014).		
However,	removing	the	entry	barriers	 for	private	sector	banks	and	opening	the	 door	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 joint	 venture	 banks	 created	 more	competition	in	the	market.	Additionally,	the	central	banks	also	deregulated	the	interest	 rates	 on	 loans	 by	 introducing	 several	 other	 prudential	 norms	 like	capital	adequacy	requirements,	loan	loss	provision,	loan	classification,	and	so	on.	 After	 that,	 the	 situation	 was	 slightly	 improved	 from	 the	 economic	perspective.		
But	the	situation	of	public	sector	banks	was	getting	worse	and	worse.	In	2003,	both	RBB	and	NBL	reported	the	net	loss	of	NRs.4.84	billion	and	NRs.0.3	billion	respectively.	So,	to	improve	their	financial	situation,	the	World	Bank	provided	US$16	 million	 of	 Financial	 Sector	 Technical	 Assistance	 Project	 (FSTAP)	 in	December	 2003.	 	 The	 main	 objective	 behind	 FSTAP	 was	 to	 help	 with	 the	restructure	and	re-engineering	NRB;	implement	stronger	bank	management	in	 both	 RBB	 and	 NBL	 to	 protect	 financial	 integrity;	 and	 support	 a	 better	
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environment	of	financial	reform	in	areas	such	as	enhanced	credit	information,	financial	reporting,	and	staff	training	(World	Bank,	2002).	
With	 the	 support	 of	 ADB	 and	 World	 Bank,	 various	 financial	 reforms	 was	withdrawn,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 political	 intervention	 is	 still	 prevailing.	Additionally,	 the	 Commission	 for	 the	 Investigation	 of	 Abuse	 of	 Authority	charged	the	governor	and	one	executive	of	NRB	with	corruption	regarding	the	recruitment	 of	 a	 consulting	 firm	 (Himalayan	 Times,	 (December),	 2007).	Although	 the	 charges	were	 cleared,	 it	 demoralised	 the	 NRB	 staff	 and	 they	refrained	from	proposing	further	strict	reforms.	
2.5 Interlink	 between	 political	 governance	 and	 bank	
governance	in	Nepal	
The	 literature	 on	 the	 caste	 system	 shows	 that	 in	 Nepal	 ancient	 kings	 had	divided	work	according	to	the	caste	a	person	was	born	in:	Brahmin,	Kshatriya,	Vaishya	or	Sudra.	The	Brahmin	were	at	the	top	of	the	ritual	orders	and	were	given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 study,	 work	 as	 a	 teachers,	 priests	 and	 advisors.	Kshatriya	were	beneath	them	and	were	the	kings	and	warriors.	Hence,	they	were	allocated	the	responsibility	to	rule	and	protect	the	country.	So,	their	jobs	would	be	in	the	police	and	army.	The	next	caste	was	Vaishya,	allocated	to	work	as	a	merchants.	Beneath	everyone	else	were	Sudra	who	were	mainly	peasants	and	labourers.	Theirs	was	the	most	dominated	group	and	they	were	regarded	“impure”	 and	 “untouchable”	 (	 Department	 for	 International	 Development,	2006).		
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During	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	wealth	was	measured	 in	 terms	 of	 land.	The	groups	 of	 people	 who	 had	 more	 land	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 powerful.	 As	Brahmins	and	Kshatriya	were	quite	close	to	power,	(kings)	and	were	engaged	in	relatively	good	jobs,	they	would	please	the	King	and	receive	ownership	of	land	or	buy	it.	Vaishya,	having		business	minds,		also	held	some	portions	of	land.	However,	the	Sudras	were	quite	poor	and	had	to	work	as	labourers	for	their	living	(Gellner,	2007).			
The	Brahmins	were	given	opportunitiies	to	in	Nepal	and	abroad	(Czarnecka	&	Toffin,	2011).	Due	to	their	knowledge,	they	worked	as	advisors	to	the	kings,	priests	of	temples,	and	teachers	for	all	other	castes.		During	the	period	of	the	autocratic	 Rana’s	 regime	 (1846-1951)	 the	 country's	 rules	 and	 regulations	(Muluki	Ain)	were	formed	using	the	Orthodox	Hindu	notions	(Hofer,	1979).		
Similarly,	 Kshatriyas	 were	 close	 to	 kings,	 and	 accustomed	 to	 traveling	 to	various	 places	 for	 training;	 they	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 nurture	 their	knowledge	and	realised	the	importance	of	education	and	slowly	and	gradually	they	nurtured	their	skills	and	abilities	as	well.		They	did	not	limit	this	to	their	generation,	but	also	created	a	good	family	and	educational	environment	 for	their	children.	Thus,	 these	two	castes	were	comparatively	better	off	both	 in	terms	of	their	education	and	wealth.		Being	more	educated	and	close	to	power	(Kings),	Brahmins	were	seen	more	often	in	the	civil	services,	political	parties,	judiciary	system	and	universities,	as	well	as	on	boards	of		directors	of	many	private	and	public	organisations.	Despite	having	a	population	of	only	31	per	cent,	it	was	found	that	Brahmins	and	Kshatriyas	held	two-thirds	of	the	jobs.		
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This	prevailed	not	only	 in	 the	central	 levels	but	also	through	to	 local	 levels.	Even	then,	central	directly	nominated	and	appointed	officers	as	there	had	been	no	elections	for	the	previous	20	years	(	Himalayan	Times,	2017).		
Hence,	while	forming	any	constitution,	rules,	regulations	and	policies	for	the	country	or	for	t	organisations,	these	are	more	likely	to	be	biased	towards	or	in	favour	of	 these	dominating	 castes	of	people.	Addtionally,	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	proper	 transportation,	 communication	 and	 technological	 systems,	 even	 in	these	castes,	the	dominating	voice	was	that	of	the	people	who	were	living	in	the	 capital	 or	 some	major	 cities	 of	Nepal	 rather	 than	 there	 being	 inclusive	participation	from	all	areas	and	all	groups	of	people.	This	is	probably	one	of	the	reasons	for	formulating	a	rule-based	governance	mechanism	rather	than	a	principle-based	governance	system.		
Realising	these	conditions,	some	 lower	caste	activists	attempted	to	 form	an	alliance	to	oppose	this	scenario.	This	was	captured	by	the	Maoist	party	who	played	the	ethnic	card	for	their	revolution	and	civil	war.	The	Communist	Party	of	Nepal	(Maoists)	launched	its	“people's	war”	on	12	February	1996	by	giving	the	people	hope	to	eradicate	these	caste	differences.	After	ten	years	of	Maoist	civil	war,	finally,	through	the	peace	process,	the	war	was	ended	and	Nepal	was	declared	 a	 federal	 democratic	 republic	 and	 the	 autocratic	monarchical	 rule	was	ended	 in	April	2006.	Then	the	 interim	government	was	 formed	and,	 in	November,	 2006	 the	 eight-party	 alliance,	 including	 Maoists,	 signed	 the	agreement	 that	 led	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 interim	 government,	 interim	constitution	 and	 interim	parliament.	During	 this	 period,	 the	 leading	Maoist	
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party	 argued	 that	 all	 castes,	 including	 Sudras,	 should	 be	 proportionately	represented	 in	 the	 constitutional	 assembly.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 major	milestone	for	the	uplifting	of	the	various	deprived	and	backward	groups,	such	as	women,	in	Nepal.	Although	there	had	been	some	quotas	previously,	these	had	not	been	implemented	properly.		
Although	 lower	 caste	 and	 deprived	 groups	 have	 received	 some	 additional	benefits	 from	this	constitution,	still	 the	major	beneficiaries	were	the	people	living	in	cities	or	town	areas.		Even	today,	people	living	in	the	eastern	Terai	of	Nepal,	who	refer	to	themselves	as	Madeshi,	are	revolting	against	the	prevailing	government	by	demanding	that	both	dhoti	and	topi	(terai	man	and	hillman’s	cap)	 should	have	equal	opportunities	and	 receive	equal	 respect.	Due	 to	 the	revolt	from	Madeshi	group,	at	the	end	of	2015,	the	India	border	was	blocked	for	more	than	two	months,	and	as	a	result	there	was	a	crucial	shortage	of	fuel,	food,	 including	 medicines,	 and	 other	 necessary	 items	 in	 Nepal	 (Guardian,	November,	2015).		
2.6 Corporate	Social	Responsibility	of	banking	in	Nepal	
Corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	is	a	comparatively	new	concept	in	Nepal	and	there	is	no	compulsion	for	commercial	banks	to	invest	in	CSR	practices.	However,	most	of	the	banks	are	voluntarily	investing	funds	in	CSR	and	report	this	on	their	websites	and	in	annual	reports	(Upadhyay-Dhungel	&	Dhungel,	2013).	 	 The	 top	 level	 managers	 of	 commercial	 banks	 of	 Nepal,	 noting	 the	expansion	 of	 CSR	 in	 the	 Indian	 fiancial	 sector,	 assume	 there	 is	 first-mover	advantage	 for	 a	win-win	 relationship	 between	CSR	 and	 banks’	 longer-term	
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financial	performance,	given	the	government's	penchant	for	regulating	in	such	directions.	 Chapagain	 (2008)	 suggested	 nearly	 two	decades	 ago	 that	 banks	could	 subscribe	 to	 CSRand	 profit	 maximisation,	 as	 two	 of	 their	 goals.	Additionally,	banks	not	only	influence	the	profit	and	loss	of	their	shareholders	but	 help	 drive	 the	 economy	of	 the	whole	 country,	 so,	 they	 should	 be	more	socially	responsible	than	other	industries.		As	the	banking	sector	is	one	of	the	most	profit-generating	industries	in	Nepal,	it	not	only	comes	under	pressure	from	stakeholders	to	carry	out	business	in	a	socially	responsible	and	ethical	manner	 but	 also	 perceives	 the	 constant	 threat	 of	 further	 government	intervention.		
Due	to	the	lack	of	rules	and	regulations	to	report	CSR	expenditure,	it	is	very	difficult	 to	 determine	 the	 total	 amount	 invested	 by	 each	 bank	 in	 CSR.	Nevertheless,	from	the	individual	banks’	websites	there	is	disclosure	of	their	involvement	in	the	education,	training,	development	and	welfare	of	deprived	people	and	the	ares	of	funding	for	health	care	and	support,	cultural,	arts	and	heritage	 protection,	 education	 and	 development	 of	 children	 and	 women’s	games,	blood	donations,	and	so	on.	A	potentially	surprising	observation	to	be	discussed	in	the	analysis	chapter	is	that	many	private	sector	banks	seem	to	be	more	eagerly	engaged	in	CSR	than	public	sector	banks.		
On	 their	own	 initiative,	banks	have	 tried	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	betterment	of	society;	 it	 would	 be	 better	 if	 the	 government	 of	 Nepal	 or	 central	 banks	promulgated	policies	and	guidelines	concerning	investment	in	CSR	activities.	
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It	is	apparent	that	CSR	activities	are	concentrated	in	cities	and	urban	areas	vis	à	vis	rural	areas,	where	the	most	needy	people	reside.		
The	 banks	 can	 also	 be	 socially	 responsible	 in	 various	 other	 ways	 like	encouraging	green	finance,	putting	restrictions	on	the	loans	to	businesses	that	produce	more	carbon	emissions,	conducting	environmental	audits,	subsiding	interest	rates	for	green	financing	products	and	so	on.	If	the	banks	would	take	all	these	initiatives	then,	in	the	long	run,	they	will	contribute	to	environmental	protection	in	the	long	term	(Acharya	&	Locke,	2016).		
2.7 Conclusion		
This	chapter	provides	the	background	about	Nepal	from	a	wider	perspective	covering	its	geography,	history,	economic	and	political	systems,	and	providing	a	context	for	the	contemporary	settings	that	influence	governance	directly	and	indirectly.	 	 The	 evolution	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Nepalese	 financial	system	was	discussed	and	the	adoption	of	 technology	 in	the	banking	sector	indicates	 an	 urban	 bias.	 Corporate	 governance	 practice	 in	 Nepal	 was	introduced,	 including	when	 and	 how	 it	 emerged,	 and	 the	 endemic	 political	interference	 in	 the	 banking	 sector.	 Finally,	 the	 emerging	 areas	 of	 CSR	 and	Green	Finance	are	observed	and	the	challenges	these	may	provide	to	corporate	governance	in	the	Nepali	finance	sector	are	noted	for	further	discussion.	
The	following	chapter	will	review	the	literature	and	outlines	the	changes	and	trends	 of	 corporate	 governance.	 It	 also	 tries	 to	 explore	 the	 corporate	governance	relationship	on	the	financial	performance	of	the	firms,	especially	relating	to	the	banking	institutions.		 	
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3 Chapter	Three	
Corporate	Governance	Mechanism	
3.1 Introduction	
This	 chapter	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 internal	 and	 external	 corporate	governance	mechanism.		It	also	provides	a	brief	overview	and	development	of	corporate	governance	practices	in	Nepal	including	the	supervisory	framework,	various	 acts	 and	 directives	 of	 central	 banks	 and	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	dealing	with	problems	in	banks	and	financial	institutions.	
3.2 Corporate	Governance	Mechanism	
Corporate	 governance	 mechanism	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 an	 organisation	 is	monitored	and	controlled	to	protect	the	interest	of	its	shareholders.	In	other	words,	it	is	the	formal	mechanism	developed	to	ensure	that	the	agent	who	is	working	on	behalf	of	the	shareholders	is	performing	and	will	perform	for	the	best	 interest	 of	 their	 principals	 (Hill	 and	 Jones	 2004).	 There	 are	 different	corporate	governance	mechanisms	 that	have	been	developed	 to	govern	 the	company,	which	can	broadly	be	classified	as	internal	and	external	governance	mechanisms	or	the	rule-based	and	the	principle-based	corporate	governance	mechanism.	The	Anglo-Saxon	model,	which	has	 the	unitary	board	model	of	corporate	governance,	is	used	in	the	U.S.A	and	believes	that	there	needs	to	be	a	strong	external	corporate	governance	mechanism	to	control	the	behaviour	of	the	agents.	Countries	like	United	Kingdom,	Canada,	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	some	Commonwealth	countries	have	principle-based	models	where	they	
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believe	 that	 the	 code	 of	 corporate	 governance	 determines	 the	 board	responsibilities	rather	than	the	rule	of	law.	Companies	are	supposed	to	report	the	 governance	 practices	 they	 have	 followed	and	 if	 they	 have	 not	 followed	them,	they	have	to	give	reason.	Similarly,	countries	like	Japan	believe	in	the	corporate	 governance	 mechanism	 where	 there	 need	 to	 be	 more	 internal	controls	 to	 govern	 the	 company	 (Tricker,	 2011).	 Thus,	 the	 corporate	governance	mechanism	can	be	broadly	classified	as	external	and	internal.		
3.2.1 External	Governance	
The	external	corporate	governance	mechanism	includes	various	mechanisms	for	 monitoring	 and	 control	 by	 the	 stakeholders	 who	 are	 outside	 the	organization	and	have	less	access	to	company	information.	It	also	includes	the	various	 rules	 and	 regulations	 formulated	 by	 the	 government	 or	 regulatory	authority	that	the	companies	must	comply	with	(Shi,	Connelly,	&	Hoskisson,	2017).	The	various	types	of	external	corporate	governance	mechanisms	are	briefly	explained	below:	
i. Ownership	Structure:		
Ownership	structure	simply	refers	to	the	distribution	of	equity	of	the	firm.	 The	 several	 dimensions	 of	 ownership	 structures,	 which	 have	implications	for	corporate	governance,	are	discussed	below:	
ii. Concentration:	
Literature	 suggests	 ownership	 concentration	 as	 one	 of	 the	mechanisms	 to	 mitigate	 agency	 problems	 and	 results	 from	 the	
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separation	of	ownership	and	control.	(Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	 1976;	Nguyen,	 Locke,	&	Reddy,	 2015;	 Reddy,	 2010).	This	 is	 based	 on	 interest	 alignment	 which	 states	 that	 larger	shareholders	 have	 strong	 incentives	 and	 power	 to	 monitor	 the	company’s	 performance	 at	 low	 cost	 (Grossman	 &	 Hart,	 1986).	However,	 the	 nature	 and	 level	 of	 ownership	 concentration	 is	extremely	 different	 around	 the	 world	 (Porta,	 Lopez	 de	 Silanes,	Shleifer,	&	Vishny,	1998)	
iii. 	Identity:	
The	 identity	 of	 shareholders	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 for	 the	implementation	 of	 corporate	 governance	 of	 firms.	 Different	shareholders	have	different	interest	in	the	firms;	some	want	profits,	dividends,	good	capital	structure,	growth,	etc.	which	is	reflected	by	the	 shareholders	 (Thomsen	 &	 Pedersen,	 2000).	 	 The	 literature	suggests	 four	 major	 categories	 of	 the	 shareholders,	 which	 are	briefly	discussed	below:	
iv. Debt	Holders:	
The	debt	holders	 such	as	banks	and	debenture	holders	will	have	huge	interest	in	a	company	as	their	return	on	investment	is	directly	linked	 with	 the	 company’s	 performance;	 this	 motivates	 them	 to	closely	monitor	the	company’s	financial	performance.	This	helps	to	reduce	 the	agency	 cost	 and	 leads	 to	minimising	 risky	 investment	and	availability	of	free	cash	flow.	In	several	countries	banks	play	an	
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important	role	while	formulating	various	decisions	for	the	company.	This	 helps	 to	 minimise	 the	 risk,	 information	 asymmetries	 and	capital	 misallocation	 (Lopez-de-Silanes	 &	 Zamarripa,	 2003).	However,	in	some	countries,	the	debt	holders	are	in	a	dominating	role,	which	might	lead	to	the	agency	problem.	
v. Family	Holding	
Family	 holding	 refers	 to	 family	 members	 holding	 a	 significant	portion	of	equity	of	a	company.	The	family	holding	is	quite	common	in	 Asian	 countries	 as	 compared	 to	 other	 countries	 (Claessens,	Djankov,	&	Lang,	2000).		The	research	by	Shleifer	and	Vishny	(1986)	found	that	family	holding	was	more	than	33	per	cent	in	fortune	500	firms	and	those	firms	have	poorly	diversified	portfolios,	have	long	term	investors	who	hold	the	senior	management	positions,	and	as	a	result	their	performance	is	different	when	compared	to	non-family	firms.	 	 Similarly,	 Fama	 &	 Jensen(1985)	 have	 shown	 how	 large	undiversified	shareholders	have	different	investment	decision	rules	where	they	focus	on	firm	growth,	technological	innovation	or	firm	survival	 rather	 than	 focussing	 on	 enhancing	 shareholders’	 value,	while	the	diversified	shareholders	evaluate	market	value	by	using	market	 value	 rules	 to	maximise	 the	 value	 of	 firm’s	 residual	 cash	flow.		
On	the	contrary,	the	research	also	suggests	that	family	holdings	can	positively	 influence	 competitive	 advantage.	 Demsetz	 and	 Lehn	
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(1985) noted	 that	 concentrated	 investors	 have	 large	 economic	motivations	to	reduce	agency	conflicts	and	maximize	firm	value.	As	the	 family	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 firm,	 they	 have	 additional	incentives	 to	 monitor	 manager’s	 moves	 and	minimise	 free-rider	problems.	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 Burkart,	 Panuzi,	 and	 Shleifer	 (2002)	suggest	 that	 those	 families	 with	 a	 presence	 in	 the	 firm	 have	additional	competitive	advantages.	Furthermore,	as	the	family	has	long-term	 investment	 horizons,	 companies	 suffer	 less	 from	managerial	myopia	and	are	less	likely	to	forgo	good	investment	to	boost	the	earnings	of	the	company	(Stein,	1988). 	
vi. Block	holders:	
Adam	 Smith	 (1776)	 was	 quite	 concerned	 about	 the	 separation	 of	ownership	and	control;	however	he	did	not	state	exactly	the	extent	of	this	separation.	In	the	research	conducted	by	Holderness	and	Sheehan	(1988),	New	York	and	American	stock	exchanges	have	27	per	cent	of	the	block	holders	more	than	30	per	cent	of	the	votes.		The	major	reason	behind	holding	blocks	of	shares	is	that	they	share	the	benefits	of	control	and	 substantially	 influence	 company	 decision	 making.	 The	 block	holders	have	interest	in	profit	maximisation	which	helps	to	minimise	the	 problem	 of	 separation	 of	 ownership	 and	 control,	 as	 stated	 by	Michael	C.	Jensen	and	William	H	Meckling	(1976).		On	the	contrary,	the	research	has	found	large	block	holding	firms	minimise	risk	taking,	have	a	more	monitoring	role	and	influence	organisation	control.	This	might	
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increase	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 minority	 shareholders	 and	 block	holders	(Allen	&	Phillips,	2000;	Barberis,	Shleifer,	Boycko,	&	Tsukanova,	1996;	Dharwadkar,	George,	&	Brandes,	2000;	Stulz,	1988).			However,	these	 problems	 are	mainly	 seen	 in	 the	 developing	 economies	where	there	are	weak	regulatory	and	legal	structures.		
vii. Foreign	Holding:	
There	 is	a	 lot	of	empirical	literature	 focussed	on	 foreign	holding	and	firm	 performance.	 Some	 researchers	 have	 also	 undertaken	comparative	studies	of	the	productivity	of	foreign	holding	firms	versus	domestic	holdings	(Aitken	&	Harrison,	1999;	Arnold	&	Javorcik,	2005;	Robert	E.	Baldwin,	1998).	This	literature	suggests	that	the	productivity	of	foreign	firms	is	comparatively	higher	because	they	accumulate	firm-specific	 advantages	 such	 as	 good	 managerial	 skills,	 transfer	 of	technology,	 huge	 capital	 advantage,	 coordinated	 relationships	 with	suppliers	 and	 customers,	 export	 relations	 and	 so	 on.	 	 Generally	 the	foreign	holding	 institutions	have	 long-term	 investment	horizons	and	focus	on	market-based	 performance	measures	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	diversify	their	investment	to	different	industries	and	sectors.		
viii. External	Audit:	
External	 audit	not	only	helps	 to	overcome	 the	agency	problems	 that	arise	from	separation	of	ownership	and	control	but	it	is	also	one	of	the	most	 reliable	 ways	 to	 build	 investors’	 confidence	 and	 other	stakeholders	about	 the	 company.	The	external	 audit	helps	 to	ensure	
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that	 the	 company	 is	 transparent;	 reliability	 enhances	 the	 quality	 of	financial	reporting	and	reduces	information	asymmetries	between	the	shareholders	 and	 mangers.	 This	 audit	 process	 also	 helps	 to	 boost	investors’	confidence,	builds	trust	that	the	reported	financial	statement	are	truthful	and	presented	in	the	proper	way	(Sikka,	2009).	As	per	the	Company	 Act,	 2006,	 all	 the	 listed	 companies	 in	 Nepal,	 including	 the	banks	and	financial	institutions,	need	to	conduct	an	external	audit	by	an	 external	 auditor	 and	 make	 it	 publically	 available	 to	 the	 general	shareholders.		
3.2.2 Internal	Governance	Mechanism	
The	 internal	 corporate	 governance	 mechanism	 includes	 board	 of	directors,	internal	audits,	and	executive	compensation	schemes,	which	are	briefly	discussed	below:	
3.2.2.1 Board	of	Directors:		The	board	of	directors	represents	shareholders.	Shareholders	of	the	company	nominate	their	board.	They	play	a	mediator	role	between	the	principals	who	are	the	investors	for	the	company	and	the	agents	or	the	managers	who	are	responsible	for	allocation	and	deployment	of	resources	for	the	wealth	maximisation	of	the	company.	The	board	performs	responsibilities	such	as	appointing	and	terminating	top-level	 managers,	 advising	 top	 management,	 determining	 their	compensation	and	so	on	(Denis,	2001).	The	board	of	directors	can	be	 further	 classified	 as	 inside	 and	 outside	 directors.	 The	 inside	
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directors	are	generally	expert	in	that	particular	business	and	mainly	perform	the	monitoring	role.	In	other	words,	they	are	responsible	for	controlling	the	inside	activity	of	the	firm,	like	controlling	the	top-level	 mangers.	 Outside	 directors	 are	 not	 directly	 related	 to	 the	company	 but	 they	 have	 good	 knowledge	 about	 the	 external	business	 environment.	 Outside	 directors	 are	 also	 known	 as	independent	 directors	 or	 non–executive	 directors.	 All	 the	 board	directors	are	generally	focused	on	achieving	the	vision,	mission	and	objectives	of	the	company	(Monks	&	Minow,	2001,	p.	81).	They	are	also	responsible	for	conducting	the	internal	audit	of	the	company	to	reveal	the	actual	financial	performance	of	the	company.		
3.2.2.2 Internal	Audit:	The	 internal	 audit	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 contemporary	corporate	 governance	 and	many	 researchers	 have	 acknowledged	internal	 audit	 as	 a	 part	 of	 an	 effective	 corporate	 governance	mechanism	(Carcello,	Hermanson,	Neal,	&	Riley,	2002;	Gramling	&	Myers,	2003;	Holt	&	Dezoort,	2009;	Paape,	Scheffe,	&	Snoep,	2003).			Historically,	 internal	 audit	 is	 taken	 as	 a	 monitoring	 function	(Morgan,	 1980),	however	 it	 is	 an	 independent	 appraisal	 function	and	 plays	 an	 important	 element	 of	 organisational	 control	 i.e.,	important	for	the	achievement	of	corporate	objectives	(Institute	of	Internal	 Auditors,	 2012).	 	 	 Similarly,	 the	 Institute	 of	 Internal	Auditors	(2004)	states	that	the	internal	audit	is	used	to	evaluate	the	company’s	performance	and	contributes	to	the	improvement	of	risk	
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management,	 control	 and	 governance,	 and	 recognizes	 the	assurance	 and	 consulting	 role	 of	 internal	 auditing	 in	 corporate	governance.	The	 board	 of	 directors	 of	 the	 company	 are	 responsible	 for	formulating	the	audit	committee	or	conducting		the	internal	audit	of	the	company	to	reveal	the	company’s	actual	financial	performance	(Hill,	2013).	The	internal	audit	is	equally	important	for	public	and	private	sector	companies	(Cohen,	Krishnamoorthy,	&	Wright,	2002).	The	 internal	audit	provides	the	 information	about	any	 fraudulent	practices	of	the	company,	points	out	any	discrepancies	and	ensures	the	company	has	strictly	abided	by	the	legal	rules	and	regulations.		
3.2.2.3 Executive	Compensation	Schemes	Modern	 agency	 theory,	 which	 is	 taken	 as	 the	 basis	 determining	compensation	schemes,	suggests	that	mangers	are	egoistic	and	they	must	be	given	good	incentives	to	act	for	the	best	interest	of	the	firms	for	which	they	work.	 	This	 theory	suggests	 that	mangers	must	be	given	 enough	 monetary	 compensation	 and	 equity	 compensation	(stock	options)	to	attract	and	motivate	managerial	interest	towards	the	accomplishment	of	 the	organisational	goals.	Kaplan	(Jurow	et	al.).	 	 Providing	 stock	 options	 will	 directly	 provide	 additional	incentives	for	the	mangers	to	perform	better	(Denis,	2001).		
3.3 Governance	Practices	in	Nepal	
The	capital	market	of	Nepal	is	relatively	small	compared	to	other	nations.	The	development	of	a	capital	market	has	been	delayed	due	to	a	lack	of	proper	rules	
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and	regulations	for	investors’	protection	and	good	governance	(World	Bank	2005).	 The	 banking	 sector	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 for	 the	 development	 of	capital	markets,	however	in	Nepal,	compared	to	other	developing	nations,	the	banking	sectors	seems	to	be	less	efficient	due	to	an	increase	in	NPL,	shortfall	in	capital,	ineffective	supervision,	and	slow	recovery	rate	.	The	average	daily	turnover	at	Nepal	Stock	Exchange	(NEPSE)	was	Rs.	892.7	million	(approx.	8	million	 USD)	 during	 the	 year	 2017.	 	 Nepal	 had	 embraced	 a	 dematerialised	share	 trading	 system	 by	 replacing	 the	 traditional	 paper	 based	 system	 only	during	January	2015	(Republica,	2017).	The	dematerialised	process	has	led	to	an	increase	in	the	number	of	retail	investors	and	volume	of	trading.			
Due	to	the	pressure	from	the	various	donor	agencies,	general	public	and	other	stakeholders,	 central	 banks	 came	 up	 with	 some	 policies,	 such	 as	decentralisation,	interest	rate	deregulation,	and	provision	for	private	as	well	as	 foreign	 banks	 during	 the	 Financial	 Sector	 Reforms	 (FSR)	 of	 the	 1990s.		Similarly,	due	to	the	pressure	from	IMF,	the	government	also	entered	into	an	agreement	with	World	Bank	for	a	financial	sector	restructure	project	in	2004	(Ozaki,	2014).	Following	this	agreement,	 the	government	and	central	banks	implemented	 corporate	 governance	 standards,	 accounting	 and	 auditing	standards	for	banks	and	other	financial	institutions	(World	Bank,	2005).		
During	the	year	2000,	the	Asian	Development	Bank	approved	the	corporate	and	 financial	 governance	 project	 with	 the	 long-term	 goal	 to	 promote	sustainable	growth	and	reduce	poverty	in	Nepal.	Similarly,	the	medium-term	objective	was	to	improve	corporate	governance	and	efficiency	in	the	financial	
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sector	by	firstly,	strengthening	the	capacity	of	the	Securities	Exchange	Board	(SEBON),	the	Nepal	Stock	Exchange	(NEPSE),	and	the	Companies	Registrar’s	Office	(CRO).	Secondly,	to	improve	legal	enforcement	capacity	by	establishing	the	 National	 Judicial	 Academy	 (NJA),	 legal	 information	 sector	 and	 secure	transactions	 registry,	 and	 thirdly,	 by	 improving	 payment	 and	 settlement	infrastructure.	This	project	came	into	effect	on	28	November	2001.	However,	during	 the	 first	 stage,	 the	 project	 to	 improve	 corporate	 governance	 and	efficiency	 proved	 to	 be	 ineffective	 but	 the	 members	 agreed	 to	 refocus	 on	developing	governance	and	capital	markets	(Asian	Development	Bank,	2010).		
The	financial	and	technical	assistance	from	World	Bank	led	the	development	of	financial	sector	reform	project	in	2002.	The	main	objectives	of	FSR	was	to	reduce	direct	government	intervention	as	an	owner	while	strengthening	the	supervision	 and	 regulatory	 role;	 develop	 strong	 corporate	 governance	 in	government	banks;	 strengthen	the	 role	of	 central	banks	 (NRB)	and	provide	sufficient	 autonomy	 for	 formulating	 monetary	 policy,	 banking	 system	regulation,	 supervision	 and	 licensing	of	 banks	 and	 non-banks	 by	 drafting	 a	new	Act;	improve	auditing	and	accounting	standards;	and	improve	financial	discipline	through	adequate	disclosure	and	competition.	As	a	result,	the	NRB	Act	2002,	Companies	Act	2006	and	Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act	2006,	were	approved	(World	Bank,	2002).		
The	NRB	ACT	2002	provides	 the	 sufficient	 autonomy	 and	 full	 authority	 for	licensing,	supervision	and	regulation	over	t	banking.	The	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	Act	(2002)	has	made	several	provisions	regarding	the	formation	of	boards	of	
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directors	 which	 includes	 their	 education	 qualifications	 and	 experiences,	criteria	 for	 disqualification	 of	 directors,	 duties	 and	 responsibilities,	 board	meetings	and	so	on	 for	 the	good	corporate	governance	of	 banks.	Later,	 the	Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act	(Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act),	2006	came	up	as	a	single	umbrella	Act	by	amending	and	consolidating	all	other	laws	to	protect	 the	 interest	of	 the	 investors,	depositors,	provide	reliable	banking	and	intermediary	services	and	to	minimise	banking	and	other	financial	risk.		This	 act	 made	 central	 banks	 more	 powerful.	 Additionally,	 the	 Institute	 of	Chartered	 Accountants	 in	 Nepal	 started	 to	 formulate	 and	 issue	 various	accounting	 and	 auditing	 rules	 and	 standards	 based	 on	 the	 International	Accounting	Standards	and	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards,	which	must	 be	 followed	 by	 companies	while	 preparing	 their	 financial	 statements	(World	Bank,	2005).		Similarly,	the	The	Companies	Act	(2006)	and	Securities	Act	 (2007)	have	also	emphasised	developing	good	corporate	governance	 in	companies.	 	 It	has	mainly	 focused	on	 investor	protection,	 transparency	and	accountability;	 promoting	 good	 corporate	 governance	 in	 Nepal	 to	 bring	dynamism	for	the	economic	development	of	country.			
3.4 Development	of	Corporate	Governance	in	Nepal	
While	 organisations	 and	 banks	 in	 Nepal	 have	 been	 governed	 in	 one	 way	 or	another	since	 their	 incorporation,	 the	financial	 sector	 reform	of	1990s	can	be	taken	as	a	pioneer	step	for	the	establishment	of	a	formal	governance	mechanism.	The	central	bank	of	Nepal,	NRB,	repeatedly	issues	several	corporate	governance	guidelines	 for	 the	 banking	 sector.	 The	 FSR,	 along	 with	 the	 governance	mechanism,	helps	not	 only	 to	 protect	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 shareholders,	 boosts	
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investors’	confidence	and	capacity	building	but	also	helps	to	foster	networking	opportunities	with	various	developing	and	developed	economies.	To	achieve	the	same	 objectives,	 the	 NRB	 has	 issued	 the	 unified	 directives	 6	 which	 includes	guidelines	for	boards	of	directors,	managers	and	shareholders,	role	of	internal	auditor,	 external	 auditor	 and	 internal	 control,	 compensation	schemes,	 etc,	 	 to	foster	good	governance	(BAFIA,	2006).		These	guidelines	were	prepared	based	on	 the	 recommendations	 and	 guidelines	 made	 by	 the	 BASEL	 committee	 on	corporate	 governance	 and	 the	 OECD’s	 	 principles	 of	 corporate	 governance	(McGee,	2010).		The	key	points	discussed	in	the	guidelines	handbook	for	good	governance	 are	 related	 to	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 management,	 financial	disclosures	and	auditors,	which	are	briefly	discussed	below:	
3.4.1 Board	of	Directors	
As	per	 the	Bank	and	Financial	 Institutions	Act,	2006	all	banks	must	have	a	board	of	directors	of	between	five	to	nine	members	including	one	professional	director	 from	 the	 list	provided	 by	 the	NRB.	 The	 directors	 are	 appointed	 at	general	or	annual	general	meetings	of	the	banks	and	financial	institutions.	In	the	event	of	vacancy	of	the	post	before	the	general	meeting,	the	existing	board	of	directors	may	appoint	the	directors	for	the	remainder	of	the	term.	Similarly,	the	professional	director	is	appointed	by	the	existing	board	of	directors	from	the	list	of	professional	experts	provided	by	the	Nepal	Rastra	Bank.		Among	the	chosen	directors,	 the	 chairperson	of	 the	board	 is	 chosen	by	 the	majority	of	votes	(Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act,	2006).		Further,	there	is	a	single-tier	board	structure	in	Nepal	and	generally	there	are	no	two	members	related	from	
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the	same	family,	and	chairman	and	managing	director	positions	are	separated	in	most	companies	(World	Bank,	2005).		
Similarly,	Chapter	3,	section	13	and	18	of	BAFIA	2006	defines	the	criteria	for	a	board	of	directors	and	includes	the	following:	
• The	 professional	 directors	 must	 have	 at	 least	 a	 master’s	 degree	 in	management,	banking,	finance,	money,	economics,	commerce	or	trade;	however,	there	are	no	restrictions	for	directors	who	are	elected	from	the	public.	
• A	candidate	must	be	a	normal	person	who	is	not	blacklisted	or	insolvent.		
• The	 candidate	 is	 not	 the	 director	 of	 any	 other	 bank	 or	 financial	institution;		
• The	candidate	is	not	a	partner	in	any	kind	of	contract	with	particular	banks,	and	so	on.	Similarly,	the	new	Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act	2017	has	set	the	tenure	for	the	managing	director	and	chairman	for	two	terms	each	of	four	years,	while	the	 term	 of	 the	 professional	 directors	 is	 only	 one	 term	 on	 the	 board	 of	directors,	 however	 other	 directors	 can	 be	 elected	 for	 several	 terms	 (Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017a).	
In	 the	 same	way,	 directors	 are	 allowed	 to	 receive	 only	meeting	 allowances	unless	 specified	 by	 the	 bank’s	 articles	 of	 association.	 	 Additionally,	 the	company	must	 hold	 its	 board	 meetings	 at	 least	 12	 times	 a	 year;	 with	 the	interval	between	any	two	meetings	not	exceeding	more	than	two	months.		The	board	meetings	may	be	called	at	any	time	when	at	least	two	thirds	of	directors	
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provide	 a	meeting	 request	 in	writing	 to	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	 board;	 but	 to	conduct	 any	 board	meeting	 there	must	 be	 at	 least	 51	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	number	 of	 directors.	 	 If	 any	 directors	 have	 any	 personal	 interest	 in	 the	resolution	to	be	discussed	at	 the	meeting,	 then	they	are	not	entitled	to	 take	part	in	that	meeting.		
BAFIA	2006	has	also	pinpointed	some	specific	responsibilities	to	the	board	of	directors,	which	are	pinpointed	below:	
• No	board	directors	are	entitled	to	derive	any	personal	benefits	from	the	bank	or	financial	institutions	while	performing	the	role.	
• If	any	director	is	found	to	have	derived	personal	benefit,	then	the	financial	institution	has	the	right	to	recover	that	amount	from	the	director.		
• If	 any	 directors	 take	 any	 decision	 beyond	 his/	 her	responsibility	 and	 cause	 harm	 to	 the	 bank,	 the	 bank	 or	financial	 institution	 will	 not	 be	 responsible	 for	 any	 action	taken	by	that	director.	
• The	board	should	prescribe	the	remuneration	and	benefits	of	the	chief	executive.	
 
3.4.2 Management	
Since	BAFIA	2006,	there	has	been	a	slight	change	in	the	appointment	criteria	for	 the	CEOs	of	banks	and	financial	 institutions	 in	BAFIA	2017.	A	bank	CEO	must	 have	 completed	 a	Master’s	 degree	 in	management,	 banking,	 financial,	
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monetary	 and	 economics,	 commerce,	 auditing,	 statistics,	 or	 law.	 Or,	alternatively,	they	may	have	a	Bachelor	degree	and	at	least	10	years	working	as	an	officer	in	these	areas	to	be	eligible	to	become	a	bank	CEO.	Furthermore,	just	as	it	is	for		the	board	of	directors,	for	any	individual	to	be	appointed	CEO,	he/she	 must	 be	 a	 normal	 person,	 and	 should	 not	 be	 have	 been	 declared	bankrupt	 or	 have	 any	 fraud	 or	 dishonest	 offence.	 Beside	 this,	 the	 person	should	not	have	been	blacklisted	(or	have	completed	three	years	from	being	released	from	blacklisted).	
The	chief	executive	officer	of	a	bank	can	have	a	two-year	tenure.		The	CEO	is	accountable	to	the	board	and	is	responsible	for	supervising	and	controlling	the	activities	 of	 the	 bank	 or	 financial	 institution	 that	 have	 been	 passed	 by	 the	board	of	directors.		Additionally,	the	CEO	is	responsible	for	the	preparation	of	the	 annual	 budget	 and	 action	 plan	which	 he/she	 presents	 to	 the	 board	 for	approval	before	implementation.			(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2017a).		
3.4.3 Audit	Committee	
The	 Companies	 Act	 (2006),	 Bank	 and	 Financial	 Institution	 Act	 (2017),	 and	Unified	 directives	 (2017),	 issued	 by	 the	 central	 banks	 have	 specified	 the	requirements	 to	 have	 an	 audit	 committee,	 and	 outlines	 duties	 and	responsibilities	and	the	size	of	audit	committee.	The	Companies	Act	 (2006)	requires	all	the	listed	companies	with	the	paid	up	capital	of	NPR	30	million,	which	is	fully	or	partly	owned	by	the	government,	to	have	an	audit	committee	under	the	chairmanship	of	a	non-executive	director	who	is	not	involved	in	the	day	 to	day	operations	of	 the	 company.	Further,	 this	Act	prohibits	 any	 close	
66		
relatives	of	the	CEO	to	be	the	members	of	the	audit	committee.	Additionally,	this	Act	requires	at	least	one	experienced	person	with	professional	certificates	in	accounting	or	with	experience	in	the	accounting	and	financial	fields,	after	having	 obtained	 at	 least	 a	 Bachelor’s	 degree	 in	 accounting,	 commerce,	management,	finance	or	economics.	
In	 the	 same	 vein,	 the	 Unified	 directives	 (2017),	 issued	 by	 the	 central	 banks	regarding	 the	 code	 of	 corporate	 governance,	 specifically	 states	 that	 CEOs	 of	banks	 or	 financial	 institutions	 cannot	 be	 members	 of	 the	 audit	 committee,	however	they	can	participate	if	necessary.	The	directives	also	require	the	audit	committee	to	evaluate	the	financial	condition	of	the	institution	and	their	internal	control	mechanism,	issue	necessary	guidelines	for	management	of	the	institution,	as	 well	 as	 provide	 their	 findings	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 accounts	 and	 financial	management	 to	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 for	 necessary	 action.	 The	 board	 of	directors	 are	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 the	 suggestions	 provided	 by	 the	audit	committee	and	if	 they	are	unable	to	 implement	them,	they	must	provide	appropriate	reasons	for	not	doing	so.	The	Companies	Act	(2006)	has	highlighted	the	responsibilities	of	the	audit	committee	as:		
• To	review	the	accounts	and	financial	statements	of	the	company	
• To	review	internal	financial	control	and	risk	management	systems	
• To	supervise	and	review	internal	auditing	activity	of	the	company	
• To	recommend	 the	names	of	potential	auditors	 for	 the	appointment	of	the	 auditor	of	 the	 company	 and	 fix	 their	 remuneration	 and	 terms	 and	conditions	
• To	review	 the	remarks	contained	 in	 the	external	audit	 report	and	 take	
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necessary	actions	if	required.	
• To	provide	board	of	directors	about	the	accurate	information	about	the	company.	
• To	prepare	accounts	related	policy	of	the	company	and	enforce	it.	
3.4.4 External	Auditors	
As	 per	 the	 Companies	 Act,	 2006	 all	 the	 listed	 companies	must	 appoint	 an	external	auditor	and	have	their	accounts	audited.	In	cases	where	the	company	has	a	branch	office	outside	Nepal,	the	appointed	auditor	audits	the	accounts	of	that	 branch	 as	 well,	 if	 the	 foreign	 county’s	 law	 allows.	 The	 company	 can	appoint	any	auditor	among	the	persons	holding	an	auditor	licence.	However,	the	auditor	must	be	approved	by	the	general	meeting	of	 the	company	or	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 conditions	 mentioned	 in	 the	 articles	 of	 association.	However,	for	the	banks	and	other	financial	institutions,	the	auditor	must	be	appointed	from	amongst	an	auditors	list	approved	by	the	NRB	(BAFIA,	2017).		The	 auditor	 for	 the	 commercial	 banks,	 development	 banks	 and	 finance	companies	 should	 a	 chartered	 accountant,	 while	 for	 the	 class	 D	 financial	institutions,	 such	 as	 co-operatives,	 auditors	 can	 either	 be	 chartered	accountants	 or	 registered	 auditors.	 The	 NRB	 may	 remove	 any	 authorised	auditors	at	any	time	if	the	auditors	fail	to	fulfil	their	duty.	Additionally,	banks	and	 financial	 institutions	 can	 appoint	 same	 auditor	 for	 a	 maximum	 three	consecutive	terms.		
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3.5 Supervision	Framework	
The	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 economic	development	of	the	country.	The	monitoring,	control	and	supervision	of	these	institutions	should	be	robust	as	compared	to	other	industries	because	they	use	other	people’s	money.		If	there	is	any	problem	in	the	banking	sector	then	it	will	not	only	affect	the	business	it	will	also		affect	the	economy	of	whole	country	or	even	the	whole	world.	The	recent	example	was	the	global	 financial	crisis	of	2008.	 So,	 in	 every	 country,	 as	 compared	 to	 other	 institutions,	 the	 banking	sector	has	to	comply	with	additional	regulations	from	the	central	banks.	The	government	 along	 with	 the	 central	 banks	 always	 try	 to	 keep	 updated	 and	develop	effective	supervision	to	ensure	a	safe	and	efficient	banking	sector.	So,	in	the	,	context	of	Nepal,	the	central	bank	of	the	country,	the	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	has	 adopted	 several	 monitoring	 and	 control	 mechanisms	 to	 ensure	 good	governance,	market	 discipline	 and	 build	 investors’	 confidence.	 The	 current	status	of	supervision	system	implemented	by	NRB	are	discussed	below:	
3.5.1 Supervision	System	of	Banking	in	Nepal	
The	central	bank	of	Nepal,	Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	carries	out	the	supervision	of	banks	and	financial	institutions	in	two	different	ways	i.e.,	on-site	monitoring	and	off-site	supervision	and	inspection.		
I. On-site	Monitoring:	Nepal	 Rastra	 Bank	 at	 any	 time	may	 conduct	 on-site	 inspection	 and	supervision	of	banks	or	financial	institutions.	The	reputed	officer	of	the	central	 bank	 or	 an	 expert	 designated	 by	 NRB	 carries	 out	 such	
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inspections.		It	is	the	legal	duty	of	all	the	banks	or	financial	institutions	to	provide	the	statement,	data,	record	and	information	as	asked	for	by	the	 officials	 to	 review	or	 examine	within	 a	 time	 prescribed	 by	 them	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank	Act,	2002).		Generally,	the	on-site	monitoring	and	inspection	is	carried	out	once	a	year	for	the	bank’s	head	office	and	at	least	once	in	three	years	for	a	branch	office	(Sahayogee,	2017).		
II. Off-site	supervision	and	inspection:	Along	 with	 the	 on-site	 monitoring,	 the	 NRB	 conducts	 off-site	supervision	and	monitoring	of	the	banks	and	financial	institutions	by	asking	 banks	 for	 necessary	 documents	 and	 information.	 The	 central	bank	conducts	 the	 capital	 adequacy,	 asset	quality,	 earnings,	 liquidity	and	 sensitivity	 (CAELS),	 by	 calculating	 various	 ratios	 such	 as	 capital	adequacy	ratio,	credit	to	deposit	and	core	capital,	non-performing	loan	to	 total	 loan,	 net	 liquid	 assets	 to	 total	 deposit,	 return	 on	 assets	 and	return	on	equity	on	a	quarterly	basis	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2014).			
This	 method	 is	 comparatively	 less	 expensive	 compared	 to	 onsite	inspections.	Along	with	CAELS	analysis,	NRB	also	assesses	the	policies,	directives	and	regulations	to	see	if	they	are	sufficient	to	meet	current	monitory	 policy	 and	 fulfil	 the	 national	 objectives	 of	 economic	development.		
In	the	same	way,	the	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	has	formulated	various	Acts	to	guide	and	 maintain	 good	 governance	 in	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions.	 A	 brief	description	of	them	are	given	below:	
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3.5.2 Nepal	Rastra	Bank	Act,	2002:	
This	Act	was	formulated	with	the	objective	to	strengthen	supervision	of	banks	and	financial	institutions.	This	Act	gives	independence	and	autonomous	rights	to	 the	 central	 banks,	 free	 from	 government	 intervention,	 to	 formulate	monetary	and	foreign	exchange	policies	to	maintain	price	stability,	balance	of	payment,	 develop	 a	 secure,	 healthy	 and	 efficient	 payment	 system,	appropriately	regulate,	inspect	and	supervise	banks	and	financial	systems	and	enhance	 public	 credibility	 towards	 banks	 and	 financial	 systems	 (NRB	 Act,	2002).	 	 This	 Act	 has	 also	 stated	 several	 requirements	 to	 prevent	 political	intervention	 and	 maintain	 professionalism	 in	 Nepal	 Rastra	 Bank	 by	specifically	mentioning	 the	 criteria	 for	 the	 formation	of	boards	of	directors	including	appointment	of	governor	and	deputy	governor,	their	qualifications,	code	of	 conduct,	 terms	of	directors	and	remuneration	and	other	benefits	of	directors.	 Further,	 it	mentions	 the	 constitution,	 functions	 and	 duties	 of	 the	inquiry	committee,	meetings	of	the	board,	their	functions,	duties	and	power	and	professional	code	of	conduct	and	official	responsibilities	(NRB	Act,	2002).		These	all	help	to	enhance	the	good	corporate	governance	in	the	central	banks.	In	the	same	way,	the	Act	has	also	formulated	various	provisions	required	for	effective	supervision	including	on-site	and	off-site	inspection,	specified	times	for	 submission	 of	 reports,	 provision	 for	 inspection	 of	 reports	 and	 legal	penalties	 in	case	of	non	-compliance	by	the	banks	and	financial	 institutions.		This	Act	has	also	provided	ultimate	power	of	cancellation	of	operating	licences,	authority	 for	suspension	of	 the	board	of	directors,	and	take-over	by	central	banks	 for	 problematic	 commercial	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions.	
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Additionally,	 it	 also	mentions	 the	 provision	 for	 a	 fine	 for	 violation	 of	 bank	regulations.		
3.5.3 Bank	and	Financial	Institutions	Act,	2006:	
The	Bank	and	Financial	Institutions	Act,	2006	was	formulated	to	promote	trust	amongst	the	general	public	in	the	overall	banking	and	financial	system,	protect	and	promote	rights	and	 interests	of	depositors,	provide	quality	and	reliable	banking	 and	 financial	 intermediary	 services	 to	 the	 general	 public,	 develop	healthy	 competition	 among	 the	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions,	 minimise	risks	related	to	banks	and	the	financial	sector,	and	boost and consolidate the 
economy of the State of Nepal by liberalizing the banking and financial 
sectors and make necessary legal provisions relating to the establishment of 
banks and financial institutions in Nepal. This	 act	 provides	 four	 types	 of	licences	for	the	BFIs:	commercial	banks	(class	A),	development	banks	(class	B),	finance	companies	(class	C)	and	micro	finance	development	banks	(class	D).		It	has	also	mentioned	the	provisions	relating	to	the	board	of	directors	and	chief	executive	officer,	including	their	functions,	duties	and	power,	criteria	for	their	appointment,	 their	 remuneration,	 and	 facilitates	 meetings	 and	 their	responsibilities	and	duties.	Similarly,	it	has	also	included	the	provision	related	to	capital,	operating	and	financial	transactions,	supply	and	recovery	of	credit,	accounts,	 records	 return	 and	 reports,	 appointment	 of	 auditors,	 along	 with	their	 functions,	 duties	 and	 power,	 provisions	 related	 to	 mergers	 and	provisions	related	to	offenses	and	punishments.	(BFIA	Act,	2006).	 	Based	on	the	international	banking	norms	and	standards,	NRB	has	issued	more	than	22	
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directives	 for	 the	regulation	of	banks	and	financial	 institutions.	Some	of	 the	major	 directives	 issued	 by	 the	 central	 banks	 include	 directives	 regarding	capital	 adequacy,	 loan	 classification	 and	 provisioning,	 credit	 concentration	and	single	obligor	limits,	risk	management,	corporate	governance,	provisions	related	to	investments,	cash	reserve	ratios,	deprived	sector	lending,	knowing	your	customers,	electronic	banking,	and	so	on	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016b).		
3.5.4 Unified	Directives,	2017	
For	the	proper	and	smooth	operation	of	the	banks	and	financial	institutions,	all	 the	 fragmented	 provisions	 related	 to	 supervision	was	 brought	 into	 one	place	in	the	unified	directives	to	avoid	any	regulatory	slipup	in	the	operation	of	 the	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions.	 The	 first	 unified	 directives	 were	formulated	in	2010	and	after	that	every	year	they	have	been	revised	to	meet	the	changing	regulatory	requirements.		This	has	eased	the	supervision	process	for	the	NRB.	The	unified	directives	include	supervision	by-law,	on-site	and	off-site	 inspection	manuals,	procedures	to	review	a	bank’s	overall	performance	based	 on	 the	 CAMEL	 ratings,	 and	 so	 on.	 This	 helps	 to	 strengthen	 the	surveillance	of	banks	and	financial	institutions	and	provides	early	warning	for	unforeseen	possible	actions.		
In	 the	 same	 way,	 unified	 directives	 have	 also	 incorporated	 various	international	guidelines	from	BASEL	II	and	BASEL	III,	with	some	customisation.	It	has	also	promulgated	stress-testing	guidelines	for	class	A	commercial	banks	to	gauge	the	strengths	of	the	banking	sector	against	possible	shocks.	Similarly,	it	has	also	incorporated	Internal	Capital	Adequacy	Assessment	Process	(ICAAP)	
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guidelines	 to	 identify	 the	 unique	 risk	 of	 each	 bank	 and	 set	 the	 capital	requirements	accoutring	 to	 this	 risk.	 	 In	 the	 same	way,	 “Prompt	Corrective	Action”	 (PCA)	was	 implemented	with	several	 triggers	 for	 capital	deficiency,	liquidity	shortfall	and	non-performing	loans	(Nepal	Rastra	Bank,	2016b).		
3.6 Prudential	Regulations:	
In	addition	to	the	above	Acts	and	directives,	the	central	bank	of	Nepal	issues	several	 prudential	 regulations	 related	 to	 disclosure,	 assets	 quality,	 loan	classification,	 corporate	 governance,	 code	 of	 conduct,	 periodical	 reporting	requirements,	mechanism	for	divestment	of	shares	by	promoters,		and	so	on,	to	mitigate	several	financial	risks	and	to	bring	regulations	in	line	with	various	international	 standards.	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 NRB	 also	 amends	 the	 licensing	requirements	and	capital	adequacy	requirements	time	and	again	to	promote	strict	standards.	NRB	experts	formulate	all	these	regulations	after	consultation	with	world	banks	and	following	the	guiding	Principles	of	Bank	Supervision	by	the	Bank	for	International	Settlement	(BIS).		
3.7 Legal	framework	for	dealing	with	problems	in	banks	and	
financial	institutions	
As	in	other	companies,	there	is	always	the	possibility	of	problems	arising	in	banks	 and	 financial	 institutions.	 As	 banks	 use	 other	 people’s	 money	 to	maintain	their	solvency	and	liquidity	risk,	they	need	to	improve	their	financial	resources,	improve	their	risk	management	capabilities,	and	risk	profile.	The	government	and	central	banks	have	formulated	some	Acts	to	guide	and	protect	banks	from	problems	that	may	occur.	The	various	Acts	formulated	to	deal	with	
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the	 remedial	 actions	 for	 problematic	 banks	 include;	 The	 NRB	 Act,	 2002,	Companies	 Act,	 2006,	 BAFIA,	 2006,	 The	 Solvency	 Act,	 2006	 and	 Unified	Directives,	2017.	With	the	help	of	all	these	Acts	the	central	bank	of	Nepal,	NRB,	have	an	ultimate	power	to	declare	the	bank	as	problematic	under	section	86	B	of	the	NRB	Act,	2002.	
3.8 Responsibilities	of	regulatory	bodies	for	the	resolution	of	
problem	banks:	
Two	 institutions	 in	 Nepal	 are	 mainly	 responsible	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	problematic	banks.	The	first	is	Nepal	Rastra	Bank	and	the	second	is	the	Debt	Recovery	Tribunal.	The	roles	and	responsibilities	of	these	two	institutions	are	briefly	discussed	below:	
3.8.1.1 Nepal	Rastra	Bank	
As	the	central	bank	of	the	country,	the	role	of	NRB	is	to	identify	problems	early,	ensure	 preventive	 and	 corrective	 measures	 and	 formulate	 a	 resolution	strategy	if	required.	The	NRB	Act,	2002	provides	full	legal	authority	and	power	for	 the	 NRB	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 problem	 bank.	 The	 central	 bank	 tries	 to	 avoid	situations	where	they	may	have	to	 intervene	by	developing	strict	screening	tests	when	allocating	 licences	to	banks	and	financial	 institutions.	To	control	their	 behaviour,	 even	 after	 establishment	 and	 during	 their	 operations,	 the	central	 bank	 has	 formulated	 various	 guidelines,	 rules,	 regulations,	 and	supervision	 systems	 including	on-site	and	off-site	 inspections	 to	ensure	 the	soundness	of	the	banks	and	financial	institutions.	However,	even	with	these	
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regulations	and	guidelines,	 if	 the	NRB	finds	some	issue	 in	 terms	of	a	bank’s	functionality	 or	 liquidity,	 then	 the	 central	 bank	 will	 intervene	 and	 their	resolutions	will	come	into	effect.		
The	NRB	Act,	2002,	states	various	corrective	actions	that	need	to	be	taken	for	a	 problem	 bank.	 	 The	 NRB	 provides	 guidelines,	 instruction,	 strategies	 and	plans	to	be	discussed	with	a	problem	bank’s	board	and	gives	a	specific	period	to	implement	them.	If	the	bank	is	unable	to	take	the	corrective	actions	then	the	NRB	 takes	 additional	 steps	 to	 save	 the	 bank	 from	 liquidation	 (Dhungana,	2008),	discussed	below:	
i. NRB	declares	the	bank	as	problem	bank	as	per	section	86(B)	of	NRB	Act,	2002	and	initiates	corrective	actions	and	for	the	banking	and	financial	institutions	pursuant	to	section	86	(C)	of	the	NRB	Act,	2002.		ii. The	NRB	initiates	restructuring	actions	by	taking	control	over	the	bank	as	per	section	86	(d	and	e)	iii. If	 that	 does	 not	 work,	 then	 finally	 the	 NRB	 appeals	 in	 court	 for	liquidation.	The	BAFIA,	2006	and	Insolvency	Act,	2006	clearly	state	the	provision	for	liquidation.	
3.8.1.2 Debt	Recovery	Tribunal:	
Nepal	has	a	complex	and	lengthy	process	to	recover	the	bad	loans	of	banks	and	financial	 institutions.	 In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 this	 process	 and	 make	 it	 more	standardised,	an	institutional	framework	was	introduced	in	2002.	To	deal	with	the	 loan	 recovery	 process,	 under	 the	 Nepal	 financial	 sector	 reform,	 the	government	has	established	the	Debt	Recovery	Tribunal	(DRT).	The	DRT	has	
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the	legal	authority	to	acquire	borrowers’/	guarantees’	additional	other	assets	that	are	not	pledged	to	the	concerned	banks	and	have	the	power	to	dispose	of	it	through	the	auction	process	for	the	recovery	of	loans.	The	problem	bank	will	bring	its	case	to	the	DRT	and	the	DRT	will	help	to	solve	it.	
Furthermore,	 to	 solve	 this	 issue,	 the	 court	 should	provide	 timely	and	quick	support	for	the	banks	and	financial	institutions.	Till	the	time	the	bank	is	able	to	recover	its	loans,	it	may	not	be	able	to	meet	depositors’	claims.	To	deal	with	such	 problems,	 adequate	 and	 skilful	 commercial	 lawyers	 are	 required.	Moreover	there	should	be		special	courts	or	lawyers	to	deal	with	such	cases	(Dhungana,	2008).		
3.9 Conclusion		
This	 chapter	 provided	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 corporate	 governance	mechanism	 in	 Nepal.	 	 Additionally,	 it	 also	 discusses	 the	 regulatory	 and	supervisory	 framework	for	banks	 including	the	 legal	 framework	for	dealing	with	problems	in	banks	and	financial	institutions.	
The	following	chapter	will	review	the	literature	and	outline	the	changes	and	trends	 in	 corporate	 governance.	 It	 also	 tries	 to	 explore	 the	 relationship	between	corporate	governance	and	financial	performance	of	firms,	especially	relating	to	banking	institutions.		
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4 Chapter	Four	
Literature	Review	
4.1 Introduction	
In	this	chapter,	prior	research	into	the	governance	of	banking	institutions	in	low-income	 countries	 is	 reviewed.		Attention	 is	 focussed	 on	 the	 issues	examined,	the	methods	and	data	used	in	the	empirical	analyses	and	the	key	findings	in	these	prior	studies. 
Theory	 and	 testing	 of	 research	 questions	 in	 corporate	 governance	 have	developed	 into	 a	 substantial	 body	 of	 knowledge.		With	 advancements	 in	financial	 econometric	 research,	banks	and	 financial	 institutions	 receive	 less	coverage	than	other	industrial	sectors,	perhaps	due	to	the	different	nature	of	their	 balance	 sheets.		The	 majority	 of	 literature	 concerns	 publicly	 listed	companies,	using	data	available	 from	large	databases.		Not	surprisingly,	 this	has	meant	the	majority	of	work	stems	from	the	more	mature	financial	markets	of	Western	Europe	and	North	America. 
The	 concern	 for	 public	 sector	 performance	 has	 increased	 the	 volume	 of	material	dealing	with	governance	in	the	organisations	and	institutions	other	than	corporations.		Small	businesses,	non-government	organisations	(NGOs),	family	businesses	and	mixed	ownership	enterprises	where	government	and	private	equity	are	present	are	benefitting	from	careful	analyses.	
Low-income	countries	(LIC)	have	many	problems,	and	corporate	governance	is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 accepted.		Research	 in	 these	 countries,	 which	 is	 often	
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hampered	by	a	paucity	of	data,	especially	reliable	and	complete	data,	remains	less-well	 developed.		The	 lack	 of	 regulatory	 frameworks,	 under-developed	financial	 markets,	 and	 lack	 of	 interest	 from	 scholars	 in	 more	 mature	economies	 has	 limited	 the	 volume	 of	 robust	 research	 published	 in	 the	area.		Nevertheless,	 knowledge	 gained	 in	 other	 countries	 provides	 a	 useful	starting	 point	 where	 no	 LIC	 research	 is	 available	 for	 engaging	 with	 the	research	questions	being	examined	in	this	thesis. 
The	 remainder	of	 this	 chapter	 is	 organised	 as	 follows,	 first	 it	discusses	 the	chronological	 development	 of	 corporate	 governance,	 then	 the	 corporate	governance	 in	 low	 income	 countries,	 followed	 by	 corporate	 governance	 in	banks	and	finally	it	identifies	the	research	gap	and	concludes	the	chapter.		
4.2 Introduction	 and	 Early	 Approach	 of	 Corporate	
Governance	
There	have	been	extensive	studies	in	the	field	of	corporate	governance.		Yet	it	persists	 to	 be	 of	 interest	 among	 the	 academicians	 and	 a	 matter	 of	 public	concern	due	to	the	various	corporate	governance	scandals	that	have	occurred	in	Europe,	USA	and	in	various	places	throughout	the	world	(Allen,	2005).	The	chronological	development	of	corporate	governance	is	given	below.		
4.2.1 Foundation	for	study	of	Corporate	Governance		
The	root	of	corporate	governance	can	be	traced	back	to	1622	when	a	conflict	of	interest	arose	between	the	shareholders	and	multiple	directors	in	the	Dutch	East	 Indies	 Company	 (Jongh,	 2011).	 In	 1776,	 Adam	 Smith	 raised	 concerns	
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about	 the	 separation	 of	 ownership	 from	 control	 in	 a	 large	 corporation.	 In	Smith’s	 view,	 the	 separation	of	 ownership	 and	 control	 in	 corporations	 created	poor	incentives	for	professional	managers	to	operate	companies	efficiently.	Smith	postulated	that	 if	shareholders	wanted	managers	to	operate	companies	 in	their	own	best	interest,	then	they	needed	to	devise	ways	to	control	managers'	actions	(Reddy,	2010).	
4.2.2 From	1850	to	1950	
This	century	can	be	recognised	as	the	beginning	of	the	formation	of	various	legislation	related	to	corporate	governance	as	different	rules	and	regulations	were	propounded	during	this	period:	
• 1870:		German	Company	Law	introduced	the	dual	board	structure	to	govern	the	organisation;		
• 1890:	The	UK	government	developed	the	UK’s	Directors	Liability	Act	which	 states	 that	 the	 company	 directors	 are	 liable	 in	 damages	 for	‘untrue	statements’;	
• 1899:	 With	 the	 aim	 to	 attract	 more	 investment;	 Delaware,	 US 1	formulated	the	General	Incorporate	Act;	and	
• 1933:	The	Security	Act	1933	was	developed	in	the	UK,	which	defines	the	 responsibilities	 of	 directors	 and	 shareholders	 in	 the	 articles	 of	association	of	the	company.	
	
	
																																																								
1 	Delaware	is	 a	 U.S.	 state	located	 on	 the	Atlantic	 Coast	in	 the	North-eastern	and	Mid-Atlantic	regions	of	the	United	States	
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Later,	following	the	Smith’s	view,	in	their	seminal	work	Berle	&	Means	(1932)	examined	 the	 large	 modern	 organisations	 with	 separate	 ownership	 and	control.	From	their	studies,	they	showed	that	in	large	corporations	with	many	investors,	due	to	their	lack	of	interest,	knowledge,	time	or	money	to	handle	the	company,	managers	are	hired	and	are	provided	with	discretionary	power	to	manage	 the	 corporation.	 	 However,	 frequently,	 the	 company	 will	 become	concentrated,	and	ownership	will	be	separated	 from	control,	and	these	two	trends	undermine	the	fundamental	assumptions	of	Adam	Smith's	capitalism.	The	 interests	of	 the	owner	and	of	 the	ultimate	manager	may,	 and	often	do,	diverge.	Consequently,	many	of	the	checks	which	formerly	operated	to	limit	the	use	of	power	tend	to	disappear	(McCraw,	1990).	
Shareholder's	theory	is	the	traditional	theory	of	corporate	governance,	and	it	traces	its	links	to	the	works	of	Adam	Smith	(1776)	and	Berle	and	Means	(1932),	which	 was	 acknowledged	 by	 the	 seminal	 paper	 by	 Michael	 C.	 Jensen	 and	William	 H.	 Meckling	 (1976).	 This	 theory	 was	 initially	 proposed	 by	 Milton	Friedman.	According	to	Friedman	(1962):		
There	is	one	and	only	one	social	responsibility	of	business:	to	use	its	 resources	 to	 engage	 in	 activities	 designed	 to	 increase	 its		profits	so	long	as	it	stays	within	the	rules	of	the	game,	which	is	to	say,	engages	in	open	and	free	competition,	without	deception	or	fraud.	
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This	theory	proposes	that	managers	are	the	hired	agents	of	shareholders	to	run	 the	 business	 and	 increase	 their	 profits.	 	 This	 theory	 has	 the	 greatest	influence	among	the	theorist	and	academicians.		
4.2.3 During	1970s	
During	 that	 period	 there	were	 three	 significant	 developments	 in	 corporate	governance	 thinking:	 the	 significance	 of	 independent	 outside	 directors	was	recognised	and	the	audit	committees	were	introduced	in	the	United	States,	and	the	two-tier	board	was	promoted	in	the	United	Kingdom	(Tricker,	2011).		
Michael	C.	Jensen	and	William	H.	Meckling	(1976)	identified	the	existence	of	an	‘agency	problem’	between	managers	and	shareholders.	 	As	the	managers	(agents)	do	not	own	the	company	resources,	there	is	a	possibility	that	they	will	commit	moral	hazards	(hiding	 losses,	shirking	duties,	etc.)	 to	 increase	their	individual	wealth	at	the	cost	of	the	shareholders.		
In	all	these	studies	it	was	found	that	there	is	a	possibility	of	a	conflict	of	interest	between	the	managers	and	shareholders.	Since	there	are	many	shareholders	in	the	organisation,	they	need	to	hire	the	managers	and	nominate	the	board	of	directors	 to	 run	 the	organisation.	But	 the	big	 challenge	was	developing	 the	mechanism	 to	 control	 their	 actions	 for	 the	 better	 performance	 of	 the	organisation.		
During	this	period,	the	popular	theory	of	corporate	governance,	agency	theory	was	developed.		
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4.2.4 During	1980s	
The	 focus	 of	 the	 organisation	 during	 this	 phase	 was	 to	 increase	 the	shareholders’	value.	The	directors	began	to	be	concerned	only	with	the	profit	of	the	organisation.	At	this	time,	many	state-run	enterprises	were	privatised	in	 the	 UK	 and	 gradually	 in	 other	 countries.	 However,	 massive	 corporate	failures	were	faced	in	US,	UK,	Japan,	Australia	and	other	nations	due	to	huge	junk-bond	finance,	insider	dealings,	and	dubious	corporate	governance.	 	For	all	 these	 reasons,	 corporate	 governance	 has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 attention	 of	many	investors,	academicians	and	researchers.		
As	a	result,	Earl	(1983)	published	a	paper	in	Perspectives	on	Management;	the	American	Law	Institute	(1984)	published	a	report	on	Principles	of	Corporate	Governance;	Williams	 and	 Findlay	 (1984)	 studied	 the	 problems	 that	might	arise	due	to	the	organisational	hierarchy	and	the	self-interests	of	the	agents;	Mintzberg	(1984)	conducted	research	on	who	should	control	the	organisation;	Nader	(1984)	studied	how	an	organisation	can	reform	its	governance	practice	to	make	it	more	efficient;	and	Baysinger	and	Bulter	(1985)	studied	corporate	governance	 by	 looking	 at	 its	 effect	 on	 corporate	 performance	 and	 board	composition.	 Williamson	 (1988)	 combined	 the	 corporate	 finance	 with	corporate	governance,	arguing	that	debt	and	equity	are	treated	not	mainly	as	alternative	 financial	 instruments,	 but	 rather	 as	 alternative	 governance	structures	 and	 also	 compares	 and	 contrasts	 the	 transaction-cost	 approach	with	the	agency	approach	to	the	study	of	economic	organisation.	
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After	 extensive	 research	 related	 to	 agency	 problems	 in	 US	 markets,	researchers	diverted	their	interests	into	Europe	and	other	developed	markets,	including	France,	Germany,	Japan	and	the	UK.	The	research	topic	was	slightly	diverted	 towards	 the	 capital	 markets	 and	 corporate	 control	 and	 mainly	focused	on	the	changes	associated	with	takeovers	(Ball,	1987;	Franks,	Mayer,	Hardie,	&	Malinvaud,	1990).		
During	this	period,	another	theory	of	Corporate	Governance	was	developed;	stakeholders	 theory.	 The	 background	 of	 this	 theory	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	concepts	 of	 the	 co-operative	 movement,	 mutuality	 and	 the	 intellectual	foundations	which	 describe	 the	 company	 as	 a	 bundle	 of	 human	 assets	 and	relationships	 (Clarke,	 1984;	 Penrose,	 1980).	 According	 to	 this	 theory,	 the	organisation	should	not	only	maximise	the	interests	of	the	shareholders	but	also	those	of	other	different	stakeholders	of	organisations,	such	as	employees,	customers,	creditors,	suppliers	and	community	(Evan	&	Freeman,	1988).		
Stakeholder	theory	owes	its	development	to	Edward	Freeman‘s	seminal	text	
Strategic	 Management:	 A	 Stakeholder	 Approach.	 Freeman‘s	 study	 not	 only	defined	the	concept	of	stakeholder	but	also	provided	the	explanation	that	a	corporation	takes	responsibilities	for	its	stakeholders	(Guo,	2011).		
Freeman	(1984)	defines	the	stakeholder	as	“Any	group	or	individual	[who]	can	affect,	 or	 is	 affected	 by,	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	 corporation’s	 purpose.	Stakeholders	 include	 employees,	 customers,	 suppliers,	 stockholders,	 banks,	environmentalists,	 government	 and	 other	 groups	who	 can	 help	 or	 hurt	 the	corporation.”		
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4.2.5 During	the	1990s		
There	were	major	developments	for	corporate	governance	during	the	1990s:		
1992:	 The	 Committee	 on	 the	 Financial	 Aspects	 of	 Corporate	 Governance,	chaired	by	Adrian	Cadbury	in	the	UK,	published	the	Cadbury	Report	which	is	deemed	a	crucial	turning	point	in	global	corporate	governance.	This	report	has	influenced	the	development	of	corporate	governance	not	only	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	but	also	 in	many	other	countries	such	as	 India	and	Russia	(United	Nations,	2003).		
1994:	Following	 the	 Cadbury	 Report,	 the	 group	 chaired	 by	 Paul	 Rutteman	developed	new	guidelines	for	‘internal	control’	and	‘financial	reporting’	which	should	be	followed	by	the	directors	of	listed	companies	registered	in	the	UK	(Davitt,	2006).	 
1995:	 The	 Greenbury	 Report	 was	 developed	 by	 Sir	 Richard	 Greenbury	 to	tackle	 the	 growing	 concern	 about	 directors’	 remuneration	 (Jones	 &	 Pollitt,	2001).	In	the	same	year,	to	improve	the	pension	schemes	in	the	UK,	the	United	Kingdom	Legislation	developed	the	Pension	Act.	
1999:	Turnbull	published	the	report	on	internal	control	where	he	advised	the	directors	on	combined	code	(Tricker,	2011).	
The	1990s	was	also	a	period	when	corporate	governance	came	forward	as	an	issue	both	for	public	policy	and	management	practice	(Deakin,	Konzelmann,	Hobbs,	 &	Wilkinson,	 2005).	 In	 the	 period	 from	 1990s	 to	 2003,	 there	were	several	research	studies	on	corporate	governance	around	the	world	(Denis	&	
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McConnell,	2003).	The	US	companies	and	boards	of	directors	were	 facing	a	competitive	 threat	 from	 Japanese	 and	German	 companies	 because	 of	 rising	competition	existing	between	governance	systems	along	with	their	products,	and	the	US	corporate	governance	system	was	declining	at	that	time.	This	drew	attention	to	the	importance	of	corporate	governance	in	US	firms,	so	they	began	to	 improve	 it	 and	 it	 quickly gained momentum in several other developed 
countries (Gilson	&	Roe,	1993). 
Shleifer	 and	 Vishny	 (1997)	 have	 studied	 corporate	 governance	 systems	around	 the	 world	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 legal	 protection	 of	investors	 and	 of	 ownership	 concentration.	 	 At	 that	 time,	many	 researchers	studied	the	relationships	between	corporate	governance	and	the	equity	prices	(Claessens,	1997;	Slovin	&	Sushka).		
During	 this	 period,	 there	 were	 many	 studies	 on	 the	 different	 models	 of	corporate	 governance	 and	 their	 comparative	 analysis	 (Allvey,	 1995;	Grunbichler	 &	 Oertmann,	 1996;	 Schaede,	 1995).	 	 Various	 research	 studies	have	 also	 been	 conducted	 on	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 corporate	governance	 structures	 and	 firm	performance	 in	 developed	 and	 transitional	economies.	De	Jong	(1997)	has	described	the	governance	structure	of	groups	of	large	European	corporations:	the	Anglo-Saxon,	the	Germanic	and	the	Latin	types	of	firms.	He	used	the	four	performance	evaluation	criteria:	productivity,	growth,	employment	and	total	compensation	to	shareholders,	and	found	that	continental	corporations	have	a	performance	equal	 to	or	better	 than	that	of	the	Anglo-Saxon	group.		
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The	collapse	of	the	Maxwell	business	empire,	and	other	corporate	failures	and	scandals	in	the	UK	have	led	to	demands	for	reforms	and	better	regulations	in	the	 field	 of	 corporate	 governance	 (Porporato	&	Robbins,	 2008).	 In	 1991,	 a	committee	 was	 established	 to	 study	 the	 financial	 aspects	 of	 corporate	governance	 by	 the	 London	 Stock	 Exchange	 and	 the	 Financial	 Reporting	Council	to	regulate	accounting	standards	in	the	UK	(Cheffins,	2011).	As	a	result,	
Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992) published	the	first	report	on	corporate	governance	about	the	financial	aspects	of	corporate	governance	in	the	UK.	In	this	report,	he	focused	on	the	importance	of	independent	non-executive	directors	and	its	code	of	best	practice.	But	this	report	did	not	become	so	popular	because	soon	after	 the	 Cadbury	 Committee	 was	 established,	 various	 prominent	 British	public	companies	collapsed	due	to	lack	of	accountability	of	top	executives.		
Although	 there	 had	 been	 some	 criticism	 in	 this	 report,	 it	 had	 a	 significant	influence	around	the	world.	With	reference	to	this	report,	many	reports	were	published	 by	 various	 countries:	 the	 Australian	 Committee	 Report	 on	Corporate	Governance	(1993),	King	Report	(1995)	from	South	Africa,	Vienot	Report	(1995)	from	France,	report	on	corporate	governance	from	Hong	Kong	Society	 of	 Accountants	 (1996),	 the	 Netherlands	 Report	 (1997)	 and	 others	(Tricker,	2011).	They	all	focussed	on	corporate	governance	and	the	potential	abuse	of	corporate	power.	The	major	concerns	of	all	these	reports	were	the	use	of	independent	outside	directors;	the	use	of	audit	committees	as	a	bridge	between	the	board	and	external	auditor;	the	separation	of	the	role	of	chairman	and	 chief	 executive;	 and	more	 checks	 and	 balances	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	small	shareholders.		
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At	this	period,	another	popular	theory	of	corporate	governance,	stewardship	theory,	was	developed	by	L.	Donaldson	&	J.	Davis	(1991)as	a	counter	strategy	to	 agency	 cost	 theory.	 Stewardship	 theory	 looks	 at	 governance	 through	 a	different	 lens	 from	 agency	 theory,	 reflecting	 the	 original	 legal	 view	 of	 the	corporation.	This	theory	assumes	that	the	managers	always	try	to	maximise	a	firm’s	performance	because	while	doing	so,	along	with	the	organisational	goals,	their	personal	needs	are	also	met.		
According	to	this	theory,	managers’	legal	duty	is	to	their	shareholders	not	to	themselves	 or	 to	 other	 interest	 groups,	 and	 they	 act	 responsibly	 with	independence	and	integrity	(Tricker,	2011).	So,	there	would	not	be	any	conflict	of	interest	between	the	owners	and	the	managers,	as	in	agency	theory.	
Advocates	 of	 stewardship	 theory	 advise	 that	 managers	 should	 be	 fully	empowered	to	operate	their	organizations	effectively.	For	example,	combining,	rather	than	separating,	the	role	of	board	chairman	and	chief	executive	officer	(CEO)	in	a	sole	position,	known	as	the	CEO	duality	(Donaldson	&	Davis,	1998).	
4.2.6 During	the	Twenty-first	Century	
In	the	twenty-first	century,	there	have	been	many	corporate	disasters	such	as	the	collapse	of	Enron,	Worldcom,	and	Tyco	in	the	US;	British	Rail,	Tomkins,	and	Independent	 Insurance	 in	Britain;	Vodafone,	 and	Mannesmann	 in	Germany;	which	 were	 all	 the	 result	 of	 bad	 corporate	 governance	 practice.	 These	tragedies	have	emphasized	the	importance	of	good	governance.	 	As	a	result,	corporate	governance	best	practice	has	been	developed	throughout	the	world;	many	countries	have	changed	their	listing	rules,	shareholders	must	approve	
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their	 plans	 for	 directors’	 stock	 options,	 subsidised	 loans	 for	 directors	 have	been	 forbidden,	 independent	 directors	 can	 be	 the	 part	 of	 audit	 and	remuneration	committee,	and	other	changes.		
This	 century,	 corporate	 governance	 policies	 and	 practices	 have	 been	developed	 not	 only	 for	 the	 listed	 companies	 but	 also	 for	 another	 types	 of	organisations,	 such	 as	 education,	 charities,	 medical,	 sports,	 professional	institutions,	and	non-government	organisations.		
The	 major	 corporate	 governance	 changes	 that	 were	 developed	 during	 this	period	are	given	below.		
2003:	 After	 the	 various	 corporate	 scandals,	 Higgs	 released	 the	 report	advocating	the	use	of	‘comply	or	explain’.	
2004:	The	Pension	Act	2004,	was	established	to	assist	regulators	to	regulate	all	work-based	pension	schemes	in	the	UK.	Influenced	by	the	UK	legislation,	USA	developed	the	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act,	which	is	the	most	significant	corporate	governance	law	in	the	USA	and	it	has	also	made	a	huge	international	impact.		
2006:	The	Company	Act	2006	was	brought	in	the	UK,	which	is	the	longest	Act	brought	 into	 force	by	parliament;	 it	was	presented	by	 revising	much	of	 the	existing	legislation.	
2010:	The	 UK	 corporate	 governance	 legislation	 formally	merged	 into	 ‘The	Code’.	 In	 the	 US,	 more	 stringent	 corporate	 governance	 legislation	 was	introduced	 through	 the	 Dodd	 Frank	 Wall	 Street	 Reform	 and	 Consumer	Protection	Act.	
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2012:	 A	 revised	 edition	 of	 The	 Code	 was	 published	 in	 the	 UK.	 Among	 other	changes,	 boards	 are	 now	 expected	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 annual	 report	 is	 fair,	balanced	and	understandable.	
4.3 Concept	of	Corporate	Governance	
The	term	corporate	governance	is	derived	from	the	word	‘gubernare’	which	means	“to	rule	or	steer”	(Bhasin,	2010).	Corporate	governance	is	as	old	as	a	corporate	 entity,	 and	 it	 is	 practised	 in	 several	 countries.	 The	 definition	 of	corporate	governance	varies	accordingly	to	culture	and	countries	(Armstrong	&	Sweeney,	2002).	However,	the	definitions	are	broadly	classified	as	‘narrow’	and	‘broad’	(Agle	et	al.,	2008;	Rossouw,	Van	der	Watt,	&	Rossouw,	2002).	In	the	 narrow	 classification,	 corporate	 governance	 is	mainly	 focused	 towards	shareholders	because	they	think	that	companies	are	primarily	responsible	to	them.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 broader	 perspective	 extends	 the	 responsibility	 of	companies	 to	 their	 stakeholders.	 Generally,	 the	 narrow	 model	 is	 quite	common	 in	 Anglo-American	 countries	 (the	 UK	 and	 US)	 while	 the	 broader	model	 is	 usually	 adopted	 in	 European	 and	 Asian	 countries	 (Aguilera	 &	CuervoCazurra,	2009).		
Cadbury	(1992)	has	defined	corporate	governance	from	a	narrow	perspective;	his	definition	 being	 that	 corporate	 governance	 “is	 the	 system	by	which	 the	companies	 are	 directed	 and	 controlled.”	 	 Similarly,	 (Norman,	 2004)	 has	defined	corporate	governance	as	the	system	that	ensures	that	the	agent	action	is	directed	towards	achieving	the	corporate	objectives.			
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From	 the	 broader	 perspective,	 corporate	 governance	 ensures	 that	 the	company	 is	operating	efficiently	and	 it	 is	using	society’s	resources	properly	(Allen,	2005).	The	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	(2001)	defines:		
Corporate	governance	…	[as	referring]	to	the	private	and	public	institutions,	including	laws,	regulations	and	accepted	business	practices,	which	together	govern	the	relationship,	 in	a	market	economy,	 between	 corporate	 managers	 and	 entrepreneurs	(corporate	 insiders)	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 those	 who	 invest	resources	in	corporations,	on	the	other	(2001,	p.130).	
In	a	recent	view,	Solomon	(2010),		defines	corporate	governance	as	both	the	internal	 and	 external	 systems	 which	 ensure	 that	 firms	 discharge	 their	accountability	to	all	their	stakeholders.		
4.3.1 Theories	of	Corporate	Governance	
The	theory	describes	what	is	possible	and	what	is	not	possible	in	particular	contexts	(Chambers,	1996).	Several	theories	have	been	developed	in	relation	to	 corporate	 governance.	 The	 objective	 of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 achieve	 a	comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 corporate	 governance	 and	 identify	 the	theories	 relevant	 to	 this	 study.	 The	 most	 popular	 theories	 of	 corporate	governance	are	discussed	below:	agency;	stewardship;	stakeholder;	resource	dependency;	institutional;	social	contract;	and	legitimacy.			
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4.3.1.1 Agency	theory	The	core	of	agency	theory	is	the	separation	of	ownership	and	control,	that	is,	shareholders	 through	 their	 board	 of	 directors	 delegate	 the	 authority	 and	responsibility	to	the	top	executive	(CEO)	to	manage	their	organisation	(which	is	also	the	crux	of	the	Anglo-American	model)	(Berle	&	Means,	1932).		(Bagley,	2015)	states	that:		
In	an	agency	relationship,	one	person	–	the	agent	–	acts	for	or	represents	 another	 person	 –	 the	 principal.	 The	 principal	delegates	 a	 portion	 of	his	 or	her	 power	 to	 the	 agent,	 and	 the	agent	 then	 manages	 the	 assigned	 task	 and	 exercises	 the	discretion	 given	 to	 him	 or	 her	 by	 the	 principals;	 the	 agency	relationship	is	created	by	an	express	or	implied	contract	or	by	law.	(p.44)		
Generally,	the	agency	relationship	will	benefit	both	the	parties;	agents	as	well	as	the	principal;	if	the	principals	can	create	appropriate	incentives	to	motivate	the	agents	to	work	in	their	best	interest.	However,	they	will	also	have	to	incur	additional	 costs	 for	 monitoring	 the	 activities	 of	 their	 agents	 (Fama,	 1980;	Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	1976).		
Brennan	(1995)	notes	that	the	agency	problem	has	emerged	due	to	a	lack	of	perfect	incentives	for	agents.	In	addition,	the	objectives	of	management	may	be	different	from	those	of	the	shareholders	as	there	are	many	shareholders	in	a	 publicly	 listed	 company	 and	 they	 are	 widely	 scattered;	 it	 might	 be	challenging	for	them	to	influence	management	in	their	way.	This	may	provide	
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an	 opportunity	 for	 the	management	 (agent)	 to	 exploit	 and	 fulfil	 their	 own	interest	rather	than	that	of	their	shareholders.	Adam	Smith	raised	a	question	as	far	back	as	1776	on	the	vigilance	of	managers	in	a	publicly	listed	company.		He	stated	that	the	separation	of	ownership	and	control	had	created	the	poor	incentives	for	managers	to	operate	their	corporation	efficiently.		
The	directors	of	such	[joint-stock]	companies,	however,	being	the	managers	rather	of	the	other	people’s	money	than	of	their	own,	it	cannot	well	be	expected,	that	they	should	watch	over	it	with	 the	same	anxious	vigilance	with	which	the	partners	 in	a	private	 co-partner	 frequently	watch	 over	 their	 own.	 Like	 the	stewards	of	 a	 rich	man,	 they	 are	 apt	 to	 consider	 attention	 to	small	matters,	not	for	their	master’s	honour	and	very	easily	give	themselves	 a	 dispensation	 from	 having	 it.	 Negligence	 and	profusion,	 therefore,	must	always	prevail,	more	or	 less,	 in	 the	management	of	the	affairs	of	such	a	company.	(Smith,	1776,	pp.	264,265)			Thus,	agency	theory	assumes	that	the	separation	of	ownership	and	control	in	listed	companies	provides	the	incentives	for	the	agents	(managers)	to	act	in	a	self-interested	 and	 opportunist	 manner,	 which	 in	 turn	 induces	 principals	(shareholders)	 to	 invest	 in	 formal	 governance	mechanisms	 to	 alleviate	 the	agency	problem	 through	minimization	of	 agency	 costs	 (Michael	C.	 Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	1976).		
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The	agency	relationship	formed	after	the	delegation	of	authority	to	the	agents	(managers)	 from	 the	 principals	 (shareholders)	 might	 result	 in	 an	 agency	problem	because	firstly,	the	owner	(principal)	and	the	manager	(agent)	have	different	interests;	secondly,	the	principal	cannot	properly	monitor	the	actions	of	 the	 agents	 without	 incurring	 costs;	 and	 thirdly,	 the	 principal	 cannot	perfectly	monitor	and	acquire	the	information	available	to	or	possessed	by	the	agent	without	incurring	costs	(Denis,	2001).	The	agency	problem	derives	from	two	limitations,	one	cognitive	and	the	other	behavioural,	on	the	human	ability	to	make	allocative	decisions.	The	cognitive	limitation	is	“hidden	information”	(also	 known	 as	 “adverse	 selection”	 or	 “bounded	 rationality”)	 that	 prevents	investors	 from	 knowing	 a	 priori	 whether	 the	 managers	 whom	 they	 have	employed	as	their	agents	are	good	or	bad	resource	allocators.	The	behavioural	limitation	is	“hidden	action”	(also	known	as	“moral	hazard”	or	“opportunism”)	that	reflects	the	proclivity,	inherent	in	an	individualistic	society,	of	managers	as	agents	to	use	their	positions	as	resource	allocators	to	pursue	their	own	self-interest	 and	not	necessarily	 the	 interests	of	 the	 firm’s	principals	 (Lazonick,	2008).		
To	minimise	the	effect	of	an	agency	problem	in	a	company,	the	shareholders	of	a	company	should	bear	the	costs,	known	as	agency	costs.	The	cost	regarding	this	conflict	was	identified	by	Stephen	Ross	(1973)	and	was	further	explored	by	many	economists	and	research	scholars.	 	The	agency	costs	mainly	occur	between	 the	 principal	 and	 principal	 (PP)	 and	 between	 principal	 and	 agent	(PA).		The	cost	associated	due	to	the	PP	relationship	is	relatively	more	recent	
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but	there	are	many	research	studies	to	be	found	on	the	PA	aspects	of	agency	costs.			
4.3.1.1.1 Principal	–	Agent	Problem	The	principal	and	agent	problems	arise	when	the	desires	and	the	goals	of	the	principals	and	agents	conflict,	and	the	agents	pursue	their	own	goals	instead	 of	 those	 of	 the	 principal.	 It	 is	 the	 result	 of	 conflicting	 interests	among	 managers	 and	 owners,	 and	 asymmetric	 information	 (Chrisman,	Chua,	&	Litz,	2004).		In	many	cases,	an	agent	will	typically	possess	more	or	better	 information	 than	 the	 principal	 about	 the	 situation	 or	 the	consequences	of	actions	(Ross,	1973).	The	major	problems	that	may	arise	due	to	this	are	moral	hazard,	information	asymmetry,	and	adverse	selection.		
4.3.1.1.2 Principle-	Principle	Problem	The	 principal	 and	 principal	 problem	 arises	 in	a	 company	where	 the	 few	large	 shareholders	 influence	 and	 exercise	 substantial	 control	 over	 the	firm’s	 resources	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 minority	 of	 shareholders.	 The	principal–principal	 problem	 refers	 to	 the	 appropriation	 of	 value	 from	minority	 shareholders	 by	 majority	 shareholders,	 often	 by	 inﬂuencing	board-level	 decisions	 such	 as	 asset	 sales	 and	purchases	 (Su,	 Xu,	&	 Phan,	2008).			However,	the	level	of	agency	cost	depends	on	several	other	factors,	such	as	the	law	of	the	land,	human	ingenuity	in	implementing	the	contracts,	corporate	and	securities	laws,	historical	dealings	for	ill	behaviours	and	so	on.				
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4.3.1.2 Stewardship	theory	In	contrast	to	agency	theory,	stewardship	theory	states	that	the	managers	or	agents	 are	 good	 stewards	 and	 they	 always	 act	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 their	shareholders.	The	roots	of	this	theory	are	based	in	psychology	and	sociology		(L.	 Donaldson	 &	 J.	 H.	 Davis,	 1991).	 Stewards	 always	 try	 to	 work	 for	 the	betterment	 of	 their	 shareholders	 and	 the	 organisation,	 and	 they	 will	 not	depart	 from	 this	 even	when	 their	 interest	 is	 conflicting	with	the	principal’s	interests	(Davis,	Schoorman,	&	Donaldson,	1997).		It	is	believed	that	stewards’	utilities	are	maximised	only	when	the	shareholders’	wealth	is	maximised,	so	stewards	always	try	to	serve	in	the	best	possible	way.	Therefore,	it	is	believed	that	 stewards	 help	 to	 increase	 a	 firm’s	 performance	 and	 maintain	 good	governance	in	the	organisation	(Smallman,	2004).		
The	supporter	of	this	theory	argues	that	managers	are	trustworthy	and	loyal	not	opportunistic	and	they	act	in	the	best	interest	of	the	company.	They	not	only	work	for	the	financial	benefits	but	also	for	the	recognition,	respect	and	their	 satisfaction	 which	 they	 can	 receive	 only	 if	 they	 maximise	 the	organisation's	wealth	(Herzberg,	1966;	McClelland,	1961).	The	theory	further	argues	 that	 there	must	 be	 only	 one	 person	 as	 CEO	 and	 chairman,	 and	 the	power	 to	 formulate	 strategy	should	be	 in	 the	hands	of	 a	 single	person.	The	focus	 of	 this	 theory	 is	 on	 structure	 and	 facilities	 that	 empower	 managers	rather	than	monitoring	and	control		(Davis	et	al.,	1997).			
4.3.1.3 Stakeholder	theory	Stakeholder	 theory	 has	 been	 continuously	 developed.	 Freeman	 (1984)	was	one	of	the	first	theorists	to	give	a	view	on	stakeholder	theory.		He	argued	that	
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all	 the	 firms	 should	 be	 accountable	 to	 their	 broad	 stakeholders	 (Freeman,	1984;	Solomon	&	Solomon,	2004),	and	defines	stakeholder	as	"any	group	or	individual	who	can	affect	or	 is	affected	by	the	achievement	of	corporation’s	purpose"	(p.	37).	Solomon	(2010)	has	minutely	pinpointed	the	stakeholders	as	 shareholders,	 employees,	 customers,	 suppliers,	 creditors,	 communities,	government	and	public.			
Stakeholder	 theory	 has	 three	 branches:	 descriptive,	 instrumental	 and	normative.	The	descriptive	branch	 is	 concerned	with	how	 the	manager	will	deal	with	 their	 stakeholders'	 interest,	 what	managers	 and	 board	members	think,	the	nature	of	the	company	and	how	companies	are	actually	managed.			The	 instrumental	 branch	 evaluates	 the	 consequences	 of	 including	 the	stakeholders'	management	perspective	with	that	of	traditional	corporate	goals	of	profitability	and	growth.	The	third	normative	branch	views	and	addresses	the	objectives	of	the	company,	its	philosophical	guidelines	and	its	link	with	the	activities	of	the	companies	(Donaldson	&	Preston,	1995).	According	to	Ansoff	H.	Igor	and	McDonnell	(1965),	the	organisation	should	achieve	its	objective	by	balancing	the	conflicting	interests	of	its	various	stakeholders.		
Stakeholder	 theory	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 agency	 theory	whose	main	 aim	 is	 to	protect	shareholders’	wealth	and	 interest,	while	 stakeholder	 theory	 tries	 to	protect	the	interest	of	its	different	stakeholders	(Clarke,	2004;	Letza,	Sun,	&	Kirkbride,	 2004).	 Thus,	 this	 theory	 states	 that	 the	 organisation	 should	 be	managed	for	the	benefit	of	all	the	parties	who	have	a	direct	or	indirect	stake	in	the	company.		The	narrow	focus	of	shareholders	has	widened	to	a	broad	group	
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of	stakeholders	whose	interests	are	linked	to	environmental,	social	and	ethical	considerations	(Donaldson	&	Preston,	1995;	Freeman,	1984;	Freeman,	Wicks,	&	Parmar,	2004).	However,	stakeholder	theory	has	not	provided	any	guidance	for	the	board	about	its	legitimate	stakeholders	(Donaldson	&	Preston,	1995).				
The	 stakeholder	model	 states	 that	 corporate	 governance	 is	 concerned	with	how	 effectively	 organisational	 governance	 systems	 are	 encouraging	 for	 the	long-term	 commitment	 towards	 an	 organisation’s	 various	 stakeholders	(Maher	&	Anderson,	2000).	Hence,	stakeholder	theory	is	an	important	theory	of	corporate	governance,	and	 it	clearly	 influences	the	 functional	mechanism	around	stakeholders,	which	affects	 firm	performance	 (Abu-Tapanjeh,	2009;	Clarkson,	1995).		
Therefore,	 stakeholder	 theory	 enables	 the	 nurturing	of	 a	 good	 relationship	with	the	broad	range	of	its	stakeholders;	underpins	corporate	efficiency;	and	emphasises	shareholders'	wealth	maximisation	objectives.			
4.3.1.4 Resource	Dependency	Theory	Resource	dependency	theory	states	that	the	firm’s	survival	depends	upon	its	ability	to	gain	control	over	its	resources		(Salancik	&	Pfeffer,	1978).	However,	resources	 are	 limited	 and	 firms	 need	 to	 compete	with	 each	 other	 for	 them	(Hessels	&	Terjesen,	2010).			To	remedy	this	situation	they	need	to	establish	either	 coalitions	 or	 contacts	 (Van	 Witteloostuijn	 &	 Boone,	 2006).	 These	coalitions	 may	 be	 internal	 (e.g.	 board,	 employees	 and	 shareholders)	 or	external	(e.g.	suppliers,	government)	and	each	group	will	have	the	means	to	use	and	control	those	resources	for	the	firm’s	survival	(Sheppard,	1995).			
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According	 to	 resource	 dependence	 theory,	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 bring	resources	 like	 information,	 skills,	 and	 their	 links	 to	 various	 external	 key	constituents,	 i.e.	 buyers,	 suppliers,	 social	 groups,	 media,	 government,	 and	various	 stakeholders,	 that	 will	 reduce	 uncertainty	 (Gales	 &	 Kesner,	 1994).	Therefore,	linking	the	firm's	external	factors	will	help	to	reduce	its	transaction	costs	 (Hillman,	 Cannella,	 and	 Paetzold	 (2000).	 Thus,	 this	 theory	 suggests	appointing	a	variety	of	board	directors	with	broadening	external	linkages	to	resources	and	information	to	improve	the	firm's	performance	(Dalton,	Daily,	Johnson,	&	Ellstrand,	1999;	Provan,	Beyer,	&	Kruytbosch,	1980).			
4.3.1.5 Institutional	theory	Institutional	theory	has	its	roots	in	sociology,	political	science	and	economics	(Aguilera	&	Jackson,	2010).	Ahrens	et	al.	(2011)	have	categorised	his	theory	into	two	major	branches.	The	first	is	political	science	and	economics	oriented	institutional	 theory;	 from	 this	perspective,	 the	 institution	 is	defined	as	 “the	humanly	 devised	 constraints	 that	 structure	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	interaction.	They	consist	of	informal	constraints	(sanctions,	taboos,	customs,	traditions,	 and	 codes	 of	 conduct),	 and formal	 rules	 (constitutions,	 laws,	property	 rights)”	 (North,	 2005).	 The	 second,	 sociology	 and	 organisational	theory	branch	of	institutional	 theory	emphasize	how	the	organisational	and	individual	behaviour	is	guided	less	by	formal	rules	and	regulations	and	more	by	social	procedures.		
Regarding	 the	 role	 of	 institutional	 theory	 in	 corporate	 governance,	 many	researchers	have	 found	that	applying	the	corporate	governance	mechanism	varies	from	one	country	to	another	and	is	mainly	influenced	by	its	institutional	
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environments	such	as	legal	rules	and	regulations,	financial	system,	economic	system,	culture	and	corporate	ownership	pattern	(Aguilera	&	Jackson,	2003;	Ahrens	et	al.,	2011;	Davies	&	Schlitzer,	2008;	Zattoni	&	Cuomo,	2008).		
4.3.1.6 Social	Contract	Theory	Similar	to	stakeholder	theory,	social	contract	theory	views	the	responsibility	of	 an	 organisation	 from	 a	 broad	 perspective.	 	 Social	 contract	 theory	 views	society	 as	 the	 sequence	 of	 social	 contracts	 between	 the	 society	 and	 its	members	(Gray,	Owen,	&	Adams,	1996).	The	integrated	social	contract	theory	was	first	proposed	by	Donaldson	and	Dunfee	(1999)	as	guidance	for	managers	when	making	an	ethical	decision	by	way	of	reference	to	their	communities,	their	expectations	from	the	business,	and	their	specific	form	of	involvement.		The	notion	of	social	contract	theory	is	that,	as	the	firm	operates	in	a	society,	it	uses	 all	 the	 resources	 of	 that	 society;	 so	 it	 is	 ultimately	 accountable	 to	 its	society	(Deegan,	2013).		
4.3.1.7 Legitimacy	theory	Like	social	contract	theory,	legitimacy	theory	is	created	out	of	the	concept	of	a	social	contract	between	the	organisation	and	the	society	in	which	it	operates.	Legitimacy	 is	 defined	 as	 “a	 generalised	 perception	 or	 assumption	 that	 the	actions	of	an	entity	are	desirable,	proper,	or	appropriate	with	some	socially	constructed	 systems	 of	 norms,	 values,	 beliefs	 and	 definitions”	 (Suchman,	1995).	In	brief,	legitimacy	theory	states	that	the	organisation	should	not	only	consider	the	rights	of	its	investors	but	also	the	rights	of	the	public	at	large,	or	they	may	have	several	restrictions	on	the	operations	and	the	use	of	resources	imposed	om	them	(O’Donovan,	2002).		Ramanathan	(1976)	argues	that	profit	
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maximisation	is	used	as	a	measure	to	evaluate	corporate	performance	but	in	legitimacy	 theory,	 profit	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 measure	 of	 a	 firm’s	legitimacy.		Corporate	governance	helps	to	identify	the	legitimacy	gap	between	society	 and	 an	 organisation	 and	 tries	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 the	organisational	objectives	and	the	firm’s	legal	responsibility	towards	its	society.		
4.4 Corporate	Governance	model	in	Nepal		
There	are	very	few	formal	codes	of	Corporate	Governance	in	Nepal.	The	central	banks	of	Nepal	have	developed	some	codes	of	conduct	for	banks	and	financial	institutions.	Similarly,	the	accounting	and	auditing	standards	have	also	been	developed	with	a	financial	sector	reforms	program	(World	Bank,	2005).	The	financial	sector	reforms	project	helped	the	development	of	the	NRB	Act	–	2002,	Bank	 and	 Financial	 Institutions	Act	 –	 2006,	 and	 the	 Companies	Act	 –	 2006		(Adhikary,	Pant,	&	Dhungana,	2007).			
Similarly,	the	Company	Act	2006	and	Securities	Exchange	Act	have	helped	to	protect	 the	 interests	of	 general	shareholders	by	making	 the	 company	more	accountable,	responsible	and	transparent.		Also,	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Board	 of	 Nepal	 (SEBON)	 insurance	 boards	 have	 developed	 some	 rules,	regulations,	 policies	 and	 procedures	 for	 good	 governance	 of	 organisations.	The	general	model	of	corporate	governance	prevailing	in	Nepal	is	quite	similar	to	the	Anglo-Saxon	model	of	corporate	governance.		The	corporate	governance	model	of	Nepal	is	shown	in	Figure	3.1	below	
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Figure	4.1	Nepal’s	corporate	governance	model	As	shown	in	Figure	4.1,	shareholders	own	the	company.	There	are	two	broad	categories	of	shareholders:	promoter	shareholders	and	public	shareholders.	From	these	shareholders,	the	board	of	directors	of	the	company	is	elected	to	work	as	the	watch	dog	and	lead	the	company	in	a	better	direction.	Then	the	board	 of	directors	 appoints	 the	 CEO	 for	 the	 day-to-day	management	 of	 the	company.	The	management	of	the	company	is	accountable	and	responsible	for	leading	the	company	by	following	all	the	rules,	regulations	and	guidelines.		
4.5 Corporate	Governance	in	Low-Income	Countries	(LIC)	
As	discussed	earlier,	corporate	governance	has	gained	prominence	all	around	the	 globe	 for	 more	 than	 two	 decades.	 In	 developed	 nations,	 the	 study	 on	corporate	 governance	 started	 with	 questionable	 business	 practices	 and	
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several	corporate	scandals.	There	has	been	extensive	research	on	corporate	governance	and	its	impact	on	the	performance	of	both	the	financial	and	non-financial	 sectors.	 Even	 in	 low-income	 countries,	 there	 is	 no	 shortage	 of	frequent	 scandals	 and	 questionable	 business	 practices.	 So,	 slowly	 and	gradually	 the	 research	 on	 these	 markets	 has	 gained	 the	 attention	 of	 the	researchers	(Reed,	2002).		
Willingly	 or	 unwillingly,	 developing	 economies	 started	 to	 impose	 good	governance	practices	due	to	the	pressures	from	international	bodies	such	as	IMF	and	world	banks.	 	Loans	to	developing	countries	like	Brazil	and	Mexico	have	frequently	resulted	in	a	debt	crisis,	and	as	a	condition	for	renegotiating	the	 loan,	 the	 international	bodies	designed	structural	 adjustment	programs	which	require	changes	in	governance	(Biersteker,	1990).	However,	even	now,	in	 some	 low-income	 countries	 like	 Nigeria,	 there	 are	 some	 constraints	 for	implementing	 good	 governance,	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 proper	 shareholders	 rights,	weak	 regulatory	 framework,	 weak	 monitoring,	 lack	 of	 transparency	 and	disclosure,	 lack	of	 enforcement	and	 ineffective	boards	of	directors	 (Okpara,	2011).	
Now	the	question	might	arise	whether	good	governance	will	help	to	increase	firm	 performance	 in	 developing	 nations.	 Numerous	 studies	 have	 been	conducted	on	this	topic.	In	the	study	by	Kyereboah-Coleman	(2007)	in	Africa	it	was	found	that	there	is	a	positive	influence	of	corporate	governance	on	firm	performance.	Zheka	(2006)	studied	this	relationship	in	more	than	5000	firms	and	 reported	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 to	 support	 this	 argument.	 The	
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researcher	further	mentioned	that	that	one	point	increase	in	overall	corporate	governance	index	would	result	in	around	a	half	per	cent	increase	in	a	firm’s	performance	
Javid	 and	 Iqbal	 (2008)	 examined	 the	 50	 non-financial	 firms	 listed	 in	 the	Karachi	stock	market	and	found	that	there	is	a	statistically	significant	positive	relationship	between	 the	quality	of	 firm,	 the	 level	of	 corporate	governance,	and	firm	performance.	
In	 the	 study	 conducted	 to	 compare	 the	 impact	 of	 corporate	 governance	between	developed	countries	and	developing	countries,	Shah	(2009)	collected	the	data	for	1035	listed	companies	in	USA	(developed	economy)	and	120	listed	companies	in	Pakistan	(developing	economy)	for	the	period	2002	to	2007.	His	study	finds	that	there	is	a	positive	relationship	between	corporate	governance	score	 and	 dividend	 pay-out,	 and	 corporate	 governance	 score	 and	 firm	performance,	 in	 both	 the	 countries.	 But	 there	 is	 a	 negative	 relationship	between	 leverage	and	CGI	 in	Pakistan,	while	 in	 the	USA	 it	 shows	a	positive	relationship.		
In	 the	 same	 vein,	 a	 study	 was	 conducted	 to	 investigate	 the	 relationship	between	corporate	governance	and	firm	performance	of	twenty	firms	listed	on	the	Karachi	Stock	Exchange	by	using	Tobin's	Q	to	measure	the	performance	of	corporate	governance	and	return	on	assets	(ROA)	and	return	on	equity	(ROE),	to	 measure	 the	 firms’	 performance	 from	 2005-2009.	 Through	 multiple	regression	 models,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 leverage	 and	 growth	 have	 a	 positive	relationship	with	Tobin’s	Q,	which	confirms	a	significant	effect	in	measuring	
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the	 performance	 of	 the	 firm.	 It	 means	 that	 firms	 having	 good	 corporate	governance	measures	 perform	well	 compared	 to	 the	 firms	 that	 have	 no	 or	fewer	 corporate	 governance	 practices	 (Khatab,	 Masood,	 Zaman,	 Saleem,	 &	Saeed,	2011).	
Chugh,	 Meador,	 and	 Kumar	 (2011)	 investigated	 the	 relationship	 between	corporate	governance	and	firm	performance	in	India;	the	research	found	that	an	excessively	autonomous	board	(high	proportion	of	independent	directors)	lowers	the	performance.		
The	 research	 by	 Cunat,	 Gine,	 &	 Guadalupe	 (2012)	 to	 identify	 the	 effect	 of	corporate	 governance	 on	 shareholders’	 value	 found	 that	 by	 adopting	 one	governance	proposal,	 shareholder	value	was	 increased	by	2.8	per	 cent.	The	market	 reaction	 was	 larger	 in	 firms	 with	 more	 anti-takeover	 provisions,	higher	institutional	ownership,	and	stronger	investor	activism	for	proposals	sponsored	by	institutions.		
Varshney,	Kaul,	and	Vasal	(2012)	constructed	a	corporate	governance	index	based	 on	 internal	 and	 external	 corporate	 governance	mechanisms	 in	 India,	and	 as	 a	 performance	 measure	 investigated	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 value-based	performance	 measure	 Economic	 Value	 Added	 (EVA),	 traditional	 measures	such	as	Return	on	Net	worth,	Return	on	Capital	employed,	and	Tobin’s	Q	to	evaluate	 the	 linkage	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 firm	 performance.	The	 study	 concluded	 that	 there	 is	 a	 positive	 linkage	 between	 the	 two,	i.e,better-governed	firms	exhibit	better	financial	performance.		
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However,	 a	 study	 conducted	 by	 Young	 (2003)	 researching	 the	 relationship	between	the	corporate	governance	and	firm	performance	found	that	there	was	no	relationship	between	these	two	variables.		Alhaji,	Yusoff,	and	Alkali	(2012)	compared	 the	 influence	 of	 board	 characteristics	 and	 firm	 performance	 in	Malaysia.	 For	 the	 study,	 three	 board	 characteristics	 were	 measured:	 the	number	of	 independent	directors,	board	 size,	 and	 leadership	structure.	The	firm	 performance	 was	 considered	 in	 terms	 of	 return	 on	 equity	 (ROE)	 and	earning	per	share	(EPS).	They	used	a	sample	of	86	companies	from	Trading	services	and	Consumer	products	listed	on	Bursa	Malaysia	for	the	fiscal	year	2011.	The	study	found	no	relationship	between	the	three	board	characteristics	(independent	 non-executive,	 board	 size	 and	 leadership	 structure)	 and	 firm	performance	(ROE	and	EPS).	
However,	a	study	conducted	to	measure	the	impact	of	corporate	governance	on	private	and	state	banking	sectors	in	Sri	Lanka	found	there	was	a	moderate	impact	 of	 corporate	 governance	 on	 banks’	 performance	 (Ajanthan,	Balaputhiran,	&	Nimalathashan,	2013).	Their	study	focused	on	four	aspects	of	corporate	governance:	board	size	(BS),	board	diversity	(BD),	outside	directors	percentage	 (OSDP),	 and	 board	 meeting	 frequency	 (BMF).	 They	 measured	banking	performance	 through	 return	on	equity	 (ROE)	and	 return	on	assets	(ROA).			
Zabri,	 Ahmad,	 &	 Wah	 (2016)	 investigated	 the	 top	 100	 publically	 listed	countries	 in	 Bursa	 Malaysia	 and	 their	 relationship	 between	 corporate	governance	 practices	 and	 firm	performance	 by	 using	 board	 size	 and	 board	
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independence	as	governance	variables	and	return	on	assets	(ROA)	and	return	on	equity	(ROE)	as	performance	variables,	and	found	that	there	is	a	significant	negative	relationship	with	ROA	and	an	insignificant	relationship	with	ROE.		
Overall,	 the	 empirical	 relationship	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 firm	performance	 is	 mixed.	 Several	 studies	 found	 that	 corporate	 governance	enhances	firm	performance	(Ehikioya,	2009;	Kota	&	Tomar,	2010;	Kyereboah-Coleman,	 2007;	 Locke	 &	 Duppati,	 2014;	 Zheka,	 2006).	 However,	 many	researchers	(Cheng,	2008;	Chugh	et	al.,	2011;	Dey	&	Chauhan,	2009;	Jackling	&	 Johl,	 2009;	 Ujunwa,	 2012)	 have	 found	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	corporate	governance	and	firm	performance.			The	 research	 above	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 conclude	 the	 relationship	 between	corporate	 governance	 and	 firm	 performance	 in	 low-income	 countries.	 The	nature	of	general	firms	is	quite	different	from	that	of	banks.	So,	the	following	discussion	explores	whether	 the	 relationship	 is	 inclusive,	 even	 in	banks,	or	whether	there	is	some	pre-stated	relationship.		
4.6 Corporate	Governance	of	Banks		
Before	 discussing	 empirical	 results	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 corporate	governance	 and	 banks	 performance,	 the	 following	 discussion	 identifies	 the	major	corporate	governance	differences	between	banks	and	other	firms.	
4.6.1 How	corporate	governance	differs	in	banking	sector	
Banks	and	the	financial	institutions	are	very	different	from	other	industries,	manufacturing	 for	example,	as	 they	utilise	other	people’s	money.	The	banks	
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assure	their	depositors’	specific	return	on	their	investments	(Shleifer	&	Vishny,	1997).	 The	 governance	 of	 banks	may	 be	 different	 from	other	 non-financial	firms	for	several	reasons.		First,	the	number	of	stakeholders	is	higher	in	banks	than	 in	 other	 institutions.	 Secondly,	 the	 investors,	 depositors,	 as	 well	 as	regulators,	 have	 a	 direct	 interest	 in	 the	 financial	 institution's	 performance	because	 the	 health	 of	 the	 overall	 economy	 is	 directly	 correlated	with	 their	performance	(Adams	&	Mehran,	2003).	Banks	stimulates	economic	growth	by	efficient	allocation	of	funds	that	might	even	lower	the	cost	of	capital	(Levine,	2004).			
Banks	also	play	a	monitoring	role	for	their	borrowers,	especially	when	there	is	 an	 information	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 two	 parties	 i.e.	 borrowers	 and	lenders	(Diamond,	1984;	Fama,	1985;	Freixas	&	Rochet,	2008).	Banks	could	perform	monitoring	cost	at	a	lower	price	because	banks	delegated	monitors	(Diamond,	1984)	and	banks	have	information	advantages	(Fama,	1985).		
Another	reason	for	proper	governance	of	banks	is	investors	are	less	informed	than	bankers	about	the	utilisation	of	their	funds	deposited	in	the	banks	(Caprio	Jr	 &	 Levine,	 2002).	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 loan	 quality	 of	 banks	 can	 be	 easily	manipulated	for	a	longer	period	of	time,	and	the	banks	can	easily	adjust	their	risk	of	loan	more	quickly	than	other	non-financial	firms	(Furfine,	2001).			
Banks	are	liable	to	provide	liquidity	at	a	point	of	time	for	their	depositors	while	they	provide	loans	with	longer	maturities	(Diamond	&	Dybvig,	1983).	Also,	the	capital	 structure	 of	 the	 banks	 is	 different	 compared	 to	other	 firms	 because	generally,	banks	have	little	equity	when	compared	to	other	firms.	Around	90	
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per	 cent	of	 a	banks'	 funding	 is	 from	debt,	which	 is	 rare	 in	other	 industries	(Macey	&	O'hara,	2003).		
In	 summary,	 the	 two	 different	 characteristics	 of	 banks,	 when	 compared	 to	other	organisations,	 require	 the	 regulators	 to	develop	a	 separate	 corporate	governance	 mechanism	 for	 them.	 First,	 the	 information	 asymmetries	 are	higher	in	banks	than	other	non-financial	firms	(Furfine,	2001).	For	example,	banks	can	more	easily	amend/hide	the	risk	composition	of	assets	and	loans	than	 a	 non-financial	 institution.	 Banks	 have	 high	 leverage	 which	 leads	 to	increasing	the	possibility	of	agency	problems	as	well.	 	Morgan	(2002)  finds	investors	generally	prefer	to	buy	the	bonds	issued	by	non-financial	institutions.	Second,	 the	 banks	 are	 heavily	 regulated	 due	 to	 their	 importance	 in	 the	economy.	 Also,	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 economy	 to	 implement	 various	international	standards,	formulated	by	BIS,	World	Bank	and	IMF,	requires	the	involvement	of	governments	in	banks'	governance	process.		
4.6.2 Empirical	Research	on	the	Corporate	Governance	of	Banks	
Especially	since	the	global	financial	crisis,	concern	regarding	good	governance	of		banks	has	increased	tremendously	(United	Nations,	2010).		
Romano,	 Ferretti,	 and	 Rigolini	 (2012)	 analysed	 the	 interaction	 between	corporate	 governance	 and	 the	 performance	 of	 Italian	 banks	 for	 the	 period	2006	to	2010	by	using	the	fixed-effect	model	on	a	panel	data	set	on	the	seven	corporate	governance	variables:	board	size,	board	composition,	existence	of	board	committee,	control	and	audit	committee	size	and	membership,	board	remuneration	 and	 women	 directorship.	 The	 research	 found	 the	 positive	
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influence	of	board	composition	on	the	profitability	variable	ROA	and	ROE.	It	was	 also	 found	 that	 board	 size	 did	 not	 affect	 performance,	while	 a	 smaller	audit	 committee	 showed	 better	 control	 over	 the	 firms,	 thus	 enhancing	 the	bank’s	profitability.		The	research	also	shows	that	there	is	a	significant	positive	relationship	between	women	directorship	on	both	ROA	and	ROE.	
In	 the	 comparative	 study	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 corporate	 governance	 and	 the	banks'	performance	 in	30	 foreign	and	 local	banks	 in	Pakistan	during	2001-2009,	 it	was	 found	that	 there	was	a	significant	positive	 impact	of	corporate	governance	 variables	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 overall	 banking	 sector	 in	Pakistan.	 But	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 impact	 of	 corporate	 governance	practices	on	the	performance	of	foreign	banks	(Rehman	&	Mangla,	2012).	
Pandya	 (2011)	 investigates	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 corporate	 governance	structure	on	company	performance	in	another	Asian	country,	India,	by	taking	board	structure	and	CEO	duality	as	the	governance	variable	and	ROA	and	ROE	as	the	performance	variable.	Using	the	multiple	regression	analysis,	it	found	there	is	no	relationship	between	the	corporate	governance	structure	and	firm	performance	in	Indian	banks.	Similarly,	Thuraisingam	(2013)	investigated	the	relationship	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 financial	 performance	 of	financial	institutions	of	Sri	Lanka	from	2008	to	2011	by	using	the	simple	linear	regression	 model.	 The	 researcher	 concluded	 that	 there	 was	 no	 significant	relationship	between	the	corporate	governance	variables	(board	size,	board	composition	and	audit	committee)	and	the	firm	performance	variables	(ROA	and	ROE).		
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A	 study	was	 conducted	 to	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 ownership	structure	and	corporate	governance	and	its	effects	on	performance	of	firms	in	Kenya	 with	 reference	 to	 banks.	 It	 was	 found	 that	 there	 was	 no	 significant	difference	 between	 the	 type	 of	 ownership	 and	 financial	 performance	 and	between	 banks'	 ownership	 structures	 and	 corporate	 governance	 practices.	Further	 results	 showed	 that	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	corporate	governance	and	financial	performance	of	banks	(Unyi,	2011).	
However,	 Ajanthan	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 investigated	 the	 relationship	 between	corporate	governance	and	the	banking	performance	of	the	private	and	public	sector	 banks	 in	 Sri	 Lanka	 by	 focusing	 on	 four	 	 aspects	 of	 the	 corporate	governance	 variables:	 board	 size,	 board	 diversity,	 percentage	 of	 outside	directors,	and	board	meeting	frequency,	while	the	banking	performance	was	measured	 by	 return	 on	 assets	 and	 return	 on	 equity.	 The	 researcher	 used	multiple	 regression	 methods	 and	 found	 that	 the	 there	 was	 a	 negative	significant	 relationship	between	all	 the	 corporate	governance	variables	and	ROA	variables,	except	for	board	meeting	frequency.		
In	 another	 study	 conducted	 to	 identify	 the	 performance	 persistence	 of	 the	agency	cost	and	performance	of	banks	in	India,	it	was	found	that	the	agency	cost	of	 the	banks	did	not	decline	during	the	period	2005	to	2013	(Acharya,	Dupatti,	&	Locke,	2015).	
This	 discussion	 clearly	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 no	 exact	 consensus	 on	 the	relationship	between	the	corporate	governance	and	banks’	performance.		
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Also,	although	there	have	been	several	 types	of	research	undertaken	on	the	importance	 of	 corporate	 governance	 in	 developed	 countries,	 the	 corporate	governance	 issues	 in	 developing	 economies	which	 have	 just	 emerged	 from	wars	and/or	various	political	and	natural	calamities	are	yet	 to	be	explored.		This	study	fills	the	gap	in	the	existing	literature.	
4.7 Conclusion		
This	 chapter	briefly	describes	 the	evolution	of	 corporate	governance	as	 the	start	 of	 the	 literature	 review	 on	 the	 corporate	 governance.	 The	 literature	review	 has	 been	 presented	 in	 chronological	 order.	 A	 brief	 introduction	 of	corporate	 governance	 is	 given,	 followed	 by	 the	 theories	 of	 corporate	governance.	For	a	clear	understanding	of	the	topic,	the	corporate	governance	practices	in	low-income	countries	were	discussed	rather	than	the	corporate	governance	 in	 the	 banks.	 And	 finally,	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 research	 gap	concludes	the	chapter.		The	following	chapter	will	discuss	the	hypothesis	and	empirical	model	development.	
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5 Chapter	Five	
Hypotheses	and	Empirical	Model	Development	
5.1 Introduction	
In	this	chapter,	an	examination	of	 the	relationship	between	governance	and	performance	 of	 banks	 in	Nepal	 is	 built	upon	 the	 prior	 studies	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 Three.	 	 Several	 hypotheses	 consistent	 with	 an	 underlying	 agency	theory	of	governance	are	proposed	and	empirically	tested.		
Nepal,	 as	 a	 low-income	 country	 (LIC),	 faces	 many	 challenges	 as	 noted	 in	Chapter	Two.		The	long	periods	of	political	unrest	involving	Maoist	insurgents,	disestablishment	of	the	monarchy	and	the	2011	earthquake	contributed	major	shocks	 to	 the	 financial	 system.	 	 Prior	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	 impact	 of	corporate	governance	on	bank	performance	differs	between	countries	due	to	the	individual	difference	in	economic,	social	and	legal	rules	and	regulations	of	the	 countries	 (Aslan	 &	 Kumar,	 2014;	 Globerman,	 Peng,	 &	 Shapiro,	 2011;	Thrikawala,	 2016).	 	 Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 institutional	 factors	 in	 Nepal	 are	likely	to	play	a	significant	role	and	will	add	to	the	limited	research	on	corporate	governance	and	banks'	performance	in	developing	countries.	
Section	 5.2	 of	 this	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 hypotheses	 based	 on	 research	questions	 and	 the	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 links	 between	 corporate	governance	 and	 banks'	 performance.	 Similarly,	 section	 5.3	 describes	 the	conceptual	framework.	The	sections	5.4,	5.5	and	5.6	provide	a	brief	description	
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of	 independent,	 dependent	 and	 control	 variables	 respectively	 used	 in	 the	study.	Section	5.7	provides	the	conclusion	of	the	chapter.	
Agency	 theory	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 governance	 as	 a	 central	instrument	to	provide	for	longer-term	sustainable	achievement	of	stakeholder	goals.	 	 These	goals,	while	 including	 financial	 performance,	 also	 incorporate	outreach,	development	and	social	goals.			
5.2 Hypotheses	Development	
Corporate	governance	plays	a	 critical	 role	 in	 long-term	survival	of	 the	 firm	(Stanwick	&	Stanwick,	2010).	The	well-developed	financial	institutions	reflect	the	growth	and	prosperity	of	the	nation	while	weak	performances	hinder	the	economic	growth	of	a	country	(Khan	&	Abdelhak,	2001).	The	failure	of	banks	leads	to	economic	turmoil	and	destabilises	the	economic	growth	process.	The	consequence	of	these	banking	failures	in	the	economy	leads	to	a	reduction	in	the	 credit	 flow	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 ultimately	 affects	 the	 efficiency	 and	productivity	of	the	business	units	(Chijoriga,	1997;	Saunders	&	Wong,	2011).	Banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 require	 a	 well-developed	 governance	mechanism	to	address	the	public’s	desire	for	banks	to	be	safe,	innovative	and	transparent,	 and	 increase	 market	 discipline	 and	 information	 production	(Mehran	&	Mollineaux,	2012).		
The	board	plays	a	significant	role	in	formulating,	monitoring	and	rectifying	the	critical	 decisions,	 ensuring	 various	 control	 mechanisms,	 and	 developing	transparent	 and	 sustainable	 policy	 (Andrews,	 1980;	 Fama	&	 Jensen,	 1983;	Ghasemi	&	Ab	Razak,	2016;	Huse	&	Rindova,	2001).		In	connection	with	this,	
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the	 previous	 researchers	 have	 identified	 important	 variables	 that	 help	 to	promote	 good	 corporate	 governance	 practices,	 like	 board	 size	 (Salim,	Arjomandi,	 &	 Seufert,	 2016),	 CFO	 (Javaid	 &	 Saboor,	 2015),	 percentage	 of	minority	directors	(Carter,	Simkins,	&	Simpson,	2003),	percentage	of	female	directors	(gender	diversity)(Pathan	&	Faff,	2013)	and	percentage	of	outside	directors	 (Yermack,	 1996).	 These	 variables	 fit	 for	 the	 study	 of	 corporate	governance	and	banks'	performance.	The	previous	researchers	have	provided	evidence	that	there	may	be	positive,	negative	or	no	relationship	in	relation	to	these	variables.	However,	their	relationships	with	the	Nepali	banks	are	yet	to	be	 investigated.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 examine	 these	 board	characteristics	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 commercial	banks	in	Nepal.		
5.2.1 	Board	Size	
Zahra	and	Stanton	(1988)	argued	that	board	size	is	an	essential	instrument	for	effective	 control	 and	 good	 corporate	 governance.	 However,	 most	 firms,	especially	the	banks,	are	required	to	maintain	a	board	size	as	prescribed	by	the	law,	regulations	and	as	per	the	requirements	of	the	stock	exchange.	Even	then,	there	is	no	clear	consensus	among	researchers	on	the	appropriate	board	size	and	its	impact	on	a	firm’s	performance.	Agency	theory	suggests	smaller	board	 size	 minimises	 the	 agency	 cost	 by	 having	 effective	 control	 over	 the	management	(Jensen,	1993)	and	suggests	that	board	size	should	not	be	more	than	eight	members.	Similarly,	Lipton	and	Lorsch	(1992)		and	Jensen	(1993)	have	advised	eight	to	nine	members	on	the	board.	If	there	are	more	than	nine	
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members,	the	board	is	less	likely	to	criticise	top	management,	and	it	is	subject	to	CEO	control.	Further,	if	there	is	a	large	board,	it	becomes	difficult	to	achieve	cohesiveness,	 there	 are	 delays	 in	 decision	 making,	 and	 because	 of	 time	limitations,	 a	 large	 board	 faces	 difficulties	 in	 members	 expressing	 their	opinions	(Sonnenfeld,	2002;	Yermack,	1996).		
Resource	dependence	theory	predicts	a	positive	relationship	between	board	size	and	performance	(Dalton	et	al.,	1999).	Likewise,	Firstenberg	and	Malkiel	(1994)	argued	that	the	large	board	provides	diverse	managerial	experience,	knowledge,	diversity	 in	gender,	nationality,	 and	has	 its	own	capabilities	 for	stimulating	 various	 perspectives.	 	 Also,	 Anderson	 and	 Reeb	 (2003),	 Klein	(2002),	(Johnson,	Daily,	&	Ellstrand,	1996);	Monks	and	Minnow	(1991),	and	Hillman	et	al.	 (2000)	 find	that	a	 larger	board	provides	an	 increased	pool	of	expertise,	environmental	linkages	and	greater	freedom	for	optimal	committee	assignments		and	thus,	improves	the	quality	of	monitoring.	
The	optimal	board	size	is	continuously	debated,	as	researchers	provide	mixed	results.	Some	researchers	argue	that	the	optimal	board	size	is	situational	and	it	depends	upon	the	nature	of	company	and	market	(Boone,	Field,	Karpoff,	&	Raheja,	 2007;	 Coles,	 Daniel,	 &	 Naveen,	 2008;	 Linck,	 Netter,	 &	 Yang,	 2008).	Empirical	 studies	 on	 board	 size	 and	 performance	 have	 also	 provided	inconclusive	 results.	 Some	 researchers	 (e.g.	 (Andres	 &	 Vallelado,	 2008;	Ghasemi	&	Ab	Razak,	 2016;	Kiel	&	Nicholson,	2003;	Mohamed,	 2009)	have	found	 a	 positive	 relationship,	 while	 others	 (Dalton	 &	 Dalton,	 2005;	Mak	 &	Kusnadi,	2005)	have	estimated	a	negative	relationship.	In	a		different	view,	an	
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insignificant	 relationship	 between	 these	 two	 variables	 is	 found	 by	 Reddy,	Locke,	&	Scrimgeour	(2010);	Wintoki,	Linck,	&	Netter	(2012);	and	Schultz,	Tan,	&	Walsh	(	2010).		
In	the	Asian	market,	Jackling	and	Johl	(2009)	studied	the	impact	of	board	size	on	top	Indian	companies	and	find	that	the	larger	board	size	provides	greater	exposure	to	external	resources	and	improves	firm	performance.	Similarly,	in	a	Nepalese	context,	Poudel	and	Hovey	(2013)	have	found	a	positive	relationship	between	 the	 board	 size	 and	 efficiency	 in	 Nepali	 commercial	 banks.	 Some	researchers	 (Chatterjee,	 2012;	 Mak	 &	 Kusnadi,	 2005;	 Wellalage,	 Locke,	 &	Scrimgeour,	2012)	have	found	an	inverse	relationship	between	board	size	and	firm	 value.	 In	 summary,	 from	 both	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 research,	 the	relationship	 between	 board	 size	 and	 a	 firm's	 performance	 is	 inconclusive.	Given	these	conflicted	views,	a	neutral	null	hypothesis	is	proposed:	
H1:	 There	 is	 no	 relationship	 between	 board	 size	 and	 bank	
performance	in	Nepal.		
5.2.2 CFO	
The	 CFO	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 developing	 sustainable	 financial	 policy,	safeguarding	 the	 long-term	 existence	 of	 a	 firm,	 formulating	 various	 credit	policies,	 risk-mitigating	 policies	 and	 other	 financial	 policies	 of	 the	 banks.	However,	 there	 have	 been	 numerous	 studies	 on	 the	 influence	 of	 executive	characteristics	on	firm	performance	(Barker	III	&	Mueller,	2002;	Bertrand	&	Schoar,	2003),	but	very	few	research	studies	on	the	relationship	between	the	CFO	and	a	firm’s	performance.	In	the	study	on	S&P	500	firms	for	the	period	
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2001	to	2011,	Girigori	(2013)	finds	a	significant	positive	relationship	with	the	firm's	 performance.	 Chava	 and	 Purnanandam	 (2010)	 emphasise	 that	 CFOs	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	 corporate	 risk-taking	and	 they	directly	 influence	a	firm’s	financial	policies.		The	influence	of	CFO	can	be	compared	to	CEO	when	it	comes	to	the	financing	decisions	of	the	firm	(Frank	&	Goyal,	2007).		
The	 study	 by	 the	 Javaid	 and	 Saboor	 (2015)	 of	 58	 manufacturing	 firms	 in	Pakistan	finds	the	existence	of	CFO	means	firms	can	perform	better	and	they	can	have	a	sound	implementation	of	corporate	governance	practices.		Similarly,	in	the	study	investigating	whether	a	family	firm	hires	an	external	CFO,	it	was	revealed	 that	 a	 non-family	 CFO	 could	 reduce	 the	 risk	 by	 adding	 valuable	resources	to	the	firm	(Lutz	&	Schraml,	2011).	 	A		study	conducted	in	Italian	family	firms	Gordini	(Gordini,	2016)	found	that	a	non-family	CFO	has	a	positive	effect	on	a	firm's	performance.	Di	Giuli	and	Caselli	(2008)	also	report	similar	findings	from	the	sample	of	708	small	and	medium	Italian	firms	from	2002	to	2004.	Based	on	these	empirical	studies	on	CFO	and	firm's	performance,	this	study	proposes	the	following	hypothesis:	
H2:	There	is	a	positive	relationship	between	the	existence	of	a	CFO	
and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		
5.2.3 Percentage	of	minority	of	directors	
Agency	 theory	 states	 the	 nature	 of	 agency	 conflict	 varies	with	 and	without	large	 shareholders.	When	 there	 is	 concentrated	ownership	 then	 the	agency	conflict	 is	 more	 between	 the	 controlling	 shareholders	 and	 minority	shareholders,	 in	 other	 words,	 it	 shifts	 from	 principal–agent	 to	 principal-
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principal	 conflicts	 (Bebchuk	 &	 Weisbach,	 2010;	 Filatotchev,	 Jackson,	 &	Nakajima,	2013;	Young,	Peng,	Ahlstrom,	Bruton,	&	Jiang,	2008).	In	his	research	Gugler,	(2001)	finds	that	the	block	holders	take	private	benefits	at	the	cost	of	a	minority	of	shareholders.	In	an	underdeveloped	market	where	government	regulations	are	not	properly	developed,	the	block	holders'	ownership	is	even	more	important	because	they	can	be	actively	involved	in	the	monitoring	and	management	 of	 the	 firm	 (Filatotchev	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Heugens,	 Essen,	 &	Oosterhout,	2009).			While	digging	into	corporate	governance	literature,	the	major	benefits	of	block	holders'	 ownership	 are	 direct	monitoring	 of	 their	 agents,	 reduction	 of	 free	riding	 by	 minority	 shareholders	 (Michael	 C.	 Jensen	 &	William	 H	Meckling,	1976;	Shleifer	&	Vishny,	1997),	while	the	costs	for	block	holders’	ownership	include	 lower	 liquidity,	 increase	 in	 principal-principal	 conflict	 and	 lower	management	 initiatives	 (Chordia,	 Subrahmanyam,	 &	 Anshuman,	 2001;	Shleifer	&	Vishny,	1986;	Simon	&	La	Porta,	2000).	The	empirical	research	on	the	existence	of	minority	directors	could	not	find	any	clear	evidence	to	support	the	benefits	and	costs	associated	(Bohren	&	Odegaard,	2003;	Pham,	Suchard,	&	 Zein,	 2011;	 Schultz	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Xu	 &	 Wang,	 1999)	 with	 financial	performance.	 	 Similarly,	 Zahra	 and	 Stanton	 (1988)	 reported	 no	 statistically	significant	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	a	minority	of	directors	and	a	firm’s	performance,	while	others	have	found	a	negative	relationship	(Haniffa	&	Hudaib,	2006;	Hu,	Tam,	&	Tan,	2010).			
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As	 block	 holder	 is	 a	 common	 feature	 of	 companies	 in	 Nepal,	 this	 research	assumes	the	existence	of	minority	directors	has	a	negative	effect	on	a	bank’s	financial	performance.		
H3:	 There	 is	 a	 negative	 relationship	between	 the	 percentage	 of	
minority	directors	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		
5.2.4 Percentage	of	outside	directors	
For	good	governance,	firms	must	have	a	mix	of	inside	and	outside	directors	on	their	 boards.	 Outside	 directors	 can	 independently	 evaluate	 managerial	performance,	decide	their	remuneration	and	replace	them	if	necessary	(Fama	&	Jensen,	1983;	Morin	&	Jarrell,	2000;	Weisbach,	1988;	Zahra	&	Pearce,	1989).	Their	presence	on	the	board	improves	board	vigilance	and	controls	managers’	self-interest	 and	 opportunism	 (Cadbury,	 1992;	 Rhoades,	 Rechner,	 &	Sundaramurthy,	2000)	as	inside	directors	may	be	less	effective	in	monitoring	the	CEO	(Daily	&	Dalton,	1994).	In	parallel,	(Baysinger	&	Hoskisson,	1990)	find	that	inside	directors	are	loyal	to	the	CEO,	and	they	consider	CEO	evaluation	as	being	a	 sensitive	 issue.	 Similarly,	scholars	 (Mizruchi,	1983;	Zahra	&	Pearce,	1989)	argue	that	an	effective	board	consists	of	a	higher	proportion	of	outside	directors.	 In	an	early	study	by	Baysinger	and	Butler	(1985)	to	establish	the	relationship	between	the	proportion	of	independent	directors	and	return	on	equity	finds	that	boards	with	more	outsiders	outperformed	other	firms.	
In	 contrast,	 other	 scholars	 (Baysinger,	 Kosnik,	 &	 Turk,	 1991;	 Boeker	 &	Goodstein,	1991;	Byrd	&	Hickman,	1992;	Gales	&	Kesner,	1994;	Mace,	1971)	argue	 that	 more	 outside	 directors	 from	 diverse	 backgrounds	 politicise	 the	
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board	process	which	in	turn	weakens	effective	leadership(Adams	&	Ferreira,	2009);	 increases	 team	 conflict	 and	 reduces	 the	 firm’s	 economic	 flexibility	(Chaganti,	Mahajan,	&	Sharma,	1985).	 Similarly,	Agrawal	&	Knoeber	 (1996)	find	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	outside	directors	on	the	board	and	 firm	 performance.	 Hermalin	 and	 Weisbach	 (1991)	 	 compared	 the	percentage	 of	 outsiders	 on	 boards	 with	 the	 performance	 variables	 using	Tobins'	Q	and	found	no	relationship	between	them.	Likewise,	Bhagat	and	Black	(2000)	also	find	no	relationship	between	long-term	market	returns	and	board	independence.	In	the	research	by	Ponnu	and	Karthigeyan	(2010),	there	is	no	benefit	from	having	outside	directors	on	the	boards	of	listed	companies.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 research	 by	 Kiel	 and	 Nicholson	 (2003)	 and	 Chatterjee	(2011)	reported	no	evidence	for	a	positive	relationship	between	the	outside	members	and	the	firm's	performance.	
An	early	study	by	Baysinger	and	Butler	(1985)	tests	the	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	independent	directors	and	a	relative	measure	of	return	on	equity.	They	find	that	boards	with	more	outsiders	outperformed	other	firms.		
Despite	 these	 contrasting	 views,	 it	 is	 accepted	 that	 outside	 directors	 bring	various	 skills,	 experiences	 and	 networking,	 enhance	 the	 organisational	problem-solving	techniques	and	monitor	effectively	(Milliken	&	Martins,	1996;	Mizruchi,	 1983;	 Pfeffer	 &	 Salancik,	 1989).	 Complementing	 it,	 resource	dependence	 theory	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	 board	 represented	 by	 outside	directors	enhances	the	flow	of	information,	reduces	uncertainty,	and	secures	
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firms’	resources	(Pfeffer	&	Salancik,	1989).	In	line	with	this	empirical	research	and	agency	theory,	the	proposed	hypothesis	for	the	study	is:	
H4:	 There	 is	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 the	 percentage	 of	
outside	directors	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		
5.2.5 Percentage	of	female	directors	
In	recent	years,	gender	diversity	in	management	and	on	boards	has	become	a	subject	 of	 empirical	 studies,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 an	 important	 indicator	 for	 good	governance	(Erhardt,	Werbel,	&	Shrader,	2003;	Smith,	Smith,	&	Verner,	2006).		In	Norway,	since	the	end	of	2005,	the	law	has	required	boards	to	have	40	per	cent	female	directors,	and	in	Spain,	they	have	had	to	maintain	this	percentage	since	the	beginning	of	2015	(Adams	&	Ferreira,	2009;	Rose,	2007). Similarly,	sixteen	countries	now	require	quotas	to	increase	women's	representation	on	boards,	and	many	more	have	voluntary	quotas	in	corporate	governance	codes	(Rhode	&	Packel,	2014).	Thus,	this	reform	also	indicates	that	female	directors	provide	new	insights	and	perspectives	that	help	to	enhance	firmperformance.		In	a	similar	vein,	Brennan	and	McCafferty	(1997)		have	concluded	that	female	directors	can	increase	firm	value	for	two	reasons:	women	are	not	part	of	the	old-boys	network,	which	allows	them	to	be	more	independent;	and	they	have	better	 understanding	 of	 consumer	 behaviour,	 their	 needs	 and	 the	opportunities	to	meet	those	needs.	They	can	enrich	boardroom	dynamics	with	different	values	and	perspectives	(Ruigrok,	Peck,	&	Keller,	2006).		Adams	and	Ferreira	(2009)	confirm	this	by	emphasising	that	more	women	on	the	board	has	 a	 direct	 relationship	with	 the	 firing	 of	 poorly	 performing	 CEOs.	 Recent	
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evidence	also	suggests	that	gender	diversity	in	the	top	management	and	board	has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 financial	 performance	 (Carter,	 D'Souza,	 Simkins,	 &	Simpson,	 2010;	 Garcia-Meca,	 Garcia-Sanchez,	 &	 Martinez-Ferrero,	 2015;	Pathan	 &	 Faff,	 2013;	 Wellalage	 &	 Locke,	 2013).	 In	 support,	 more	 gender	diversity	on	boards	acts	as	a	“substitute	mechanism	for	corporate	governance	that	 would	 be	 otherwise	 weak”	 (Gul,	 Srinidhi,	 &	 Ng,	 2011)	 and	 leads	 to	improving	the	firm's	performance.			Board	 diversity	 can	 also	 promote	 more	 effective	 global	 relationships	 and	increase	board	independence	because	people	of	different	gender,	ethnicity	or	cultural	backgrounds	might	ask	questions	that	would	not	come	from	directors	with	more	traditional	backgrounds	(Arfken,	Bellar,	and	Helms	(2004).	
But	scholars	like	Hillman	and	Dalziel	(2003);	Terjesen,	Sealy,	&	Singh	(2009),	and	D'Aveni	and	MacMillan	(1990)	argue	that	it	is	not	the	board	diversity	that	impacts	 performance	 but	 the	 depth	 and	 breadth	 of	 knowledge,	 resources,	experience,	 linkages	 and	 prestige	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors.	 Rose	 (2007)	observed	 Danish	 listed	 companies	 and	 found	 no	 significant	 relationship	 of	gender	diversity	with	firm	performance.	Their	findings	were	in	line,	even	in	the	cross-country	analysis,	with	Denmark,	Norway	and	Sweden	(Carter	et	al.,	2010;	Randøy,	Thomsen,	&	Oxelheim,	2006).	
Critics,	however,	contended	that	the	existence	of	female	directors	on	a	board	has	 a	 negative	 relationship	 on	 firm	 performance.	 In	 the	 study	 of	 US	 firms,	Adams	 &	 Ferreira(2009)	 have	 found	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 the	
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proportion	of	female	directors	and	Tobin’s	Q.	Similarly,	in	the	study	by	(hern	&	Dittmar	(2012),	there	was	a	negative	association	between	female	directors	and	firm	performance.		
Thus,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 establish	 the	 relationship	 between	 female	 board	representation	 and	 firms'	 performance.	 Agency	 theory	 and	 resource	dependence	theory	provide	some	insight	and	predict	the	possibility	that	board	gender	diversity	affects	 firm	outcomes	but	 the	nature	of	 the	 relationship	 is	unclear	(Carter	et	al.,	2010;	Erhardt	et	al.,	2003).			Based	on	these	views,	it	is	important	 to	 further	 explore	 the	 relationship	as	 it	 does	 not	 suggest	 a	 clear	outcome.	This	study	is	based	on	the	Nepali	banks’	governance	contexts.	On	the	basis	of	these	arguments,	the	hypothesis	for	this	study	is:		
H5:	 There	 is	 no	 relationship	 between	 the	 percentage	 of	 female	
directors	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		
5.3 Conceptual	Framework	
This	 section	 provides	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 this	 study	 based	 on	 the	theoretical	 and	 empirical	 research	 on	 corporate	 governance	 and	 banks'	performance.	On	the	left-hand	side	of	Figure	5.1,	there	is	the	list	of	corporate	structure	 governance	 variables	 suggested	 from	 the	 prior	 studies,	 corporate	governance	principles	and	guidelines:	board	size,	the	existence	of	CFO,	female	director,	outside	director	and	minority	director.		These	corporate	governance	variables	are	 linked	 to	banks’	 financial	performance	variables	presented	on	the	right-hand	side	of	the	figure.	The	performance	variables	of	this	study	are	return	on	assets,	non-performing	loan	to	total	loan,	loan	to	deposit,	deposit	to	
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total	assets,	operating	expenses	to	interest	income,	and	operating	expenses	to	total	 loan.	 	 The	 relationship	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 bank	performance	may	be	affected	by	several	other	variables	as	well.	Therefore,	as	suggested	by	the	extant	literature,	various	control	factors	are	used:	firm	age,	number	 of	 branches,	 gross	 domestic	 product,	 real	 interest	 rate,	 bond	 rate,	interbank	settling	rate,	inflation,	public	sector	bank	and	joint	venture	bank.		
		
Figure	5-1:	Conceptual	framework	
5.4 Data	Sources	
This	 study	 comprises	 an	 unbalanced	 panel	 dataset	 of	 all	 (30)	 commercial	banks	of	Nepal	for	a	period	of	10	years,	2003	to	2012.	The	data	for	the	study	related	 to	 banks’	 performance	 and	 governance	 variables	were	 hand-picked	from	the	banks'	annual	reports.		The	interest	rate,	interbank	settling	rate	and	
125		
bond	rates	are	collected	from	the	publications	of	central	banks	and	the	data	for	the	macroeconomic	variables	were	taken	from	the	World	Bank	database.		
Data	Treatment	There	 were	 27	 missing	 observations.	 The	 time-series	 is	 relatively	 short	covering	10	years	and	it	is	preferable	to	estimate	missing	observations	rather	than	delete.	Various	approaches	were	proposed	in	the	literature,	among	them	are	likewise	deletion,	pairwise	deletion,	extrapolation,	hot	deck	imputation2,	last	observation	carried	forward,	multiple	imputation	and	mean	substitution	(Howell,	2008).	Among	the	various	methods,	last	observation	carried	forward	method	was	used	to	fill	the	missing	data.	As	a	robustness	check,	imputed	value	was	checked	with	a	three-year	moving	average	and	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	values.		This	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 many	 of	 the	 missing	 observations	 related	 to	governance	variables.		As	directors	are	appointed	for	four	year	terms,	which	are	often	 renewed,	 there	 is	 little	variability	 in	 these	data.	 	 Similarly,	where	banks	were	merged,	 the	 continuing	 banks	 are	 taken	 into	 the	 study	 and	 for	those	financial	institutions	that	have	been	upgraded	from	B	and	C	categories	to	A	category	(commercial	banks),	the	data	have	been	taken	from	the	date	they	have	received	approval	as	commercial	banks.		
																																																								
2	Hot	 deck	 imputation	 is	 a	method	 for	 handling	missing	 data	where	 each	missing	 value	 is	substituted	with	an	observed	response	from	a	similar	unit. 
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5.5 Dependent	Variables	
Most	 of	 the	 corporate	 governance	 literature	 has	 incorporated	 profitability,	deposit	and	assets	utilisation	variables,	and	market	price	in	the	study	as	the	performance	variables.	 	Following	the	empirical	measures,	this	research	has	also	included	the	common	set	of	variables	in	this	study.	They	are	Return	on	Assets	(ROA);	Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	(NPL/TL);	Loan	to	Deposit	(LTD);	Deposit	to	Total	Assets	(DTA);	Operating	Expenses	to	Interest	Income	(OEII);	and	Operating	Expenses	to	Total	Loan	(OETL).	Although	Tobin’s	Q	is	commonly	used	as	a	performance	measure	in	corporate	governance	literature,	this	 research	 could	 not	 incorporate	 it	 because	 not	 all	 the	 banks	 (the	government	 banks)	 are	 listed	 on	 the	 Nepal	 Stock	 Exchange.	 A	 summary	 of	various	financial	performance	variables	used	in	the	study	is	given	below.	
5.5.1 Return	on	Assets	(ROA):	
In	prior	studies	of	financial	performance	of	banks	several	metrics	have	been	applied,	including	Tobin's	Q,	ROE	and	ROA,	which	are	the	most	common.		In	the	absence	of	 robust	data	 for	 calculating	Tobin's	Q	 this	was	not	a	 realistic	option.		The	choice	of	ROA	over	ROE	was	based	on	a	concern	about	the	central	bank	 setting	 the	 banks'	 liability	 to	 assets	 ratio	as	 a	 monetary	 tool.		 The	ROA	was	thought	 to	be	a	better	measure	of	 the	banks'	performance	 in	each	time	period,	giving	an	idea	of	how	efficient	existing	management	is	in	using	its	assets	to	generate	its	current	earnings.	This	ratio	measures	how	efficiently	the	company	can	manage	its	assets	to	generate	the	profit	during	the	year.	It	tells	the	operating	efficiency	of	the	business.	The	companies	that	have	higher	ROA	
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are	considered	to	be	utilising	their	assets	properly	and	can	generate	higher	earnings	for	their	shareholders;	while	the	companies	that	have	lower	ROA	are	judged	to	be	poorly	using	their	assets	or	they	are	generating	less	income	when	compared	to	their	investment.			
5.5.2 Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	(NPL/TL):	
NPL/TL	is	another	measure	to	evaluate	the	banks’	performance.	This	ratio	is	used	to	determine	the	quality	of	a	bank’s	outstanding	loans.	Non-performing	loans	refer	to	overdue	loans	with	the	less	probability	of	repayment	(Somoye,	2010).	It	refers	to	the	risky	assets,	which	are	not	generating	any	income.	A	high	level	of	NPL/TL	indicates	that	a	bank’s	management	is	not	efficient	in	credit	risk	management	and	creates	larger	losses	for	the	bank	when	it	writes	off	a	loan.	Increasing	NPL/TL	of	banks	creates	higher	probability	of	default	risk.		
5.5.3 Loan	to	Deposit	(LTD):	
Loan	to	deposit	ratio	is	taken	as	the	proxy	for	the	liquidity	ratio.	This	ratio	is	used	to	show	the	long-term	solvency	of	the	bank.	Deposits	provide	liquidity	to	the	banks,	which	can	be	utilised	for	investment	in	loans,	treasury	bills,	mutual	funds	and	stock	markets.	During	a	recession	period,	the	loan	to	deposit	ratio	goes	down;	banks	have	more	deposits,	which	creates	an	intense	pressure	on	them	to	reduce	interest	rates	which	leads	to	a	decrease	in	profitability.		
5.5.4 Deposit	to	Assets	(DTA)	
This	ratio	indicates	the	leverage,	as	the	deposits	are	the	main	sources	for	banks’	funding.	This	ratio	is	used	to	evaluate	the	influence	of	a	bank’s	liability	upon	
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its	profitability	and	how	well	it	has	used	its	liabilities.	This	ratio	is	calculated	by	dividing	the	total	deposit	by	the	bank's	total	assets.	Agency	theory	(Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	1976)	suggests	that	a	higher	level	of	this	ratio	suggests	the	deposit	holders	need	to	monitor	the	CEO.		
5.5.5 Operating	Expenses	to	Interest	Income	(OEII)	
Operating	expenses	to	interest	income	indicates	the	bank’s	efficiency	(Sinkey,	1975).		A	bank	has	several	other	operating	expenses	apart	from	its	liability	to	pay	 interest	 to	 its	deposit	holders.	This	ratio	provides	 information	between	the	bank’s	 expenses	and	earning	 capacity	and	whether	or	not	 the	bank	has	optimised	its	potential.		The	management	of	the	company	must	try	to	minimise	this	ratio.		
5.5.6 Operating	Expenses	to	Total	Loan	(OETL)	
OETL	 ratio	 is	 used	 to	 analyse	 the	 bank's	 efficiency.	 Banks	 with	 a	 good	reputation	 can	 control	 their	 operating	 costs	 and	 are	 efficient	 at	 evaluating	their	 loans.	 As	 the	 business	 matures,	 this	 ratio	 will	 fall	 because	 of	 the	experience,	 economies	of	 scale,	negotiating	power	and	ability	 to	 find	better	sources	 of	 funds	 (Miller,	 2013).	 	 This	 ratio	 also	 helps	 to	 predict	 the	 future	profitability	of	a	bank.		
5.6 Independent	Variables	
The	independent	variables	used	in	this	study	are	taken	from	the	theoretical	perspective	 and	 from	 empirical	 researchers	 who	 have	 identified	 the	governance	variables	which	have	an	influence	on	a	bank’s	performance.	Most	
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of	the	variables	taken	have	either	positive,	negative	or	no	relationship	with	the	bank's	 performance.	 Several	 variables	 have	 a	 positive	 relationship	 in	 one	market	while	negative	in	another	or	vice	versa.		The	variables	taken	into	this	study	are	(i)	board	size;	(ii)	CFO;	(iii)	female	director;	(iv)	outside	director;	and	(v)	minority	director.	The	brief	description	of	these	variables	is	given.			
5.6.1 Board	Size	
Board	 size	 is	 one	 of	 the	 corporate	 governance	 variables	 most	 used	 in	 the	corporate	governance	literature.	It	refers	to	the	total	number	of	directors	on	the	board.	Agency	theory	states	that	a	smaller	board	size	is	more	effective	for	good	governance	and	may	increase	firm	performance	(Jensen,	1993;	Yermack,	1996).	In	contrast,	resource	dependence	theory	suggests	that	larger	board	size	will	 positively	 contribute	 to	 firm	 performance	 (Dalton	 et	 al.,	 1999).	 	 Prior	empirical	 research	 has	 not	 shown	 any	 clear	 consensus	 on	 the	 relationship	between	board	size	and	bank	performance.	In	the	context	of	Nepali	banks,	as	per	the	Bank	and	Financial	Institution	Act,	2006,	all	the	banks	should	have	a	board	 size	 between	 five	 and	 the	 maximum	 of	 nine	 members.	 This	 study	explores	the	relationship	in	the	Nepal	market.		
5.6.2 CFO	
To	 establish	 whether	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 CFO	 in	 banks	 influences	 a	 firm's	performance,	a	proxy	for	CFO	is	used;	a	binary	variable	“1”	is	allocated	if	there	is	a	chief	finance	officer	in	the	bank,	otherwise	“0”	is	allocated.		The	rationale	for	using	this	variable	is	anchored	in	resource	dependency	theory.	Resource	dependency	 theory	 suggests	 that	 the	 skilled	 resources	 in	 the	 organisation	
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affect	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 organisation	 (Salancik	 &	 Pfeffer,	 1978).	 	 This	suggests	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 chief	 finance	 officer	 provides	 a	 different	perspective	on	corporate	investment,	financing	and	dividend	decisions,	which	positively	influences	the	firm’s	performance	and	reduces	the	possibility	of	a	bank’s	failure.		
5.6.3 Female	Directors	
This	study	has	used	the	percentage	of	female	directors	as	the	proxy	for	board	diversity.	Both	agency	theory	(Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	1976)		and	 resource	 dependence	 theory	 (Pfeffer,	 1973)	 postulate	 that	 female	directors	have	a	positive	influence	on	firms'	performance	(Carter	et	al.,	2010).		Principally,	agency	theory	suggests	boards	with	at	 least	one	 female	director	are	 less	 likely	 to	 rubber	 stamp	 CEO	 decisions	 (Adams	 &	 Ferreira,	 2009).	Following	the	studies	by	Dezsö	and	Ross	(2012)	and	Liu,	Wei,	and	Xie	(2014),	this	research	 has	 used	 female	 director,	 measured	 by	 number	 of	 female	directors	 divided	 by	 the	 total	 number	 of	 board	 members	 as	 board	 gender	diversity.	Several	empirical	research	studies	have	used	this	variable;	however,	the	percentage	of	female	directors	on	a	board	and	their	influence	in	emerging	markets	is	still	unclear.			
5.6.4 Outside	Directors	
Outside	directors	 refers	 to	 the	board	of	directors	who	are	 from	outside	 the	organisation	 and	 are	 independent	 from	 management	 (Ajinkya,	 Bhojraj,	 &	Sengupta,	2005).		Outside	directors	have	a	direct	relationship	with	the	quality	of	decisions	as	they	help	in	effective	monitoring	of	the	organisation's	decisions	
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(Bhagat	&	 Jefferis,	 2005;	Hartarska,	 2005).	 Generally,	 outside	 directors	 are	used	as	a	proxy	for	board	independence.	There	is	a	large	proportion	of	outside	directors	in	banks	when	compared	to	other	organisations	(Adams	&	Mehran,	2003)	 although	 previous	 studies	 have	 found	 positive	 and	 negative	relationships	 between	 governance	 and	 performance.	 Following	 Chancharat,	Krishnamurti,	&	Tian	 (2012),	 and	Weisbach	 (1988),	 the	 outside	 director	 is	calculated	by	dividing	the	number	of	outside	directors	into	the	total	number	of	 board	members.	 	 In	 agency	 theory,	 outside	 directors	 play	 an	 important	monitoring	role	as	they	are	independent	from	the	organisation	(Fama,	1980).		
5.6.5 Minority	Directors	
The	existence	of	minority	of	directors	has	attracted	several	research	interest.		Normally	 the	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 between	 the	 block	 holders	 and	minority	directors	 can	 be	 found.	 This	 is	 also	 stated	 in	agency	 theory.	 Therefore,	 the	existence	 of	 minority	 directors	 helps	 to	 control	 for	 the	 principal–principal	agency	conflicts.		Past	research	has	found	both	positive	and	negative	influence	by	minority	directors	in	various	markets	(Thomsen,	Pedersen,	&	Kvist,	2006).		In	this	research,	the	percentage	of	minority	directors	is	calculated	by	dividing	the	number	of	minority	directors	 into	 the	 total	number	of	members	on	 the	board	of	directors.		
5.7 	Control	Variables	
Several	 factors	 beyond	 the	 corporate	 governance	 variables	 affect	 a	 bank's	performance.	With	the	objective	to	control	the	potential	bias,	this	research	has	controlled	for	the	unobservable	firm-specific	characteristics	(including	age	of	
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firm,	number	of	branches,	public	sector,	joint	venture),	and	macro-economic	variables	(gross	domestic	product,	real	interest	rate,	bond	rate	and	interbank	settling	rate).		
5.7.1 Age	of	Firm	
Many	empirical	research	studies	show	that	the	age	of	a	firm	is	an	important	factor	behind	a	bank's	performance.	Generally,	old	banks	are	more	transparent	than	 new	 banks:	 they	 have	 developed	 their	 goodwill	 and	 built	 confidence	among	 their	 customers,	 which	 helps	 them	 to	 earn	 higher	 profits	 than	 new	banks	(Antoniou,	Guney,	&	Paudyal,	2008)	.	In	addition,	old	banks	have	learned	what	governance	mechanism	works	best	for	their	institution.	Sine,	Mitsuhashi,	and	Kirsch	(2006)	have	shown	that	young	ventures	have	a	higher	failure	rate	than	 old	ones.	However,	 some	 researchers	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 liability	 of	newness	mainly	depends	upon	the	industry	lifecycle	(Agarwal	&	Sarkar,	2002;	Bruderl	&	Schussler,	1990). Thus,	the	impact	of	a	firm's	age	on	performance	is	a	 pragmatic	 question.	 In	 this	 research,	 age	 of	 firm	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	difference	between	last	period	of	study	(2012)	and	the	date	of	incorporation.		
5.7.2 Number	of	Branches	
This	variable	 is	 the	 count	of	 the	 total	number	of	branches	of	 the	bank.	The	inclusion	 of	 this	 variable	 is	 motivated	 by	 an	 argument	 of	 agency	 theory	(Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H	Meckling,	1976),	that	agency	costs	are	more	substantial	in	larger	firms	due	to	free	rider	problems	(Yermack,	1996).	In	the	same	 way,	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 branches	 helps	 the	 bank	 to	 function	 more	
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efficiently,	manage	environmental	 turbulence,	and	reduce	the	probability	of	business	failure	(Aldrich,	1979;	Argenti,	1976;	Sutton,	1997).		
5.7.3 Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	
GDP	is	an	important	indicator	to	assess	a	country’s	economy.	It	is	stated	as	a	comparison	with	 last	 year	 or	 previous	 quarter.	 GDP	 has	 a	 large	 impact	 on	every	 sector	 of	 the	 economy	 including	 banks.	When	GDP	has	 an	 increasing	trend,	there	is	low	unemployment,	wage	rates	will	increase,	there	will	be	more	demand	for	 investment,	and	a	 lower	probability	of	default,	which	positively	affects	banks'	performance.	A	decreasing	GDP	rate	will	reverse	these	effects.		
5.7.4 Real	Interest	Rate	
Real	interest	rate	is	an	inflation-adjusted	interest	rate.	It	states	the	real	return	to	lender	and	the	real	cost	to	the	borrower.	It	is	calculated	by	subtracting	the	inflation	 rate	 from	 the	 nominal	 interest	 rate.	 Generally,	 banks	 are	 able	 to	circulate	more	 loans	 and	 earn	 higher	 profits	when	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	 is	lower	as	there	will	be	more	demand	for	loans.			
5.7.5 Bond	Rate	
The	 bond	 rate	 is	 the	 return	 an	 investor	 receives	 from	 an	 investment	 in	corporate	 or	 government	 bonds.	 Generally,	 there	 is	 an	 inverse	 relationship	between	bond	rate	and	the	bank	interest	rate.	A	lower	bond	rate	indicates	a	stable	economy,	more	opportunities	for	business	expansion	and	growth	which	is	the	favourable	environment	for	the	banks.		
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5.7.6 Inter	Bank	Settling	Rate	
Interbank	settling	rate	is	the	interest	rate	between	the	banks	for	their	short-term	borrowings.	Banks	borrow	and	lend	funds	between	each	other	from	the	interbank	 market	 to	 manage	 the	 liquidity	 and	 to	 meet	 the	 reserve	requirements.		
5.7.7 Inflation	
Strong	 empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 inflation	 affects	 bank	 performance	(Athanasoglou,	 Brissimis,	&	Delis,	 2008;	Demirguc	Kunt	&	Huizinga,	 2010).		Many	researchers	have	 found	that	profitability	of	a	bank	 increases	during	a	period	of	inflation	(Bourke,	1989)	while	Mirzaei,	Moore,	and	Liu	(2013)	have	suggested	 that	 there	 is	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 profitability	 and	inflation.	However,	the	effect	of	inflation	on	banks	depends	upon	their	capacity	to	forecast	the	inflation.		
Table	5.1	below	shows	the	variables	used	in	this	research.		
Table	5-1:	Variables	used	in	this	study	
Variable	
type	 Variable	 Formula	Dependent		 Return	on	Assets	(ROA)		 Net	income/	Total	assets			
		 Non-performing	 loan	 to	total	loan	 Non-performing	loan/	total	loan	
		 Loan	to	Deposit	 Total	loan/	Total	deposit			 Deposit	to	Assets	 Total	deposit	/	Total	assets	
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		 Operating	 expenses	 to	total	loan	 Operating	expenses	/	Total	loan	
		 Operating	 expenses	 to	interest	income	 Operating	 expenses	 /	 interest	income		
Independent		 Board	size		 Total	 number	 of	members	 in	 the	board.					 Percentage	 of	 female	director	 Total	number	of	 female	directors	in	 the	 board/	 Total	 number	 of	board	of	directors	
		 Percentage	 of	 outside	directors	 attendance	 in	the	board	meeting		 (No.	of	Outside	directors	/	board	size)	X	100%		
		 Existence	 of	 position	 of	CFO	(CFO)		 1	if	there	is	a	CFO:	otherwise	0		
		 Percentage	 of	 directors	representing	 the	minority	of	shareholders	 (No.	 of	minority	 shareholders	 on	board	/	board	size)	X	100%	Control		 Age	of	Firm		 Age	of	bank				 Number	of	branches		 Total	number	of	branches				 Inflation	rate		 Total	inflation	rate	of	the	country				 Ownership	Structure		 Private,	joint	venture	or	public				 GDP	(%)		 GDP	interest	rate	of	the	country			 Real	interest	rate	(%)		 Real	interest	rate	of	the	country			 Bond	rate			 One	year	bond	rate			 Real	interest	rate	 Inflation	adjusted	interest	rate			 Interbank	settling	rate	 364	days		 	
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5.8 Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 has	 provided	 a	 brief	 explanation	 of	 models	 used	 for	 the	development	of	the	five	hypotheses	above.	The	hypotheses	developed	will	be	tested	 in	the	next	 two	chapters	 to	understand	the	relationship	between	the	corporate	governance	mechanism	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.	Chapter	Six	discusses	 the	 data	 collection	 and	 research	methods	 used	 in	 the	 study,	 and	Chapter	 Seven	 discusses	 the	 empirical	 results	 and	 discussion	 derived	 from	testing	the	hypotheses.			
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6 Chapter	Six	
Data	Collection	and	Research	Method	
6.1 Introduction	
This	chapter	covers	the	data	collection	process,	empirical	model	and	research	techniques	 used	 to	 investigate	 the	 research	 questions.	 There	 has	 been	extensive	 research	 into	 corporate	 governance	 and	 firm	 performance	 in	developed	 markets,	 but	 there	 are	 limited	 prior	 studies	 focusing	 on	 the	comparative	 study	 of	 corporate	 governance	 and	 bank	 performance	 in	developing	and	less	developed	countries.		This	study	empirically	investigates	the	nexus	between	corporate	governance	practices	and	bank	performance	in	Nepal.		
Various	methods,	used	in	prior	research,	have	been	considered	as	potentially	suitable	for	this	analysis	in	the	Nepali	context.	A	panel	data-based	regression	approach	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 associations	 between	 governance	 and	 bank	performance.	
The	chapter	 is	organised	as	 follows:	section	6.2	presents	 the	data	collection	process,	and	section	6.3	describes	the	data	collection	process.		
6.2 Research	Method	
The	 research	 question	 has	 guided	 the	 research	method	 used	 in	 this	 study.	Sauders,	Lewis,	and	Thornhill	(2000)	have	stated	that	the	research	philosophy	will	 depend	 on	 the	 research	 questions.	 	 To	 find	 the	 relationship	 between	
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corporate	 governance	 and	 bank	 performance,	 because	 of	 the	 nature	 and	demand	of	the	data,	positivist	methodology	has	been	used.	Several	research	questions	 were	 postulated	 in	 Chapter	 One	 (section1.2)	 and	 these	 are	addressed	using	an	empirical	research	method.		The	underlying	methodology	is	positivist	and	the	data	are	examined	to	discover	the	underlying	relationships.		
6.2.1 Description	and	Sources	of	Data	
The	 data	 used	 in	 the	 study	 comprise	 an	 unbalanced	 panel	 dataset	 of	 (30)	commercial	banks	in	Nepal	from	2003	to	2012.	The	data	has	been	studied	up	to	2012	because	of	its	availability.	Generally,	the	previous	year's	data	should	be	 made	 available	 at	 the	 end	 of	 July.	 But,	 because	 of	 political	 turmoil,	earthquake	and	other	reasons,	the	data	was	available	only	till	that	period.		As	there	is	no	database	covering	all	commercial	banks	in	Nepal	and	all	the	data	needed	for	 the	study	are	not	available	 to	 the	public	 from	the	central	bank's	website,	the	data	were	manually	extracted	from	annual	reports	on	the	banks’	websites.	Also,	in	the	context	of	banks	not	listed,	request	letters	were	sent	to	the	CEO	and	directors	of	respective	banks	to	collect	data.	In	a	few	instances	visits	 to	 individual	bank	premises	were	 required	 to	 collect	 information.	 	As	most	of	 the	banks’	 annual	 reports	are	 in	 the	 local	 language	 (Nepali),	 online	search	 functions	 do	 not	 function.	 Accordingly,	 every	 variable	 selected	 is	chosen	 after	 reviewing	 all	 annual	 reports	 of	 banks	 for	 2003	 to	 2012.	 	 It	 is	necessary	 to	determine	 that	 a	 likely	 variable	appearing	 in	 one	 bank	 is	 also	present	in	the	other	29	banks.		Additional	information	was	obtained	from	the	central	banks	(i.e.	Nepal	Rastra	Bank)	and	data	for	macroeconomic	variables	
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were	extracted	 from	the	World	Bank	database.	This	sample	 includes	all	 the	banks	 operating	 during	 the	 decade.	 The	 data	 are	 drawn	 from	 secondary	sources.	
The	 period	 2003	 to	 2012	 finishes	 with	 the	 last	 year	 in	 which	 a	 relatively	complete	 set	 of	 financial	 reports	 are	 available.	 	 The	 earthquake	 of	 2011	disrupted	both	commercial	and	governmental	data	collection	and	distribution.		Prior	 to	2003,	 the	data	are	patchy	and	 it	 is	only	with	the	end	of	 the	Maoist	insurgency	 that	 government	 and	 commerce	 focussed	 on	 production	 and	dissemination	of	financial	data.		It	is	after	2002	that	almost	50	per	cent	(15	out	of	 31)	 of	 commercial	 banks	 of	 Nepal	 were	 established.	 	 The	 2008	 global	financial	crisis,	provides	an	interesting	midpoint	for	the	time	series.	
A	careful	process	of	data	checking	to	maximise	the	integrity	of	the	database	prepared	commences	with	searching	 for	missing	data	and	outliers.	 	 Several	diagnostic	tests	were	conducted.		
6.2.2 Data	cleaning	and	editing	
To	conduct	the	statistical	analysis,	some	of	the	missing	values	were	substituted	using	the	previous	year's	value.	In	the	context	of	the	banks	that	were	merged,	the	 data	 of	 the	 continuing	 banks	 was	 taken.	 Similarly	 for	 those	 financial	institutions	 that	 were	 upgraded	 from	 finance	 companies	 to	 development	banks	to	commercial	banks.	The	data	has	been	taken	from	only	the	year	they	was	upgraded	to	commercial	banks.		
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6.2.3 Data	outliers	and	Winsorising	
The	outliers	 in	 the	dataset	will	have	a	disproportionate	effect	on	 statistical	analysis	and	may	provide	misleading	results	(Salkind,	2010;	Stock	&	Watson,	2011).	To	test	 the	existence	of	outliers	 in	 the	dataset,	Grubb’s	 test	has	been	conducted.	As	outliers	existed	in	the	dataset,	the	dataset	was	winsorised	at	1	per	cent	and	99	per	cent	to	control	for	the	noise	effect.		
6.2.4 Normality	Test	
An	assessment	of	normality	of	data	is	prerequisite	for	several	statistical	tests;	it	helps	to	decide	which	statistical	tests	will	be	appropriate:	parametric	or	non-parametric.	 If	 the	 data	 are	 not	normally	distributed	 (bell-shaped),	 then	 the	variables	are	highly	skewed	and	may	have	large	kurtosis.	There	are	two	main	methods	of	 assessing	 for	normality:	 graphic	and	numerical.	A	 check	 can	be	made	graphically	by	using	histograms,	frequency	polygons,	normal	probability	plots	 and	 box	 and	 whisker	 plots.	 Among	 these,	 the	 frequency	 polygon	 is	considered	as	an	appropriate	and	easy	method	to	interpret	the	shape	(Bernard	(2013).	
While	doing	the	normality	test	for	the	given	dataset,	it	was	found	that	the	data	were	not	properly	bell-shaped	and	 there	was	skewness	and	kurtosis	 in	 the	dataset,	so	the	non-parametric	methods	should	be	used	for	this	study.		
6.2.5 Methodology	
This	 section	 discusses	 the	 research	models	 that	 have	 been	 used	 to	 test	 the	relationship	between	corporate	governance	and	bank	performance	 in	Nepal	
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and	the	data	analysis	techniques	used	for	this	study.	The	analysis	techniques	discussed	in	this	study	are	descriptive	statistics,	panel	OLS	regression	analysis,	MANOVA,	Friedman	test,	Roy	Zellner	probability	test,	Breusch-Pagan	test	for	heteroskedasticity,	and	Wooldridge	test	for	autocorrelation.	To	investigate	the	corporate	governance	mechanism	and	its	impact,	quantile	regression	analysis	was	used.		Figure	6.1	below	shows	the	concept	map	of	the	methodology	used	in	this	study.		
	
Figure	6-1:	Concept	map	of	the	methodology	used	in	this	study	
6.3 Model	 specification	 for	 bank	 governance	 and	
performance	
This	 research	 sample	 consists	of	 both	 cross-sessional	 and	 time	 series	 data.	Thus,	it	is	probable	that	a	panel	dataset	can	be	used.	Panel	data	analysis	uses	multiple	entities	of	data	where	each	entity	 is	observed	at	 two	or	more	time	
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periods	and	allows	the	exploration	of	the	dynamic	effects	which	are	difficult	to	detect	with	the	cross	sessional	data	(Stock	&	Watson,	2011).		
So,	to	decide	whether	the	data	are	poolable	or	not,	the	‘Roy	Zellner	poolability	test’	was	conducted.	The	null	hypothesis	for	poolability	test	is	that	the	slopes	are	the	same	across	various	groups	of	banks	over	the	period	(Vaona,	2008),	that	is:	
Ho:	βi	=	β	
	
(Eq.	1)	
	suggesting	 the	 slopes	 remain	 constant	 in	 both	 the	 fixed	 and	 random	effect	models.		While	doing	the	poolability	test	the	null	hypothesis	is	rejected,	so	the	panel	 data	 are	 not	poolable.	Hence	 panel	 regression	 has	 to	 be	 used	 for	 the	analysis.		
6.3.1 	Panel	data	OLS	regression	
Panel	 data	 analysis	 is	 the	 most	 efficient	 statistical	 method,	 widely	 used	 in	econometrics,	social	science	and	epidemiology	for	several	reasons.	First,	the	panel	data	consists	of	both	the	cross	sessional	and	time	series	data.		It	allows	taking	into	account	the	unobservable	and	consistent	heterogeneity	that	might	exist	in	the	selected	company.	Second,	it	may	be	possible	to	exploit	dynamics	that	are	difficult	to	detect	with	cross	sessional	data.	The	third	reason	is	they	typically	provide	large	observations	(Maddala	&	Lahiri,	1992).				
The	commonly	used	multiple	regression	analysis	is	initially	used	in	panel	data	analysis.	Following	Hartarska	(2005);	Reddy	(2010);	Thrikawala	(2016)	and	Wellalage	 Hewa	 (2012),	 this	 study	 has	 adopted	 panel	 data	 estimation	
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methodology.	For	the	analysis,	the	basic	panel	data	regression	equation	can	be	written	as:	Performance	 it	 =	 α	 +	 β1Board	 Size	 it	 	 +	 β2CFOit	 	 +β3%	 of	minority	directors	it		+β4%	of	Female	directors	it		+	β5%	of	outside	directors	it		+	β6firm	age	it		+	β7	No.	of	branches	it		+	β8Ownership	Structure	it		+	∈VW 		
(Eq.	2)	
where	i	indicates	firm	observations	which	take	1	to	30,	t	indicates	time	which	takes	the	values	of	2003	to	2013,	α	denotes	the	intercept	of	the	straight	line	and	β	denotes	the	slope	of	the	regression	line.	The	dependent	variables	for	this	study	are		non-performing	loan	to	total	loan;	loan	 to	deposit;	 cash	 flow	 to	deposit;	deposit	 to	assets;	 loan	 to	 total	 assets;	operating	expenses	to	interest	income;	operating	expenses	to	total	loan;	and	return	on	equity	and	return	on	assets	are	used	as	a	proxy	for	company	financial	performance.	As	the	establishment	of	each	bank	is	different,	and	about	50	per	cent	of	the	banks	were	established	after	2007,	there	is	unbalanced	panel	data.	Hence,	 before	 proceeding	 with	 the	 unbalanced	 panel	 data	 analysis,	 the	individual	and	time	effects	(two-way	error	components)	are	considered.	Thus,	a	Breush-Pagan	LM	test	for	unbalanced	two-way	error	components	based	on	Baltagi	and	Li	(1990)	modelling	was	run.		
6.4 Conclusion		
This	chapter	has	provided	the	framework	for	the	econometric	analysis	used	to	test	 the	 hypotheses.	 The	 chapter	 discussed	 the	 research	 methods,	 data	collection	methods,	data	cleaning	procedure,	normality	 test	and	the	specific	data	analysis	techniques	used	in	this	study.	
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The	 following	 chapter	will	 discuss	 the	 findings	 and	 examine	 the	 important	corporate	governance	variables	for	financial	performance,	applying	the	data	analysis	methods	discussed	in	this	chapter.		
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7 Chapter	Seven	
Corporate	Governance	 and	Bank	Performance	 in	Nepal:	
An	Empirical	Investigation	
7.1 Introduction:	
This	chapter	presents	the	data	analysis	techniques	and	empirical	findings	for	the	 relationship	 between	 corporate	 governance	 practices	 and	 bank	performance	 of	 commercial	 banks	 in	Nepal.	 First,	 section	 7.2	 discusses	 the	data	 analysis	 techniques,	 and	 provides	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 descriptive	statistics	for	visualising	the	behaviour	of	the	data	in	a	more	meaningful	way.	Secondly,	 it	 reports	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 corporate	 governance	variables	 and	 bank	 performance	 variables	 by	 using	 panel	 data	 techniques.	Then	 it	discusses	the	regression	model	used	 in	the	study	and	 its	 findings.	 It	concludes	the	chapter	by	identifying	the	corporate	governance	practices	that	appear	most	significant	for	improving	the	performance	of	banks	in	Nepal.		
7.2 Data	analysis	techniques	
The	hypotheses	presented	 in	Chapter	Five	are	tested	by	using	sequences	of	data	analysis	techniques	discussed	in	the	following	sections.		
7.2.1 Descriptive	analysis	of	data	
Descriptive	 statistics	 help	 to	 describe,	 show	 or	 summarise	 the	 data	 in	 a	meaningful	way	making	them	more	useful	for	analysis.	Descriptive	statistics	are	very	important	because	they	enable	the	presentation	of	the	data	in	a	more	
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meaningful	 way,	 which	 allows	 for	 simple	 interpretation	 of	 the	 data.	 They	summarise	 the	mean,	median,	 variance,	 standard	deviation,	histograms	and	pie	charts	of	the	data	as		suggested	by	Bernard	(2013).		
Typically,	descriptive	analysis	can	be	used	to	describe	the	data	in	two	different	ways,	 first,	with	 the	 help	 of	measures	 of	 central	 tendency	 that	 are	 used	 to	describe	the	central	position	of	the	given	data	using	the	number	of	statistics	such	as	mean,	median	and	mode.	However,	the	mean	will	be	heavily	influenced	if	data	are	missing	or	have	outliers.	The	median	might	be	better	when	the	data	is	skewed	as	it	gives	the	midpoint	of	distribution.	Half	of	the	observations	are	above	the	median;	half	are	below	it,	while	the	mode	helps	to	identify	the	value	that	occurs	most	frequently	in	a	set	of	observations.		Second	is	the	measure	of	spread	that	helps	to	identify	how	spread	the	scores	are,	whether	the	data	are	homogeneous	or	heterogeneous	can	be	seen	by	using	standard	deviation.	Also	the	minimum	and	maximum	value	of	variables	can	be	seen	to	establish	which	data	are	most	scattered.	
Thus,	the	careful	analysis	of	descriptive	statistics	helps	to	identify	the	overall	behaviour	of	the	data.	After	careful	observation	of	the	descriptive	statistics,	it	was	found	that	the	non-parametric	procedures	were	appropriate	for	this	study.		
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The	descriptive	analysis	of	the	data	is	shown	in	Table	7.1	below.	
Table	7-1:	Descriptive	statistics	Variable	 Obs	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	Non-Performing	loan	to	total	Loan	 239	 0.05	 0.09	 0.00	 0.58	Loan	to	deposit	 239	 0.78	 0.17	 0.05	 1.30	Deposit	to	Assets	 238	 0.82	 0.17	 0.06	 1.30	Loan	to	Assets	 237	 0.62	 0.15	 0.06	 0.83	Operating	expenses	to	interest	income	 239	 0.89	 1.22	 0.07	 17.92	Operating	expenses	to	total	loan	 238	 1.86	 27.04	 0.01	 417.33	Return	on	assets	 239	 0.01	 0.03	 -0.21	 0.20	Board	size	 239	 7.30	 1.33	 4.00	 11.00	%	of	outside	directors	 239	 0.13	 0.05	 0.00	 0.03	CFO	 236	 0.11	 0.32	 0.00	 1.00	%	of	minority	directors	 239	 0.20	 0.11	 0.00	 0.25	%	of	female	directors	 239	 0.04	 0.07	 0.00	 0.29	Age	of	firm		 239	 15.24	 16.17	 1.00	 78.00	Branches	 234	 33.67	 39.77	 1.00	 241.00	Employee	 237	 690.08	 965.40	 34.00	 4123.00	Inflation	Rate	 265	 0.08	 0.03	 0.04	 0.13	GDP	 239	 4.30	 0.86	 3.36	 6.10	Real	Interest	Rate	 239	 4.35	 2.58	 0.37	 7.00	Bond	Rate	 239	 0.05	 0.02	 0.03	 0.09	Interbank	Settling	Rate	 239	 0.04	 0.02	 0.01	 0.06	Ownership	Structure	 246	 2.19	 0.63	 1.00	 3.00		
From	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 above,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 there	 is	 a	 huge	difference	in	the	ages	of	the	firms	i.e.,	the	minimum	being	1	and	maximum	78	years.	This	is	because	the	first	commercial	bank	of	Nepal	was	established	in	1937,	before	the	establishment	of	central	banks	in	Nepal.	 	After	the	Maoists	(revoltionary	party)	came	into	the	peace	process	in	2006,	13	of	the	total	30	commercial	banks	were	established.		
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Also,	it	can	be	seen	that	from	Table	7.1,	the	minimum	board	size	was	between	four	 (minimum)	 and	 eleven	 (maximum)	 members	 during	 2003.	 These	extremes	 occurred	 before	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Bank	 and	 Financial	Institution	Act,	2006.	This	Act	 requires	 that	 all	 the	banks	should	have	 their	board	size	of	between	five	(minimum)	and	nine	(maximum)	members.		
Similarly,	there	is	a	vast	difference	in	the	number	of	branches	across	the	banks.	For	example,	Century	Bank	Limited,	established	in	2011	with	only	one	branch	has	 slowly	and	gradually	 increased	 its	number	of	branches,	until	 in	August	2017	 it	had	67	branches	across	the	country.	 	While	one	of	 the	public	sector	banks,	 Agriculture	 Development	 Bank	 of	 Nepal,	 had	 the	 highest	 number	 of	branches,	with	241,	to	fulfil	its	objective	to	provide	banking	facilities	to	rural	people,	especially	farmers.		
In	the	same	way,	there	are	huge	differences	in	other	variables,	for	example,	the	number	of	employees.		The	minimum	number	of	bank	employees	was	34	in	the	NMB	 bank	 during	 2007,	 the	 first	 year	 of	 its	 establishment;	 while	 the	Agricultural	Development	Bank	had	the	highest	number	of	employees,	being	4123	during	2003,	which	was	mainly	due	to	the	greater	number	of	branches	in	rural	areas.	However,	due	to	development	and	adoption	of	several	banking	technologies,	the	number	of	employees	in	this	bank	is	gradually	decreasing.		
The	 descriptive	 statistics	 shown	 in	 Table	 7.1	 show	 that	 the	 data	 are	 not	normally	distributed.	So,	this	study	used	Spearman	rank	correlation,	MANOVA,	Kurskal	Wallis	test	and	quantile	regression	for	further	analysis.	
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7.2.2 Inferential	analysis	of	data	
Inferential	statistics	allows	using	samples	to	make	a	generalisation	about	the	populations	from	which	samples	are	drawn.	It	is	used	to	assess	the	strengths	of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 independent	 variables	 and	 the	 dependent	variables.	This	study	has	used	MANOVA,	correlation,	bivariate	regression	and	multivariate	regression	to	identify	the	association	between	independent	and	dependent	variables.		
7.2.3 Covariations	
Covariation	identifies	the	variation	between	two	random	variables.	It	indicates	how	changes	in	one	variable	are	associated	with	changes	in	another	variable.		Specifically,	 covariation	 is	 used	 to	measure	 the	 direction	 and	 shape	 of	 the	relationships.			The	direction	of	covariation	deals	with	the	positive	or	negative	signs	of	the	covariation,	but	the	shape	of	covariation	refers	to	the	linear	or	non-linear	relation	of	 the	covariation.	Scatterplots	can	be	created	to	 identify	 the	shapes	and	directions	of	the	relationships	(Bernard,	2013).	
7.2.4 Statistical	significance	of	the	study	
Statistical	 significance	provides	an	 indication	 that	 the	 relationship	between	two	or	more	variables	is	caused	by	something,	not	due	to	random	chance.	A	simple	way	to	discover	statistical	significance	is	to	look	at	the	p-value.	The	p-value	shows	how	probable	the	results	were	due	to	random	chance.	A	p-value	of	0.10	means	that	there	is	10	per	cent	probability	that	the	results	were	due	to	luck.	 This	 study	 employs	 three	 levels	 of	 statistical	 significance.	 The	 most	
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commonly	used	level	of	statistical	significance	(p-value	or	probability	value)	in	hypotheses	testing	is	0.05	(**)	significance	level	(Bernard,	2013).	P-values	of	 0.10	 (*)	 and	 0.01	 (***)	 are	 also	 considered	 in	 this	 study	 as	 moderately	significant	and	very	significant,	respectively.	
7.2.5 Correlation	and	multi-	collinearity	diagnostic	
The	Spearman	correlation	indicates	the	strengths	and	direction	of	association	among	 various	 dependent	 and	 independent	 variables.	 The	 Spearman’s	correlation	works	by	calculating	Pearson's	correlation	on	the	ranked	values	of	the	data.	Like	the	Pearson's	correlation,	it	is	denoted	by	rs	and	lies	between	±1.		This	helps	to	identify	the	perspective	multicollinearity	in	the	dataset.		Gujarati	and	 Porter	 (2009)	 and	 Field	 (2009)	 state	 that	 the	 if	 correlation	 coefficient	between	two	variables	is	less	than	0.8	the	multicollinearity	issue	is	unlikely	to	be	the	serious	problem.		
The	 Spearman	 rank	 correlation	matrix	 for	 the	 dependent	 and	 independent	variables	is	given	in	Table	7.2	and	Table	7.3	below.		Initially,	while	doing	the	Spearman	 rank	 correlation,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 correlation	(0.855)	between	the	number	of	branches	and	number	of	employees.	So,	 the	number	 of	 employees’	 variable	 is	 dropped,	 and	 again	 correlation	 was	conducted.	The correlation matrix presented no correlation coefficient greater than 
0.8, which Gujarati and Porter (2009) suggest as the maximum acceptable 
correlation for two explanatory variables. The highest degree of correlation is 
shown between the firm age and number of branches, suggesting that the old 
companies open more branches.   
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Table	7-2:	Spearman	rank	correlation	of	independent	variables	
 Board	size	 %	of	outside	directors	 CFO	 %	of	minority	directors	 %	of	female	director	 Firm	age	 Branches	 Inflation	Rate	 Ownership	Structure	 GDP	 Real	Interest	Rate	 Bond	Rate	 Interbank	Settling	Rate	Board	size	 1.0000		 	            %	of	outside	directors	 0.2956	 1.0000		 	           CFO	 -0.2352	 -0.1469	 1.000		 	          %	of	minority	directors	 0.0684	 0.1475	 0.011	 1.0000		 	         %	of	female	director	 -0.0433	 -0.0205	 0.147	 0.1944	 1.000		 	        Firm	age	 -0.1440	 -0.1396	 0.305	 -0.1881	 -0.077	 1.000		 	       Branches	 -0.0189	 -0.1305	 0.073	 -0.1407	 -0.075	 0.785	 1.000		 	      Inflation	Rate	 0.1156	 0.0420	 -0.009	 0.3216	 0.052	 0.032	 0.188	 1.000		 	     Ownership	Structure	 0.0483	 0.0838	 0.469	 0.1797	 0.125	 -0.019	 -0.146	 -0.031	 1.000		 	    GDP	 0.0779	 0.0205	 -0.017	 0.0833	 0.028	 0.027	 0.119	 0.662	 -0.019	 1.000		 	   Real	Interest	Rate	 0.154	 0.033	 -0.027	 0.1730	 0.0108	 0.0583	 0.2279	 0.4136	 -0.0360	 0.380	 1.000		 	  Bond	Rate	 0.001	 -0.022	 -0.01	 -0.0837	 -0.0038	 -0.0307	 -0.0211	 -0.3092	 -0.0058	 -0.122	 0.039	 1.0000		 	Interbank	Settling	Rate	 -0.027	 0.007	 0.002	 0.1143	 0.0220	 -0.0369	 -0.0074	 -0.0026	 -0.0108	 -0.166	 -0.124	 0.6491	 1.0000		
Note: Data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to 
ownership structure, bond rate and interbank settling rate are collected from central banks database, and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database. 	
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Similarly,	while	conducting	the	Spearman	rank	correlation	of	dependent	variables	it	was	found	that	the	loan	to	deposit	and	loan	to	assets	variables	are	highly	correlated,	i.e.	0.75.	The	loan	to	assets	ratio	was	dropped	instead	of	loan	to	deposit,	because	I	have	another	variable	in	my	dataset,	deposit	to	assets,	which	gives	some	insights	of	how	effectively	the	bank	is	able	collect	deposits	in	relation	to	its	assets.	Another	variable,	loan	to	deposit,	tells	us	whether	the	bank	is	efficient	in	utilising	its	deposits.	As	a	robustness	check,	the	loan	to	assets	variable	was	used	and	the	loan	to	deposit	variable	was	dropped,	board	size	was	statistically	positively	correlated	at	5%	with	the	loan	to	assets	variable.	However,	there	was	no	significant	relationship	between	board	size	and	loan	to	deposit	variable.	
The	Spearman	rank	correlation	for	dependent	variables	are	given	in	Table	7.3	
Table	7-3:	Spearman	rank	correlation	of	dependent	variables			 NPL	to	TL	 Loan	to	Deposit	 Deposit	to	Assets	 Loan	to	Assets	 OEII	 OETL	 ROA	NPL	to	TL	 1.000		 		 		 		 		 		 		Loan	to	Deposit	 -0.218	 1.000		 		 		 		 		 		Deposit	to	Assets	 0.209	 -0.4530	 1.000		 		 		 		 		Loan	to	Assets	 -0.362	 0.7493	 -0.222	 1.000		 		 		 		OEII	 -0.015	 -0.124	 0.189	 -0.079	 1.000	 		 		OETL	 0.294	 -0.259	 0.299	 -0.327	 0.606	 1.000		 		ROA	 0.140	 -0.183	 -0.019	 -0.213	 -0.248	 0.021	 1.000		
Note: Data related to banks like board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to 
ownership structure, bond rate and interbank settling rate are collected from central banks database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database. 
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7.2.6 Multicollinearity:	
Multicollinearity	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 where	 another	 correlated	 variable	influences	 one	 predictor	 variable	 in	multiple	 regression.	 This	 increases	 the	standard	 errors	 of	 the	 coefficient	 by	 making	 some	 variables	 statistically	insignificant	 when	 they	 should	 be	 significant	 (Bernard,	 2013).	 The	 most	common	method	of	measuring	the	multicollinearity	is	variance	inflation	factor	(VIF)	 which	 quantifies	 the	 severity	 of	 multicollinearity	 in	 the	 estimated	regression	 and	 provides	 an	 estimate	 of	 how	much	 variance	 has	 increased	because	 of	 collinearity	 (Field,	 2009).	 A	 VIF	 of	 10	 or	 more	 indicates	 the	existence	of	multicollinearity	among	the	independent	variables,	and	it	needs	to	be	addressed	(Nguyen,	Locke,	&	Reddy,	2014).	However,	while	compiling	the	VIF,	the	data	in	Table	7.4,	it	was	found	that	all	the	variables	are	less	than	3.17.	Overall,	the	matrix	indicates	that	multicollinearity	is	not	an	issue.	
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Table	7-4:	Variance	inflation	factor	Variables	 VIF	Board	size	 3.04	%	of	outside	directors	 3.174	CFO	 3.1	%	of	minority	directors	 3.05	%	of	female	director	 3.15	Firm	age	 2.58	Branches	 2.82	Inflation	Rate	 2.3	Ownership	Structure	 2.34	GDP	 2.32	Real	Interest	Rate	 1.92	Bond	Rate	 1.77	Interbank	Settling	Rate	 1.8	Note:	The	table	reports	the	VIF	coefficients	for	explanatory	variables			
7.2.7 Multivariate	analysis	of	variance	(MANOVA):		
MANOVA	is	simply	an	ANOVA	with	several	dependent	variables.	ANOVA	tests	for	difference	in	means	between	two	or	more	groups,	while	MANOVA	tests	for	the	 difference	 in	 two	 or	 more	 vectors	 of	 means.	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 of	MANOVA	is	that	the	multivariate	means	of	all	groups	are	equal:	
H0:	=	µ1	=µ1=….µk	
The	MANOVA	was	done	to	check	if	there	were	differences	between	the	mean	of	two	or	more	than	two	subgroups	and	it	was	found	that	all	the	subgroups	of	a	different	category	of	banks	are	different.		
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Table	7-5:		MANOVA		Source	 Statistics	 F(df1	 df2)	 F	 Prob	>F	Ownership	Structure	 W	0.5363	 12	 460	 14	 0			 P	0.5189	 12	 462	 13.5	 0		 L	0.7619	 12	 458	 14.5	 0			 R	0.5864	 6	 231	 22.6	 0	Residual	 235	Total	 237		
Kruskal-Wallis	Test	
Table	7.6	shows	whether	the	mean	rank	is	the	same	among	the	three	different	groups	of	banks,	that	is,	public	sector	banks,	joint	venture	banks	and	private	sector	 banks.	The	Kruskal-Wallis	 Test	was	 conducted	 for	 all	 the	 dependent	variables	taken	into	the	study.	Its	results	show	that	the	means	of	all	the	groups	are	statistically	significantly	different	from	each	other	for	the	variables	taken	into	study.		
Table	7-6:	Kruskal-Wallis	Test	S.N.	 Dependent	Variable	 P-value	 Findings	1	 Non-performing	loan	to	total	loan	 0.001	 Statistically	significant	difference	2	 Loan	to	deposit	 0.001	 Statistically	significant	difference	3	 Deposit	to	Assets	 0.001	 Statistically	significant	difference	4	 Loan	to	Assets	 0.001	 Statistically	significant	difference	5	 Operating	expenses	to	interest	income	 0.001	 Statistically	significant	difference	6	 Operating	expenses	to	total	loan	 0.001	 Statistically	significant	difference	7	 Return	on	assets	 0.004	 Statistically	significant	difference		
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7.3 Selection	of	Analysis	Techniques	
While	 reviewing	various	 literature	on	 corporate	governance,	 it	was	unclear	which	were	the	appropriate	universal	statistical	techniques	to	be	used	when	there	are	dichotomous/categorical	 and	 interval/continuous	variables	 in	 the	study.	However,	 in	most	of	 the	 literature,	 the	multiple	regression	equations	have	been	used.	 So,	 following	 the	 trend,	 the	multiple	 regression	 techniques	have	also	been	used	for	further	analysis.		
To	decide	which	regression	method	should	be	used	for	the	study	either	cross	sessional	or	the	panel,	the	Friedman	test	and	the	Roy	Zellner	poolability	test	were	conducted.			
The	Friedman	test	results	show	whether	or	not	the	performance	of	each	group	of	 banks	 is	 identical.	 While	 conducting	 the	 test,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 the	performance	 of	 each	 group	 of	 banks	 is	 different	 for	 all	 the	 variables.	 The	results	of	the	Friedman	test	are	given	below	in	Table	7.7.	
Table	7-7:	Friedman	Test	-	ownership	structure	to	dependent	variables	Variables	 Friedman	 Kendall	 P.value	 Interpretation	NPLTL	 177.9107	 0.3753	 0.9984	 Rejected	Loan	to	Deposit	 168.9036	 0.3563	 0.9997	 Rejected	Deposit	to	Assets	 218.3865	 0.4607	 0.8017	 Rejected	Loan	to	Assets	 169.9398	 0.36	 0.9996	 Rejected	Operating	Exp	to	Interest	Income	 144.097	 0.304	 1	 Rejected	Operating	Exp	to	Total	Loan	 169.4412	 0.3575	 0.9997	 Rejected	Return	on	Assets	 198.3505	 0.4185	 0.4185	 Rejected		
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Since	the	p-value	for	all	the	dependent	variables	is	greater	than	0.1,	the	null	hypothesis	(the	performance	of	each	group	of	banks	 is	 identical)	 is	rejected	which	means	that	there	is	a	difference	in	performance	of	all	groups	of	banks.		
The	Roy	Zellner	poolability	test	was	conducted	to	discover	whether	the	data	could	be	pooled	and	the	cross	sessional	regression	analysis	used.	For	most	of	the	variables,	it	was	shown	that	the	data	are	not	poolable,	so	the	panel	data	regression	methods	were	used.	The	results	of	the	Roy	Zellner	poolability	test	are	shown	in	Table	7.8	below.		
Table	7-8:	Results	of	Roy	Zellner	Poolability	Test	Variable	 Chi	2	(74)	 Prob	>Chi2	Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	 369.73	 0	Loan	to	Deposit	 761.29	 0	Deposit	to	Assets	 134.55	 0	Loan	to	Assets	 289.44	 0	Operating	Exp.	To	Interest	Income	 37.35	 0.99	Operating	Exp.	To	Total	Loan	 1.50E+07	 0	Return	on	Assets	 37.82	 0.998		
7.3.1 Selection	of	regression	model	
7.3.1.1 Multiple	linear	regression	analysis	Multiple	 linear	 regression	 is	 used	 to	 predict	 the	 relationship	 between	 one	dependent	variable	and	a	set	of	independent	variables.		The	most	widely	used	method	to	analyse	the	effect	of	corporate	governance	is	OLS	regression	which	estimates	 the	 unknown	 parameters	 in	 multiple	 linear	 regression	 (Stock	 &	Watson,	2011;	Thrikawala,	2016).		
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The	 following	 regression	 equation	 is	 used	 to	 establish	 the	 impact	 of	 the	explanatory	 variable	 (X)	 on	 the	 dependent	 variable	 (Y)	 for	 the	 given	 n	observation:	
Yi	=	β0	+	β1Xit	+	β2Zit	+	εit	
In	this	equation	i	indicates	various	banks;	t	indicates	the	period,	that	is,	from	2003	 to	 2012;	 X	 is	 the	 corporate	 governance	 variables;	 and	 εit	 is	 the	 error	terms;	and	β	is	the	coefficients.			
In	panel	data,	two	types	of	residual	error	can	occur.	The	first	is	the	unobserved	firm	effect	where	the	residuals	of	 the	banks	may	be	correlated	across	years	(time	series	dependence)	for	a	given	firm	(Wooldridge,	2010).	The	second	is	that	 the	 residual	 of	 a	 given	 year	may	 be	 correlated	 across	 different	 banks	(cross-sectional	dependence);	this	is	called	time	effect.		Due	to	the	presence	of	unobserved	heterogeneity	in	the	data	set,	the	independent	variables	may	be	endogenous	and	correlated	with	the	error	term	(ε)	in	the	regression	model.	The	 panel	 data	 methodology	 allows	 for	 overcoming	 the	 problem	 of	heterogeneity	 through	 individual	 effects	 by	 capturing	 all	 time-invariant	variables	 that	might	affect	dependent	variables	 “Y”.	 	The	 two	 techniques	 to	diagnose	unobserved	characteristics	 in	 the	panel	model	are	 fixed	effect	and	random	effect	models.		
7.3.1.2 Fixed-effect	and	random	effect	model	The	fixed	effect	model	is	used	to	establish	the	impact	of	variables	which	vary	over	 time.	 It	 explores	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 dependent	 and	independent	 variables	 within	 an	 entity,	 as	 each	 entity	 may	 have	 its	 own	
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distinguishing	characteristics	and	may	or	may	not	influence	the	independent	variables.	 So,	 the	 fixed	 effect	 model	 removes	 the	 effect	 of	 time-invariant	characteristics	 and	 accesses	 the	 net	 effect	 of	 a	 dependent	 variable	 on	 the	independent	 variable.	 Also,	 the	 FE	 model	 assumes	 that	 each	 has	 a	 unique	impact	 to	 the	 time-invariant	 characteristics	 and	 hence	 it	 should	 not	 be	correlated	with	other	individual.		
The	fixed	effect	model	may	be	written	as:	Yit	=	β1Xit	+	αi	+	µit.	where	αi	(i=1….n)	is	the	unknown	intercept	for	each	entity	(n	entity-specific	intercepts),	Yit	is	the	dependent	variable	(DV)	where	i	=	entity	and	t	=	time,	Xit	represents	one	independent	variable	(IV),	β1	is	the	coefficient	for	that	IV,	and	µit	is	the	error	term.	
Unlike	the	fixed	effects	model,	the	random	effect	model	assumes	the	variation	to	be	random	and	uncorrelated	with	the	independent	variables	included	in	the	model.	The	advantage	of	a	random	effect	model	is	that	time-invariant	variables	can	be	 included,	while	 in	 the	 fixed	effect	model	 time-invariant	variables	are	absorbed	 by	 the	 intercept.	 RE	 assumes	 that	 an	 entity’s	 error	 term	 is	 not	correlated	with	independent	variables	and	allows	the	time-invariant	variables	to	act	as	explanatory	variables.		
The	equation	of	random	effect	model	is:	
Yit	=	βXit	+	α	+	µit	+	εit	
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where,	i=	1,…….,	N	firms,	t=	1,…..	T	time	period	with	k	regressors	in	Xit	and	µit	is	a	normal	error	term,	and	Yit	is	the	dependent	variable.	
7.3.1.3 Hausman	test	To	 decide	 which	 regression	method	 is	 appropriate,	 fixed	 effect	 or	 random	effect	 regression,	 the	 Hausman	 test	 was	 conducted.	 	 The	 Hausman	 test	 is	additionally	 helpful	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 reverse	 causality;	 the	 possibility	 of	reverse	causality	as	a	potential	component	of		endogeneity.	Reverse	causality	is	 one	 of	 the	 three	 causes	 of	 endogeneity	 along	 with	missing	 variable	 and	simultaneity.	A	direct	test	such	as	Granger	does	not	work,	due	to	the	shortness	of	the	time	series	and	cannot	be	reported	as	a	robustness	test.	
The	shortness	of	the	time	period	is	a	problem	when	considering	the	efficacy	of	using	 lagged	 variables	 as	 a	 means	 of	 reducing	 endogeneity	 as	 has	 been	common	in	prior	research	but	was	not	considered	in	this	study.		
Testing	directly	for	endogeneity	provides	the	basis	for	choosing	between	fixed	effect	 and	 random	 effect	models.	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 preferred	model	 is	 random	 effect	 while	 the	 alternative	 hypothesis	 is	 the	 fixed	 effect	model	(Greene,	2008).	The	Hausman	test	results	suggest	the	use	of	the	random	effect	model	for	three	equations	and	the	fixed	effect	model	for	four	estmations	as	presented	in		Table	7.9.		
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Table	7-9:	Selection	of	fixed	or	random	effect	model	Variable	 Prob>chi2	 Hausman	Test	Result	Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	 0.0012	 Fixed-	effect	model	Loan	to	Deposit	 0.0214	 Fixed-	effect	model	Deposit	to	Assets	 0.0804	 Random	–	effect	model	Loan	to	Assets	 0.00	 Fixed-	effect	model	Operating	Exp.	to	Interest	Income	 0.0511	 Random	–	effect	model	Operating	Exp.	to	Total	Loan	 0.0174	 Fixed-	effect	model	Return	on	Assets	 0.2488	 Random	–	effect	model		
7.3.1.4 Test	for	Heteroscedasticity	Heteroscedasticity	is	a	situation	where	the	variance	of	error	term	varies	across	all	levels	of	independent	variables	(Stock	&	Watson,	2011).	Most	of	these	arise	with	the	cross	sessional	data,	and	it	provides	the	biased	standard	errors.	The	OLS	 regression	 assumes	 that	 the	 error	 term	 is	 constant	 across	 all	 the	observations.	 If	 the	 error	 terms	 are	 not	 constant	 and	 they	 vary	 variously	across	the	levels	of	independent	variables,	then	there	is	heteroscedasticity	in	the	data	(Stock	&	Watson,	2011).	To	test	for	the	presence	of	heteroscedasticity	of	 the	data,	 the	Breusch-Pagan	 test	of	heteroscedasticity	 is	 conducted.	 	The	result	shows	that	there	is	the	presence	of	heteroscedasticity	in	the	data	for	all	dependent	variables	except	for	deposit	to	assets	and	loan	to	assets	(see	Table	7.10).		
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Table	7-10:	Breusch-	Pagan	test	of	heteroscedasticity	Variable	 Prob.>chi2	 Heteroskedasticity/	Homoskedasticity	Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	 0.000	 Heteroscedasticity	Loan	to	Deposit	 0.0163	 Heteroscedasticity	Deposit	to	Assets	 0.0574	 Homoskedasticity	Loan	to	Assets	 0.6419	 Homoskedasticity	Operating	Exp.	to	Interest	Income	 0.000	 Heteroscedasticity	Operating	Exp.	to	Total	Loan	 0.000	 Heteroscedasticity	Return	on	Assets	 0.000	 Heteroscedasticity		
The	serial	correlation,	that	is	the	residuals	being	correlated	with	each	other,	are	 often	 encountered	 in	 economic	 models	 (Jung,	 2005).	 The	 consistent	estimation	of	the	panel	data	estimators	requires	that	the	error	term	should	be	serially	uncorrelated	(Wellalage	Hewa,	2012).	So,	to	check	for	the	presence	of	autocorrelation	in	data,	a	Wooldridge	test	for	autocorrelation	was	conducted	and	found	an	autocorrelation	in	the	data	for	all	the	variables	except	operating	expenses	 to	 interest	 income.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 Wooldridge	 test	 for	autocorrelation	of	the	data	are	show	in	Table	7.11.		
Table	7-11:	Wooldridge	test	for	autocorrelation	Variable	 Prob.>F	 Autocorrelation	Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	 0.0003	 Autocorrelation	Loan	to	Deposit	 0.0035	 Autocorrelation	Deposit	to	Assets	 0.0051	 Autocorrelation	Loan	to	Assets	 0.0444	 Autocorrelation	Operating	Exp.	to	Interest	Income	 0.7597	 No	Autocorrelation	Operating	Exp.	to	Total	Loan	 0.000	 Autocorrelation	Return	on	Assets	 0.0262	 Autocorrelation		
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The	 results	 from	 tests	 suggest	 the	 use	 of	 different	 regression	 techniques	 for	different	 variables	 taken	 into	 study.	 The	 regression	 method	 used	 for	 various	variables	are	given	shown	in	Table	7.12.	
Table	7-12:	Regression	Methods	Variable	 Autocorrelation	 Hetro/	Homoskedasticity	 FE/	RE	 Regression	Techniques	Non-Performing	Loan	to	Total	Loan	 Autocorrelation	 Heteroscedasticity	 FE	 reg,	xtreg	cluster()	Loan	to	Deposit	 Autocorrelation	 Heteroscedasticity	 FE	 reg,	xtreg	cluster()	Deposit	to	Assets	 Autocorrelation	 Homoskedasticity	 RE	 reg,	re	Loan	to	Assets	 Autocorrelation	 Homoskedasticity	 FE	 reg,	re	Operating	Exp.	to	Interest	Income	 No	Autocorrelation	 Heteroscedasticity	 RE	 reg,	xtreg	robust	Operating	Exp.	to	Total	Loan	 Autocorrelation	 Heteroscedasticity	 FE	 reg,	xtreg	cluster()	Return	on	Assets	 Autocorrelation	 Hetroskedasticity	 RE	 reg,	xtreg	cluster()	
	
7.4 Empirical	Findings	
Table	7-13	shows	a	summary	of	the	panel	data	regression	results	used	in	the	study.	 	 The	 sign	 of	 coefficients	 is	 expected,	 and	 it	 shows	 that	 many	 are	statistically	 significant	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 financial	 performance	 of	 banks	 in	Nepal,	which	 is	predominantly	aligned	with	the	prior	studies	on	developing	economies.		
The	regression	results,	reported	in	Table	7-13,	are	interesting.		The	sign	(+	or		-)	on	the	coefficients	indicates	whether	the	variable	contributes	in	a	positive	or	negative	way	to	the	returns	and	the	*	 indicates	whether	 it	 is	statistically	significant.	Considering	if	the	board	size	is	statistically	negatively	correlated	with	 non-performing	 loan	 to	 total	 loan	 and	 operating	 expenses	 to	 interest	income,	and	is	statistically	positively	significant	at	10	per	cent	and	1	per	cent	for	loan	to	deposit	and	loan	to	assets	variable	taken	into	study,	the	reason	for	
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this	might	be	that	if	there	are	more	board	members	they	can	make	a	sound	decision	 related	 to	 credit	 quality,	 and	 hence	 the	 NPL	 will	 low.	 Also,	many	directors	on	 the	board	will	be	able	 to	assign	more	people	 to	 supervise	and	advise	 on	 the	 managers’	 decisions.	 Having	 more	 supervisors	 and	 advisors	makes	it	easier	to	detect	more	opportunity	in	the	market	and	provide	more	quality	 loans	 in	 the	 market.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 previous	 research	conducted	 by	 Andres	 &	 Vallelado	 (2008);	 and	 Yermack	 (1996).	 Thus,	 this	research	 confirms	 the	 empirical	 findings	 of	 Eisenberg,	 Sundgren,	 &	 Wells	(1998),	and	Fernandez	Alavarez,	Gómez	Ansón,	&	Fernández	Méndez,	(1997)	in	non-financial	organisations.		However,	these	results	contradict	the	findings	of	Adams	&	Ferreira		(2007).		
The	 existence	 of	 a	 CFO	 is	 negatively	 significant	 at	 10	 per	 cent	with	 loan	 to	deposit	the	probable	reason.	It	might	be	that	the	CFO	needs	to	properly	analyse	the	risks	of	loans	more	appropriately	and	may	want	to	have	more	liquidity	to	cover	any	unforeseen	circumstances.	
The	 percentage	 of	 a	 minority	 of	 directors	 has	 a	 negatively	 significant	relationship	 at	 5	 per	 cent	 when	 measured	 against	 operating	 expenses	 to	interest	 income.	 This	may	 be	 because	 the	minority	 directors	may	 be	more	conservative	 with	 spending	 and	 try	 to	 reduce	 several	 bank	 expenses.	 In	contrast,	minority	directors	have	a	negative	significant	relationship	at	10	per	cent	 with	 return	 on	 assets.	 This	 finding	 is	 contradictory	 to	 that	 of	 Dwyer,	Richard,	&	Chadwick,	(2003);	Wellalage	Hewa	(2012)	who	argue	that	minority	
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directors	positively	affect	firms’	strategic	decisions	and	organisational	cultural	developments	and	positively	influence	company	financial	performance.		
The	 existence	 of	 female	 directors	 on	 the	 board	 is	 significantly	 negatively	correlated	at	5	per	cent		level	of	significance	with	non-performing	loans	to	total	loans	and	loan	to	assets,	and	this	finding	is	in	line	with	the	study	conducted	by	Adams	&	Ferreira	(2009;	Thrikawala	(2016);	Wellalage	&	Locke	(2013).	This	suggests	 that	 the	banks	having	 fewer	 female	directors	on	their	boards	have	better	financial	performance	than	other	banks.	This	is	because	in	most	of	the	south	Asian	countries	females	have	a	domestic	responsibility	and	because	of	their	 cultural	 differences	 this	 impacts	 women’s	 managerial	 activities	especially	in	Nepal’s	male-dominated	society.		
Similarly,	 the	 percentage	 of	 outside	 directors	 is	 statistically	 negatively	significant	at	10	per	cent	with	loan	to	deposit,	while	it	is	statistically	positively	significant	at	10	per	cent	and	5	per	cent	respectively	with	a	non-performing	loan	to	total	loan	and	operating	expenses	to	total	loan	respectively.	This	may	be	because	the	outside	directors	may	not	be	very	effective	in	the	management	of	the	company,	they	may	be	participating	just	as	their	retirement	plan,	and	their	remuneration	may	be	very	high.	Also,	the	outside	director	is	the	tougher	monitor;	the	CEO	may	be	reluctant	to	share	information	with	them.	Thus,	due	to	 limited	 information,	 they	may	not	be	able	 to	 contribute	positively	 to	 the	banks	(Adams	&	Ferreira,	2007;	Bhagat	&	Black,	2002).	However,	this	result	contradicts	the	finding	of	Andres	and	Vallelado	(2008).			
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7.4.1 Dynamic	System	Estimation	Regression:	
The	dynamic	system	regression	approach	is	being	used	more	frequently	in	the	empirical	research	literature	relating	to	corporate	governance,	however,	for	this	present	study	it	is	not	applicable	given	the	nature	of	the	data.	 	There	is	little	rank	correlation	between	 the	dependent	variables	and,	 given	 the	non-parametric	properties	of	the	data,	a	quantile	regression	is	more	appropriate.	
7.4.2 Quantile	Regression	
The	quantile	regression	introduced	by	Koenker	and	Bassett	(1978)	splits	the	sample	into	various	quantiles	based	on	the	performance	variables	to	obtain	a	more	comprehensive	picture.	It	models	the	relationship	on	a	set	of	predictor	variables	and	specific	quantiles	(or	percentiles)	of	the	response	variables	and	shows	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 quantiles	 of	 response	 variables.	 The	 quantile	regression	works	better	than	OLS	regression	when	the	data	are	skewed,	and	there	is	the	existence	of	heteroscedasticity	and	outliers	in	the	data	(Wellalage	&	Locke,	2014).		
As	the	data	are	skewed,	there	is	the	existence	of	outliers,	so	the	data	has	been	divided	into	seven	different	quantiles	(i.e.	0.10,	0.25,	0.40,	0.50,	0.60,	0.75	and	0.90	quantiles).	Table	7.13	below	shows	the	corporate	governance	and	bank	performance	variables	across	various	quantiles.	
7.4.2.1 Board	size	and	quantile	regression:		Table	7-14	shows	that	board	size	has	a	significantly	negative	correlation	with	the	upper	quantile	banks	for	the	variables	NPL/TL,	similarly,	Table	7-17	and	
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Table	 7-18	 shows	 that	 board	 size	 is	 negatively	 significant	 correlated	 with	operating	 expense	 to	 interest	 income	 and	operating	 expenses	 to	 total	 loan,	while	 it	 is	 positively	 correlated	with	 loan	 to	deposit	 for	 the	 banks	 that	 fall	between	0.25	and	0.75	quantiles.	This	indicates	that	higher	board	size	leads	to	an	increase	in	the	performance	of	middle-	and	average-performing	banks.	This	might	be	because	the	larger	board	may	bring	diverse	knowledge	and	ideas	into	the	 meeting,	 which	 facilitates	 better	 decision	 making	 and	 facilitates	 good	monitoring	and	supervision	(Andres	&	Vallelado,	2008).	These	findings	are	in	line	with	resource	dependent	theory	that	states	a	larger	board	provides	more	specialist	knowledge	from	different	fields	and	therefore	contributes	to	better	decision	making	(Kiel	&	Nicholson,	2003;	Mohamed,	2009;	Pfeffer	&	Salancik,	1989;	 Salim	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Zahra	 &	 Pearce,	 1989).	 However,	 it	 is	 negatively	significant	with	the	upper	middle	quantile	with	ROA	for	the	quantiles	0.5,	0.6	and	0.75.	This	also	indicates	that	the	larger	board	size	is	most	appropriate	for	middle-	 and	 higher-performing	 banks	 which	 seems	 to	 be	 quite	controversialbecause	 the	 banks	with	high	 profitability	 can	 appoint	 efficient	corporate	 governance	 mechanisms	 by	 attracting	 highly	 qualified	 board	members.	This	finding	is	similar	to	that	of	Eisenberg	et	al.	(1998);	Mollah	&	Zaman	(2015).		
7.4.2.2 CFO	and	quantile	regression:		Table	 7-14	 reveals	 that	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 chief	 financial	 officer	 has	 a	significantly	 negative	 effect	 on	 NPL/TL	 for	 average-	 and	 above-performing	banks	 (Q0.5	 and	 Q0.75),	 while	 Table	 7-15	 revels	 that	 it	 has	 a	 significant	negative	effect	on	loan	to	deposit	for	average-	and	below-performing	banks.	A	
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possible	explanation	 for	 this	might	be	 that	CFOs	are	good	at	 evaluating	 the	risks,	 so	 they	 are	 focused	 on	 providing	 the	 quality	 loans	 which	 results	 in	reducing	 the	 NPL	 and	 also	 the	 loan	 to	 deposit	 ratio.	 These	 findings	 are	supported	by	the	studies	by	Javaid	and	Saboor	(2015)	and	Lutz	and	Schraml	(2011).	In	the	same	way,	there	is	a	significant	negative	relationship	at	5	per	cent	with	the	quantile	0.60,	but	it	has	a	significant	positive	relationship	at	1	per	cent	with		the	highest	performing	banks.	This	might	be	because	CFOs	might	encourage	the	higher	performing	banks	to	be	more	involved	with	research	and	development	 which	 have	 huge	 initial	 investments,	 while	 they	 may	 restrict	these	types	of	investment	in	lower-	and	average-performing	banks.	Similarly,	there	is	a	negative	relationship	between	CFO	and	ROA	for	the	bank	that	falls	into	 the	 quantiles	 0.50	 and	 0.60.	 Girigori's	 (2013)	 	 study	 has	 also	 found	 a	negative	 effect	 of	 CFO	 expertise	 and	 a	 firm's	 performance.	 In	 contrast,	Defond,Hann	&	Hu(2005);	Francis,	Hasan	&	Wu	(2012)	and	Kirkpatric	(2009)		have	found	an	insignificant	relationship	between	the	existence	of	CFO	and	a	firm's	performance.		
7.4.2.3 Percentage	of	minority	directors	and	quantile	regression:		The	 quantile	 regression	 tables	 7-15,	 7-16,	 and	 7-17	 	 indicate	 that	 the	percentage	 of	 minority	 directors	 has	 a	 significant	 positive	 relationship	between	the	performance	of	banks	in	Nepal	with		the	performance	variables	loans	 to	 deposit	 (with	 quantiles	 below	 0.60),	 deposit	 to	 assets	 (with	 the	quantiles	0.10,	0.75	and	0.90),	OEII	(with	only	0.75	quantile)	and	OETL	(with	lowest	quantile)	respectively.	The	posit	diversity	 in	 the	board	 increased	the	quality	of	thought	and	the	strategic	decisions	of	the	firm	(Ameer	&	Rahman,	
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2009;	Crano	&	Chen,	1998).	 	 Interestingly,	 there	 is	a	significantly	positively	correlationship	 with	 the	 average	 and	 above	 average	 quantiles	 with	 the	NPL/TL	performance	variables.	This	might	be	because	minority	directors	may	be	more	likely	to	be	risk	takers	and,	to	increase	the	profitability	of	banks,	they	may	 be	 interested	 in	 providing	more	 loans	without	 considering	 the	 risk	 of	investment.	These	findings	contradict	the	findings	of	Zahra	and	Stanton	(1988)	that	there	is	no	statistically	significant	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	minority	directors	and	a	firm's	performance.	
7.4.2.4 Percentage	of	female	directors	and	quantile	regression:		The	quantile	regression	Tables	7-16	below	shows	that	having	 female	board	directors	has	a	significant	influence,	mostly	around	the	average-	and	higher-	performing	 banks	 (Q	 0.6	 to	 0.9)	 for	 the	 variable	 deposit	 to	 assets.	 On	 the	contrary,	 Table	 7.14	 shows	 that	 percentage	 of	 female	 directors	 has	 a	significant	negative	relationship	with	the	NPL	to	TL	 for	 the	quantiles	below	0.60.		The	thinking	patterns	of	males	and	females	may	be	quite	different;	the	female	 directors	 may	 add	 value	 by	 bringing	 new	 ideas	 and	 different	perspectives	 to	 the	board.	Also,	 females	may	 be	 less	 reluctant	 to	decide	on	risky	loans.	As	a	result,	their	NPL/TL	is	reduced.	This	result	is	consistent	with	the	findings	of	Adams	&	Ferreira	(2009);	Carter	et	al.	(2003);	Garcia-Meca	et	al.	(2015)	and	Pathan	&	Faff	(2013).	However,	they	are	positively	correlated	with	OEII	for	the	quantiles	0.6	and	0.75	and	negatively	correlated	with	ROA.	A	tentative	 explanation	 for	 this	 may	 be	 that	 as	 female	 directors	 are	 more	conservative	 in	 providing	 the	 loans,	 interest	 income	 is	 reduced.	 	 So	 before	providing	 loans	 they	 may	 request	 several	 checks	 and	 verifications	 which	
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increases	their	cost	and	which	results	in	a	decrease	in	net	income		and	ROA.		A	similar	result	was	found	in	the	research	by	Adams	&	Ferreria	(2009)	and	Smith	et	al.	(2006).			
7.4.2.5 Percentage	of	outside	directors	and	quantile	regression:		The	quantile	regression	tables	7-14	and	7-17	below	reveal	that	the	percentage	of	outside	directors	has	a	positive	influence	on	NPL/TL	and	OEII	respectively	for	the	middle	and	above	quantiles	at	0.75	and	0.90,	and	Table	7.18	revealed	that	 it	 is	significantly	positively	correlated	at	5	per	cent	with	0.25,	0.75	and	0.90	with	the	variable	operating	expenses	to	total	loan.	In	contrast,	Table	7.19	shows	that	percentage	of	outside	directors	is	negatively	significant	with	ROA	at	 5	 per	 cent	 with	 0.10	 quantile.	 This	 indicates	 that	 it	 has	 a	 negative	relationship	with	 the	 performance	 variables	 above.	 The	 negative	 impact	 of	outside	directors	is	consistent	with	previous	studies	(Bhagat	&	Black,	2002;	Coles	et	al.,	2008;	Pathan	&	Faff,	2013;	Yermack,	1996).	It	also	supports	the	notion	of	Subrahmanyam,	Rangan,	and	Rosenstein	(1997)	that	 independent	directors	in	the	bank	are	chosen	more	for	regulatory	and	compliance	purposes.	However,	 for	 other	 performance	 variables,	 deposit	 to	 assets	 and	 ROA,	 it	 is	significantly	positively	correlated	at	5	per	cent	with	0.75	quantile	and	1	per	cent	for	deposit	to	assets	with	0.90	quantile.	These	findings	are	in	line	with	the	research	 of	 Bhagat	 and	 Black	 (1999),	 that	 is,	 outside	 directors	 behave	differently	for	different	firms.			
7.4.2.6 Conclusion			In	summary,	tables	7-13	–	7-19	below	displaying	quantile	regression	results	indicate	 that	 corporate	 governance	 variables	 have	 significantly	 different	
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effects	 in	 different	 banks	 for	 performance	 proxy	 taken	 in	 this	 study.	 	 It	 is	interesting	 that	 in	 some	 cases	 what	 is	 shown	 as	 the	 relationship	 for	 the	average	(50%)	performers	is	different	from	the	lower	and	higher	performing	banks.		This	suggests	that	some	banks	are	doing	better	than	others.		
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Table	7-13:	Regression	results			 NPL/TL	 LTD	 DTA	 OEII	 OETL	 ROA			 xtreg	cluster()	 xtreg,	re	 xtreg	robust	 reg,	xtreg	cluster()	Board	size	 -0.0114**	 0.00880	 -0.0130	 -0.0836**	 -3.689**	 -0.00208					 (-2.57)	 (0.97)	 (-1.24)	 (-2.04)	 (-2.06)	 (-1.03)				CFO	 -0.0304	 -0.0968	 -0.0641	 -0.154	 0.429	 -0.000308					 (-1.34)	 (-1.59)	 (-1.35)	 (-0.68)	 (0.05)	 (-0.03)				%	of	minority	directors	 0.0349	 0.0761	 -0.264*	 0.624	 -44.34*	 -0.0385					 (0.64)	 (0.75)	 (-1.95)	 (0.53)	 (-1.88)	 (-1.45)				%	of	female	director	 -0.192**	 -0.109	 0.00766	 0.156	 1.538	 0.00302					 (-2.47)	 (-0.72)	 (0.04)	 (0.25)	 (0.05)	 (0.08)				%	of	outside	directors	 0.216**	 0.173	 -0.0613	 0.367	 102.6***	 -0.00444					 (2.24)	 (0.78)	 (-0.29)	 (0.81)	 (2.91)	 (-0.11)				Firm	age	 -0.000965	 -0.00747***	 0.00305*	 0.0215	 -0.152	 0.000470					 (-1.16)	 (-3.54)	 (1.71)	 (0.80)	 (-0.51)	 (1.41)				Branches	 0.0000649	 -0.000541	 0.000357	 -0.00300	 0.0515	 0.000122					 (0.28)	 (-1.30)	 (0.62)	 (-0.95)	 (0.51)	 (1.07)				GDP	 0.0183**	 0.00853	 -0.0385**	 -0.0231	 2.793	 -0.00352					 (2.42)	 (0.64)	 (-1.97)	 (-0.36)	 (0.81)	 (-0.90)				Real	Interest	Rate	 -0.00410	 -0.00954*	 -0.00221	 -0.0328	 1.906	 0.0000392					 (-1.38)	 (-1.81)	 (-0.29)	 (-0.59)	 (1.41)	 (0.03)				Bond	Rate	 0.144	 2.222***	 0.850	 -1.038	 -274.8	 -0.112					 (0.29)	 (2.59)	 (0.66)	 (-0.23)	 (-1.21)	 (-0.44)				Interbank	Settling	Rate	 -0.378	 -2.110**	 -1.798	 0.185	 346.4	 0.204					 (-0.64)	 (-2.07)	 (-1.18)	 (0.03)	 (1.28)	 (0.67)				Inflation		 -1.247***	 0.122	 0.225	 -6.254	 -205.0	 0.368**			 (-4.34)	 (0.24)	 (0.30)	 (-1.29)	 (-1.57)	 (2.51)				Public	 0.181***	 0.247**	 -0.182	 0.246	 -8.781	 -0.0370*				 (3.59)	 (2.07)	 (-1.61)	 (0.37)	 (-0.46)	 (-1.70)				Joint	Venture	 0.0372**	 -0.0345	 -0.0133	 -0.180	 -5.191	 0.00218					 (2.29)	 (-0.80)	 (-0.39)	 (-1.21)	 (-0.91)	 (0.34)				_cons	 0.163***	 0.786***	 1.134***	 2.040***	 37.60**	 0.00948					 (3.86)	 (9.76)	 (10.93)	 (3.33)	 (2.08)	 (0.47)				N	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205				(Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses.  
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central banks’ database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database). 
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Table	7-14:	Quantile	regression	for	non-performing	loan	to	total	loan		 Q(0.10)	 Q(0.25)	 Q(0.40)	 Q(0.50)	 Q(0.60)	 Q(0.75)	 Q(0.90)	Board	Size	 0.0000352	 -0.00181	 -0.000257	 -0.00121*	 -0.00236	 -0.00605***	 -0.0218*				 (0.10)	 (-1.33)	 (-0.22)	 (-1.75)	 (-1.31)	 (-2.79)	 (-1.92)				CFO	 0.000456	 -0.00352	 -0.00636	 -0.00654**	 -0.00761	 -0.0256***	 -0.0752					 (0.34)	 (-0.59)	 (-1.24)	 (-2.14)	 (-1.01)	 (-3.07)	 (-1.61)				%	of	minority	directors	 -0.00251	 0.000954	 0.00631	 0.0166*	 0.0294	 0.0770***	 0.342***		 (-0.64)	 (0.05)	 (0.38)	 (1.80)	 (1.24)	 (3.14)	 (4.07)				%	of	female	director	 -0.0106*	 -0.0175	 -0.0372*	 -0.0424***	 -0.0544*	 -0.0642	 -0.127					 (-1.85)	 (-0.79)	 (-1.75)	 (-3.54)	 (-1.90)	 (-1.65)	 (-0.59)				%	of	outside	directors	 -0.00335	 0.0209	 -0.00387	 0.00878	 0.0274	 0.119***	 0.408**			 (-0.42)	 (0.72)	 (-0.16)	 (0.65)	 (0.82)	 (3.07)	 (2.11)				Firm	age	 0.00000902	 0.0000551	 0.000123	 -0.0000821	 -0.000337	 -0.000657*	 -0.000131					 (0.23)	 (0.24)	 (0.62)	 (-0.73)	 (-1.13)	 (-1.78)	 (-0.08)				Branches	 0.000102***	 0.000104	 -0.000135**	 -0.0000605	 -0.0000526	 0.000206*	 0.0000727					 (8.17)	 (1.44)	 (-2.00)	 (-1.52)	 (-0.53)	 (1.93)	 (0.16)				GDP	 0.000269	 0.00413	 0.00472**	 0.00654***	 0.0124***	 0.0114***	 0.0220					 (0.56)	 (1.64)	 (2.08)	 (4.89)	 (3.55)	 (2.72)	 (1.05)				Real	Interest	Rate	 -0.000130	 -0.0000193	 0.000399	 0.000601	 0.000784	 -0.00192	 -0.0109					 (-0.54)	 (-0.02)	 (0.45)	 (1.18)	 (0.59)	 (-1.24)	 (-1.27)				Bond	Rate	 -0.00444	 0.0633	 0.0545	 -0.0168	 -0.137	 0.139	 0.388					 (-0.10)	 (0.38)	 (0.37)	 (-0.19)	 (-0.61)	 (0.52)	 (0.29)				Interbank	Settling	Rate	 0.00735	 -0.0895	 -0.120	 -0.121	 0.0116	 -0.325	 -1.407					 (0.16)	 (-0.45)	 (-0.68)	 (-1.18)	 (0.04)	 (-1.01)	 (-0.89)				Inflation	 -0.0358**	 -0.308***	 -0.380***	 -0.483***	 -0.782***	 -0.902***	 -2.544***		 (-2.11)	 (-3.35)	 (-4.41)	 (-9.45)	 (-5.95)	 (-5.82)	 (-3.27)				Public	 0.0400***	 0.0373***	 0.106***	 0.118***	 0.129***	 0.176***	 0.341***		 (14.86)	 (3.06)	 (9.00)	 (15.72)	 (6.26)	 (7.31)	 (3.28)				Joint	Venture	 0.00671***	 0.00758*	 0.0113***	 0.0132***	 0.0163***	 0.0310***	 0.0749**			 (5.79)	 (1.79)	 (3.10)	 (6.04)	 (2.88)	 (4.56)	 (2.21)				_cons	 0.00147	 0.0265*	 0.0270**	 0.0385***	 0.0534***	 0.102***	 0.365***		 (0.36)	 (1.83)	 (2.29)	 (5.49)	 (2.92)	 (4.70)	 (3.19)				N	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205				(Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses. 
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central bank database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database). 	 	
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Table	7-15:	Quantile	regression	for	loan	to	deposit		 Q(0.10)	 Q(0.25)	 Q(0.40)	 Q(0.50)	 Q(0.60)	 Q(0.75)	 Q(0.90)	Board	Size	 0.00657	 0.0221***	 0.0229***	 0.0222**	 0.0199**	 0.0247*	 0.0195					 (0.99)	 (3.43)	 (4.51)	 (2.27)	 (2.19)	 (1.80)	 (1.50)				CFO	 -0.218***	 -0.185***	 -0.198***	 -0.141***	 -0.0370	 0.00206	 0.00815					 (-7.41)	 (-6.31)	 (-8.52)	 (-3.20)	 (-0.97)	 (0.04)	 (0.12)				%	of	minority	directors	 0.423***	 0.438***	 0.290***	 0.351***	 0.278**	 0.202	 0.195					 (6.05)	 (5.73)	 (4.37)	 (2.62)	 (2.34)	 (1.20)	 (1.01)				%	of	female	director	 -0.0455	 -0.0418	 -0.124	 -0.170	 -0.242*	 -0.421*	 -0.669***		 (-0.43)	 (-0.42)	 (-1.35)	 (-1.03)	 (-1.70)	 (-1.89)	 (-2.93)				%	of	outside	directors	 0.160	 0.137	 -0.0235	 -0.00694	 -0.0172	 -0.122	 0.317					 (0.87)	 (1.01)	 (-0.22)	 (-0.03)	 (-0.10)	 (-0.55)	 (1.39)				Firm	age	 -0.00285***	 -0.00339***	 -0.00368***	 -0.00460***	 -0.00546***	 -0.00809***	 -0.0119***		 (-2.77)	 (-3.28)	 (-4.22)	 (-2.87)	 (-3.82)	 (-3.99)	 (-4.35)				Branches	 0.00103***	 0.000500*	 -0.000238	 -0.000589	 -0.000542	 -0.000844	 0.000759					 (3.68)	 (1.78)	 (-0.88)	 (-1.03)	 (-0.99)	 (-0.91)	 (0.62)				GDP	 0.0239**	 0.0162	 0.0194*	 0.00961	 0.0132	 0.0126	 0.00774					 (1.98)	 (1.31)	 (1.92)	 (0.50)	 (0.80)	 (0.52)	 (0.27)				Real	Interest	Rate	 -0.00928*	 -0.0129**	 -0.0100**	 -0.0132*	 -0.0156**	 -0.0243**	 -0.0106					 (-1.77)	 (-2.58)	 (-2.52)	 (-1.79)	 (-2.50)	 (-2.54)	 (-0.89)				Bond	Rate	 2.399***	 2.070**	 2.143***	 2.495**	 2.558**	 3.143*	 0.767					 (3.31)	 (2.41)	 (3.29)	 (2.02)	 (2.39)	 (1.94)	 (0.37)				Interbank	Settling	Rate	 -2.195**	 -1.866*	 -1.705**	 -2.179	 -2.481**	 -3.259*	 -1.157					 (-2.18)	 (-1.85)	 (-2.14)	 (-1.47)	 (-1.98)	 (-1.71)	 (-0.50)				Inflation	 0.406	 -0.432	 -0.557	 -0.240	 0.0950	 0.0571	 -0.896					 (1.06)	 (-0.91)	 (-1.45)	 (-0.33)	 (0.15)	 (0.07)	 (-0.84)				Public	 -0.197***	 -0.110*	 0.000935	 0.118	 0.194*	 0.441**	 0.468**			 (-3.56)	 (-1.73)	 (0.02)	 (1.11)	 (1.91)	 (2.60)	 (2.43)				Joint	Venture	 -0.0669***	 -0.0640***	 -0.0544***	 -0.0498	 -0.0325	 -0.0213	 -0.00897					 (-3.66)	 (-3.24)	 (-3.28)	 (-1.60)	 (-1.19)	 (-0.49)	 (-0.16)				_cons	 0.446***	 0.518***	 0.581***	 0.631***	 0.662***	 0.763***	 0.956***		 (7.28)	 (8.26)	 (10.98)	 (6.32)	 (7.29)	 (5.85)	 (7.58)				N	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205				(Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses. 
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central bank database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database). 	 	
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Table	7-16:	Quantile	regression	for	deposit	to	assets			 Quantile	Regression	-Deposit	to	Assets			 Q(0.10)	 Q(0.25)	 Q(0.40)	 Q(0.50)	 Q(0.60)	 Q(0.75)	 Q(0.90)	 	Board	Size	 0.0206	 -0.000164	 -0.00380	 -0.00589	 -0.00548	 -0.00495**	 -0.0135**	 			 (0.30)	 (-0.02)	 (-0.73)	 (-1.32)	 (-1.26)	 (-2.11)	 (-2.34)	 	CFO	 0.00559	 -0.0237	 -0.0248	 -0.0335*	 -0.0233	 -0.0161	 -0.0422	 			 (0.02)	 (-0.67)	 (-1.06)	 (-1.74)	 (-1.24)	 (-1.49)	 (-1.39)	 	%	of	minority	director	 0.0331	 -0.0398	 -0.0306	 -0.0541	 -0.0687	 -0.0500*	 -0.219***	 			 (0.03)	 (-0.37)	 (-0.45)	 (-0.99)	 (-1.31)	 (-1.83)	 (-2.95)	 	%	of	female	director	 -0.344	 -0.172	 -0.120	 -0.0739	 -0.0513	 -0.0462	 -0.159	 			 (-0.26)	 (-1.21)	 (-1.36)	 (-0.94)	 (-0.69)	 (-1.14)	 (-1.58)	 	%	of	outside	director	 0.413	 0.127	 0.137	 0.0316	 0.0221	 0.00389	 0.357***	 			 (0.32)	 (0.92)	 (1.53)	 (0.42)	 (0.30)	 (0.10)	 (3.21)	 	Firm	age	 0.00499	 0.00248*	 0.00154*	 0.00161**	 0.00105	 0.000581	 -0.00171***	 			 (0.46)	 (1.96)	 (1.90)	 (2.46)	 (1.64)	 (1.56)	 (-2.73)	 	No.	of	Branches	 -0.000992	 -0.000245	 0.000302	 0.000292	 0.000594***	 0.00120***	 0.00255***	 			 (-0.19)	 (-0.46)	 (0.96)	 (1.25)	 (2.90)	 (12.63)	 (11.80)	 	Inflation	 -1.512	 -0.130	 -0.191	 -0.307	 -0.230	 -0.346**	 -0.491*	 			 (-0.34)	 (-0.27)	 (-0.66)	 (-1.30)	 (-0.96)	 (-2.53)	 (-1.86)	 	Real	Interest	Rate	 0.0331	 -0.00359	 -0.00104	 0.000790	 -0.000252	 -0.00206	 -0.0135**	 			 (0.62)	 (-0.64)	 (-0.28)	 (0.25)	 (-0.08)	 (-1.14)	 (-2.44)	 	Bond	Rate	 0.933	 0.543	 -0.322	 -0.630	 -0.756	 -0.783***	 -0.566	 			 (0.10)	 (0.62)	 (-0.55)	 (-1.32)	 (-1.59)	 (-2.74)	 (-0.84)	 	Inter	Bank	settling	rate	 -1.116	 -0.940	 0.315	 0.560	 0.761	 0.496	 -0.143	 			 (-0.11)	 (-0.89)	 (0.44)	 (0.95)	 (1.30)	 (1.45)	 (-0.16)	 	Ownership	Structure	 0.0629	 0.0323	 0.0191	 0.0121	 0.00862	 0.00997	 0.0281	 			 (0.32)	 (1.36)	 (1.24)	 (0.96)	 (0.70)	 (1.41)	 (1.23)	 	_cons	 0.310	 0.779***	 0.836***	 0.910***	 0.918***	 0.944***	 1.107***	 			 (0.35)	 (8.84)	 (15.29)	 (19.50)	 (19.79)	 (36.38)	 (17.70)	 	N	 209	 209	 209	 209	 209	 209	 209	 	(Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses. 
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central bank database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database). 	 	
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Table	7-17:	Quantile	regression	for	operating	expenses	to	interest	income		 Q(0.10)	 Q(0.25)	 Q(0.40)	 Q(0.50)	 Q(0.60)	 Q(0.75)	 Q(0.90)	Board	Size	 -0.0567*	 -0.0229**	 -0.0322***	 -0.0297***	 -0.0339***	 -0.0323***	 -0.0315*				 (-1.74)	 (-2.02)	 (-3.21)	 (-3.04)	 (-5.16)	 (-2.91)	 (-1.82)				CFO	 -0.102	 -0.0533	 -0.0349	 -0.0457	 -0.0680**	 0.0377	 0.426***		 (-1.07)	 (-1.14)	 (-0.82)	 (-1.06)	 (-2.42)	 (0.80)	 (5.90)				%	of	minority	directors	 -0.399	 -0.111	 -0.0592	 -0.0810	 -0.0831	 -0.271**	 -0.240					 (-0.90)	 (-0.68)	 (-0.42)	 (-0.64)	 (-1.01)	 (-2.11)	 (-1.17)				%	of	female	director	 0.249	 0.110	 0.103	 0.131	 0.230*	 0.442**	 0.194					 (0.52)	 (0.53)	 (0.58)	 (0.75)	 (1.89)	 (2.15)	 (0.78)				%	of	outside	directors	 -0.362	 0.272	 0.404**	 0.455**	 0.446***	 0.510**	 1.088***		 (-0.72)	 (1.33)	 (2.02)	 (2.33)	 (3.43)	 (2.50)	 (2.74)				Firm	age	 -0.00904***	 -0.00184	 0.000153	 0.00231	 0.00286***	 0.00839***	 0.00271					 (-2.69)	 (-1.03)	 (0.09)	 (1.42)	 (2.65)	 (4.47)	 (0.89)				Branches	 0.000551	 -0.00124	 -0.00226***	 -0.00179***	 -0.00199***	 -0.00249***	 -0.00139*				 (0.27)	 (-1.62)	 (-3.70)	 (-3.27)	 (-5.88)	 (-4.82)	 (-1.93)				GDP	 -0.0105	 -0.00931	 -0.0223	 -0.0221	 -0.0145	 -0.0272	 -0.0553*				 (-0.19)	 (-0.45)	 (-1.13)	 (-1.18)	 (-1.15)	 (-1.27)	 (-1.82)				Real	Interest	Rate	 -0.00166	 0.0195**	 0.0218***	 0.0194***	 0.0213***	 0.0233***	 -0.00225					 (-0.09)	 (2.49)	 (2.93)	 (2.63)	 (4.31)	 (2.63)	 (-0.16)				Bond	Rate	 -6.041**	 -1.014	 -0.411	 0.0984	 -0.0317	 -0.429	 -1.086					 (-2.16)	 (-0.77)	 (-0.33)	 (0.08)	 (-0.04)	 (-0.29)	 (-0.51)				Interbank	Settling	Rate	 5.771	 2.782*	 1.819	 1.095	 1.257	 1.780	 2.273					 (1.57)	 (1.75)	 (1.22)	 (0.75)	 (1.27)	 (1.00)	 (0.82)				Inflation	 -0.568	 0.387	 0.868	 0.690	 0.722	 0.648	 1.195					 (-0.29)	 (0.49)	 (1.14)	 (0.97)	 (1.54)	 (0.83)	 (1.00)				Public	 0.272	 0.127	 0.258**	 0.120	 0.0997	 -0.0884	 0.649***		 (0.91)	 (0.98)	 (2.14)	 (1.18)	 (1.55)	 (-0.88)	 (3.91)				Joint	Venture	 0.0779	 -0.0440	 -0.0249	 -0.0503	 -0.0611***	 -0.112***	 -0.104*				 (0.79)	 (-1.25)	 (-0.78)	 (-1.61)	 (-2.96)	 (-3.25)	 (-1.76)				_cons	 1.279***	 0.844***	 0.936***	 0.954***	 0.969***	 1.056***	 1.342***		 (4.65)	 (7.66)	 (9.11)	 (9.65)	 (14.76)	 (9.11)	 (7.18)				N	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205				((Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses. 
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central bank database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database) 
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Table	7-18:	Quantile	regression	for	operating	expenses	to	total	loan		 Q(0.10)	 Q(0.25)	 Q(0.40)	 Q(0.50)	 Q(0.60)	 Q(0.75)	 Q(0.90)	Board	Size	 -0.00767***	 -0.00385**	 -0.00410**	 -0.00503***	 -0.00723***	 -0.00863***	 -0.0113**			 (-3.50)	 (-2.11)	 (-2.49)	 (-2.75)	 (-3.48)	 (-3.72)	 (-2.30)				CFO	 -0.00719	 -0.00460	 -0.00135	 -0.00629	 -0.00881	 -0.00321	 0.0125					 (-0.64)	 (-0.63)	 (-0.19)	 (-0.78)	 (-0.95)	 (-0.34)	 (0.68)				%	of	minority	directors	 -0.106***	 -0.00970	 -0.00445	 -0.00257	 0.00485	 -0.00535	 0.00622					 (-2.70)	 (-0.40)	 (-0.21)	 (-0.11)	 (0.18)	 (-0.19)	 (0.15)				%	of	female	director	 0.0566	 0.0275	 0.000449	 -0.0231	 -0.0159	 0.0218	 0.0562					 (1.36)	 (0.93)	 (0.02)	 (-0.76)	 (-0.40)	 (0.54)	 (0.93)				%	of	outside	directors	 -0.00452	 0.0739**	 0.0478	 0.0574	 0.0593	 0.102**	 0.182**			 (-0.10)	 (2.25)	 (1.48)	 (1.59)	 (1.47)	 (2.35)	 (1.98)				Firm	age	 0.000959***	 0.000489*	 0.000269	 0.000293	 0.000787**	 0.00172***	 0.000920					 (3.44)	 (1.69)	 (0.99)	 (0.97)	 (2.18)	 (4.41)	 (1.36)				Branches	 0.0000486	 -0.000384***	 -0.000471***	 -0.000530***	 -0.000500***	 -0.000516***	 -0.000537***		 (0.52)	 (-3.56)	 (-5.24)	 (-5.21)	 (-4.61)	 (-4.65)	 (-2.80)				GDP	 -0.00356	 -0.00479	 -0.00686**	 -0.00566	 -0.00386	 -0.00555	 0.00185					 (-0.71)	 (-1.45)	 (-2.21)	 (-1.61)	 (-0.94)	 (-1.32)	 (0.25)				Real	Interest	Rate	 0.00284	 0.00536***	 0.00652***	 0.00668***	 0.00671***	 0.00703***	 0.00618*				 (1.53)	 (4.32)	 (5.42)	 (4.85)	 (4.13)	 (4.08)	 (1.72)				Bond	Rate	 -0.491	 0.319	 0.230	 0.416*	 0.444	 0.753**	 0.446					 (-1.47)	 (1.63)	 (1.13)	 (1.77)	 (1.61)	 (2.50)	 (0.90)				Interbank	Settling	Rate	 0.0900	 0.0416	 0.156	 -0.135	 -0.174	 -0.321	 -0.131					 (0.23)	 (0.18)	 (0.65)	 (-0.49)	 (-0.53)	 (-0.92)	 (-0.21)				Inflation	 0.248	 0.236*	 0.306**	 0.281**	 0.189	 0.176	 -0.361					 (1.38)	 (1.79)	 (2.58)	 (2.14)	 (1.25)	 (1.14)	 (-1.29)				Public	 -0.0343*	 0.0408**	 0.0628***	 0.0731***	 0.0615***	 0.0369*	 0.248***		 (-1.95)	 (2.15)	 (3.57)	 (3.91)	 (2.79)	 (1.73)	 (6.44)				Joint	Venture	 0.00110	 0.00400	 0.00134	 0.00211	 -0.00121	 0.000443	 -0.00401					 (0.14)	 (0.71)	 (0.26)	 (0.37)	 (-0.18)	 (0.06)	 (-0.35)				_cons	 0.120***	 0.0653***	 0.0762***	 0.0887***	 0.104***	 0.113***	 0.181***		 (4.69)	 (3.59)	 (4.62)	 (4.88)	 (4.87)	 (4.77)	 (3.39)				N	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205				((Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses. 
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central bank database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database). 	 	
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Table	7-19:	Quantile	regression	for	ROA		 Q(0.10)	 Q(0.25)	 Q(0.40)	 Q(0.50)	 Q(0.60)	 Q(0.75)	 Q(0.90)	Board	Size	 0.00365	 -4.47e-19	 1.60e-18	 -0.000423*	 -0.00126***	 -0.00254***	 -0.00337		 (1.08)	 (-0.00)	 (0.04)	 (-1.66)	 (-2.89)	 (-4.06)	 (-0.73)	CFO	 -0.00634	 8.97e-18	 -2.71e-17	 -0.00820***	 -0.00413**	 -0.00320	 -0.0220		 (-0.48)	 (0.02)	 (-0.16)	 (-7.24)	 (-2.10)	 (-1.15)	 (-1.11)	%	of	minority	directors	 -0.0407	 1.98e-17	 -1.25e-16	 -0.00457	 0.000817	 0.00178	 -0.000601		 (-1.08)	 (0.02)	 (-0.26)	 (-1.36)	 (0.14)	 (0.21)	 (-0.01)	%	of	female	director	 0.0111	 4.36e-18	 9.88e-17	 -0.00574	 -0.0148*	 -0.0204*	 -0.0325		 (0.25)	 (0.00)	 (0.17)	 (-1.22)	 (-1.84)	 (-1.94)	 (-0.40)	%	of	outside	directors	 -0.120**	 2.51e-17	 8.94e-18	 -0.00117	 0.00664	 0.0242**	 0.0984		 (-2.37)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (-0.23)	 (0.73)	 (2.00)	 (1.50)	Firm	age	 0.000454	 -1.55e-19	 2.87e-18	 0.000290***	 0.000464***	 0.000354***	 0.000225		 (0.95)	 (-0.01)	 (0.44)	 (6.78)	 (6.60)	 (3.65)	 (0.36)	Branches	 -0.0000216	 1.19e-20	 5.90e-19	 -0.0000538***	 -0.000120***	 -0.000134***	 0.00000769		 (-0.13)	 (0.00)	 (0.24)	 (-3.85)	 (-4.83)	 (-3.18)	 (0.02)	GDP	 -0.0000878	 1.55e-18	 1.42e-18	 -0.000883*	 -0.00231***	 -0.00273**	 0.00119		 (-0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.02)	 (-1.78)	 (-2.63)	 (-2.17)	 (0.12)	Real	Interest	Rate	 0.00139	 -6.17e-19	 -3.36e-18	 0.0000573	 -0.000145	 0.000564	 -0.000218		 (0.66)	 (-0.01)	 (-0.12)	 (0.30)	 (-0.43)	 (1.11)	 (-0.07)	Bond	Rate	 -0.152	 1.51e-17	 6.34e-18	 0.0187	 0.0888	 0.0630	 0.0966		 (-0.51)	 (0.00)	 (0.00)	 (0.57)	 (1.56)	 (0.82)	 (0.20)	Interbank	Settling	Rate	 0.228	 -4.95e-17	 2.68e-17	 -0.0255	 -0.101	 -0.0680	 -0.152		 (0.60)	 (-0.00)	 (0.01)	 (-0.66)	 (-1.49)	 (-0.72)	 (-0.25)	Inflation	 0.114	 -1.67e-16	 -3.75e-17	 0.0587***	 0.143***	 0.165***	 0.0963		 (0.50)	 (-0.02)	 (-0.02)	 (3.13)	 (4.27)	 (3.53)	 (0.24)	Public	 -0.0173	 1.82e-17	 0.01000***	 0.00241	 0.0108**	 0.0164**	 0.0123		 (-0.45)	 (0.02)	 (2.44e+13)	 (0.87)	 (2.43)	 (2.54)	 (0.31)	Joint	Venture	 -0.00622	 -4.66e-18	 -2.15e-17	 0.00663***	 0.00535***	 0.00790***	 0.0258		 (-0.68)	 (-0.02)	 (-0.19)	 (7.99)	 (3.71)	 (3.49)	 (1.59)	_cons	 -0.0346	 0.01000***	 0.01000***	 0.0126***	 0.0184***	 0.0284***	 0.0317		 (-0.90)	 (9.47e+12)	 (2.71e+13)	 (4.97)	 (4.22)	 (4.69)	 (0.77)	N	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	 205	(Note: This table presents the results of the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ performance in Nepal. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). p-Values are presented in parentheses. 
The data related to banks such as board size, CFO, percentage of minority of directors, percentage of female directors, firm age and branches are collected from annual reports of the banks. Similarly, data related to ownership structure, bond rate 
and interbank settling rate are collected from central bank database and data related to inflation rate, GDP, real interest rate and bond are collected from the World Bank database).		
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7.5 Conclusion		
This	 chapter	 provided	 the	 framework	 and	 empirical	 results	 for	 the	econometric	 analysis	 used	 to	 test	 the	 hypotheses	 along	 with	 the	 research	methods	and	the	specific	data	analysis	techniques	used	in	this	study.		It	also	discussed	 the	 findings	 and	 examined	 the	 importance	 corporate	 governance	variables	 for	 financial	 performance,	 applying	 the	 data	 analysis	 methods	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.		
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8 Chapter	Eight	
Summary	and	Conclusion	
8.1 Introduction	
The	research	undertaken	and	reported	in	this	thesis,	as	indicated	in	Chapter	One,	 examines	 the	 research	 question,	 “Does	 the	 corporate	 governance	structure	 impact	 on	 the	 financial	 performance	 of	 banks	 in	 Nepal?”	 This	research	 was	 undertaken	 using	 a	 robust	 research	 method,	 ensuring	 the	veracity	of	the	findings.	The	findings	point	to	several	potential	changes	in	bank	governance,	which	may	be	undertaken	to	enhance	the	performance	of	banks.	Suggestions	 concerning	 implementation	 are	 now	 made.	 Finally,	 further	questions	arising	through	the	research	suggest	several	areas	with	potential	for	future	research.		
The	structure	of	the	chapter	is	organised	as	follows:	Section	8.2	reviews	the	focus	 of	 the	 study.	 Section	 8.3	 summarises	 the	 empirical	 results.	 The	significance	and	contribution	to	knowledge	and	literature	of	this	research	is	noted	in	section	8.4,	and	section	8.5	discusses	the	policy	implications.	Section	8.6	 covers	 limitations	 of	 the	 study	 suggesting	 issues	 for	 future	 research.		Section	8.7	makes	some	concluding	comments.	
	 	
181		
8.2 Overview	of	Research	Hypothesis	
Five	hypotheses	were	tested.	The	empirical	results	are	shown	in	Table	7.1.		
	
Table	8-1:	Summary	of	Hypothesis	results	regarding	corporate	
governance	variables	and	bank's	performance	Hypothesis	 Relationship	Tested	 Sign	 Different	Results	Expected	 Empirical	H1	 Board	size	&	bank's	performance	 ∅	 +	 Eisenberg	et	al.,	1998;		Mollah	&	Zaman,	2015	H2	 CFO	and	bank's	performance	 +	 +	 Javaid	&	Saboor,	2015	Lutz	&	Schraml,	2011	H3	 Percentage	of	minority	of	directors	bank's	performance	
-	 +	 Zahra	&	Stanton,	1988	
H4	 Percentage	of	outside	directors	&	bank's	performance	
+	 -	 Bhagat	&	Black,	1999	
H5	 Percentage		of	female	directors	&	bank's	performance	
∅	 +	 Adams	&	Ferreira,	2009		Smith	et	al.,	2006	
Note:	Symbols	(+),(-)	and	(∅)	represent	positive,	negative	and	no	significant	relationships,	respectively.		Nepal	 is	 a	 land	of	opportunities.	Many	of	 the	 opportunities	available	 in	 the	country	 are	 yet	 to	 be	 capitalised.	 Capital	 is	 one	 of	 the	 major	 catalysts	 for	development.	 The	 banking	 sector	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 the	 growth	 and	development	 of	 the	 country	 by	 supporting	 the	 business	 organisations	with	capital.	Good	governance	 in,	and	successful	operation	of,	 the	banking	sector	not	 only	 attracts	 local	 investors	 but	 also	 investors	 from	 abroad	 which	ultimately	increases	the	productivity	and	growth	of	the	country.		
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Despite	 having	 US$6.65	 billion	 of	 remittance	 inflows	 (only	 from	 formal	sources)	that	contributed	29.6	per	cent	of	the	country’s	GDP	(Shrestha,	August,	2016),	most	of	those	funds	are	spent	on	regular	expenditure	rather	than	being	saved	or	invested	as	capital	(Pant,	2016).		Developing	trust	in	banks	and	other	investment	 sectors	 would	 motivate	 the	 public	 to	 use	 their	 funds	 wisely.	Realising	 that	 fact,	 regulatory	 reforms	 in	 corporate	 governance	 were	developed	by	 central	banks	 in	2006	with	the	 introduction	of	 a	 code	of	best	practice.	However,	the	outcome	was	not	as	expected	and	time	and	again	the	government	 and	 central	 banks	 have	 had	 to	 create	 several	 regulations	 to	protect	the	interest	of	shareholders	with	criteria,	rules	and	regulations	on	the	board	of	directors.		This	research	investigates	whether	the	given	governance	variables	have	a	significant	role	in	bank	performance.		
8.3 Focus	of	the	study	
The	 study	was	motivated	 by	 increasing	 public	 interest,	 especially	 after	 the	various	 corporate	 failures	 and	 scandals	 that	 have	 occurred	 both	internationally	and	in	Nepal.	The	literature	supported	the	importance	of	this	motivation.	 There	were	more	 than	 127	 systemic	 banking	 crises	 during	 the	period	1970	to	2007	(Laeven	&	Valencia,	2008).	The	Asian	financial	crisis	was	more	severe.	In	addition,	the	global	financial	crisis	which	started	in	the	United	States’	with	the	sub-prime	mortgage	market	collapse	has	also	increased	public	pressure	for	proper	governance,	at	least	in	the	banking	sector	(Greenidge	&	Grosvenor,	2010).	Research	by	Honohan	&	Klingebiel	(2000)	has	found	that	14.3	 per	 cent	 of	 developing	 countries'	 GDP	 is	 used	 only	 to	 clean	 up	 their	
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financial	 system	 due	 to	 the	 results	 of	 such	 crises.	 	 The	 first	 step	 for	 the	foundation	of	a	strong	financial	system	is	to	have	a	good	governance	structure.		
Several	 corporate	 governance	 failures	 in	 Nepali	 banks,	 such	 as	 Nepal	Development	 Bank	 Limited,	 First	 Commercial	 Banks	 of	 Nepal,	 Nepal	 Bank	Limited,	 Nepal	 Bangladesh	 Bank,	 Lumbini	 Bank	 Ltd.,	 Gurkha	 Development	Bank,	 United	 Development	 Bank	 and	 several	 other	 financial	 institutions	(Kumar	 &	 Upadyaya,	 2011)	 have	 increased	 the	 demand	 for	 greater	transparency	and	accountability	in	the	way	banks	are	controlled	and	managed.	To	improve	the	status	of	governance	practices	in	Nepal,	the	central	bank	(NRB)	of	 Nepal	 has	 issued	 several	 directives,	 guidelines	 and	 principles	 for	 good	governance	 practices.	 	 It	 was	 expected	 that	 adopting	 good	 corporate	governance	practice	would	increase	the	financial	performance	of	the	banks.	To	do	this,	the	board	of	directors	can	play	a	significant	role	to	improve	a	bank's	performance	 by	 proactively	 acting	 on	 various	 issues.	 The	 NRB	 has	 issued	several	 directives	 for	 making	 boards	 independent	 by	 formulating	 rules	 to	appoint	 independent	 directors,	 professional	 directors,	 audit	 committee,	remuneration	committee	and	risk	management.		
This	 research	 first	 studied	 whether	 the	 good	 corporate	 governance	mechanisms	adopted	by	the	commercial	banks	in	Nepal	has	led	to	an	increase	in	 financial	 performance.	 To	 identify	 the	 effect	 of	 various	 corporate	governance	 mechanisms,	 the	 variables	 considered	 were	 board	 size,	 CFO,	percentage	 of	 minority	 directors,	 percentage	 of	 outside	 directors	 and	percentage	 of	 female	 directors.	 	 Similarly,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 performance	
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variables,	return	on	assets,	non-performing	loan	to	total	loan,	loan	to	deposit,	deposit	 to	 assets,	 operating	 expense	 to	 interest	 income,	 and	 operating	expenses	to	total	loan	were	studied.		The	data	for	the	study	were	collected	for	the	period	2003	to	2012	and	the	data	regarding	corporate	governance	and	performance	variables	were	handpicked	from	annual	 reports	of	banks,	while	 the	data	 for	macro-economic	variables	were	taken	from	the	World	Bank	database,	and	remaining	control	variables’	data	 were	 collected	 from	 the	 central	 bank.	 	 Ordinary	 Least	 Squares	 (OLS)	regression	techniques	and	the	quantile	regression	techniques,	analysing	the	pooled	dataset	were	used	to	test	the	hypotheses.	The	findings	of	the	study	are	significant	and	there	is	a	way	forward	to	benefit	from	the	existing	research.		
8.4 Empirical	Results	
Table	8.1	shows	a	brief	summary	of	hypotheses	tested	in	respect	to	corporate	governance	 and	 banks'	 performance	 in	 Nepal	 and	 how	 these	 findings	 are	different	from	previous	research.			
Board	size	and	financial	peformance:	Table	8.1	shows	that	 this	 	research	found	 board	 size	 has	 an	overally	 significant	 positive	 relationshiop	with	 the	financial	 performance	 of	 banks	 in	Nepal.	 This	 indicates	 that	 a	 larger	 board	leads	to	increase	in	the	performance	of	middle-	and	average-performing	banks.	This	might	have	arisen	 from	larger	boards	bringing	diverse	knowledge	and	ideas	forward,	which	facilitates	better	decision	making,	good	monitoring	and	supervision	 (Andres	 &	 Vallelado,	 2008).	 These	 findings	 are	 in	 line	 with	resource	 dependence	 theory	 that	 states	 a	 larger	 board	 provides	 more	
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specialist	knowledge	from	different	fields	and	therefore	contributes	to	better	decision	making	(Kiel	&	Nicholson,	2003;	Mohamed,	2009;	Pfeffer	&	Salancik,	1989;	Salim	et	al.,	2016;	Zahra	&	Pearce,	1989).	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	 the	banks	should	 focus	not	only	on	the	quantity	of	board	members	but	also	their	quality	in	terms	of	their	qualifications,	experiences,	enrichment	of	skills	and	diversity.	Government	regulations	concerning	boards’	requirements	to	 meet	 monitoring	 needs	 have	 not	 been	 updated	 for	 some	 time	 and	formulating	 requirements	 for	 directors	 to	 participate	 in	 training	 and	development	programmes	do	not	exist.		
CFO	and	financial	performance:	The	research	finds	that	the	appointment	of	a	chief	financial	officer	has	a	positive	effect	on	a	bank’s	financial	performance.	This	 finding	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 research	 conducted	 by	 Javaid	 and	 Saboor	(2015)	and	Lutz	and	Schraml	(2011)	who	stated	that	with	a	CFO,	the	board	can	perform	 better	 and	 provide	 sound	 implementation	 of	 good	 corporate	governance	practices.	The	main	reason	for	this	might	be	that	a	CFO	is	good	at	evaluating	potential	risks.	Thus,	the	Government	should	create	regulations	to	include	a	chief	financial	officer	on	the	board	as	they	contribute	positively	while	creating	 sustainable	 financial	 policies	 and	 help	 to	 safeguard	 the	 long-term	existence	and	independence	of	the	firms	(Di	Giuli	&	Caselli,	2008).		
Percentage	of	minority	directors	and	quantile	regression:	It	is	found	that	the	percentage	of	minority	directors	has	a	significant	positive	relationship	on	the	performance	of	banks.	The	positive	diversity	on	the	board	increased	the	quality	 of	 thought,	 and	 the	 strategic	 decision	making	 of	 the	 firm	 (Ameer	&	
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Rahman,	2009;	Crano	&	Chen,	1998).		It	might	be	because	minority	directors	may	suggest	new	avenues	for	investment	which	in	turn	helps	to	increase	the	profitability	of	banks.		
Percentage	 of	 outside	 directors	 and	 quantile	 regression:	 The	 reseach	found	a	negative	relationship	between	the	percentage	of	outside	directors	and	a	bank's	peformance.	The	negative	 impact	of	outside	directors	 is	 consistent	with	previous	studies	(Bhagat	&	Black,	2002;	Coles	et	al.,	2008;	Pathan	&	Faff,	2013;	 Yermack,	 1996).	 It	 also	 supports	 the	 notion	 of	 Subrahmanyam	 et	 al.	(1997)	that	independent	directors	in	the	bank	are	chosen	more	for	regulatory	and	compliance	purposes.	Also,	the	outside	directors	might	be	regarding	their	position	as	just	another	avenue	for	income	and	part	of	their	retirement	plan.	Hence,	it	would	be	wise	for	the	government	to	determine	specific	additional	responsibilities	for	outside	directors	as	well	as	choosing	them	based	on	their	key	skills	and	abilities.		
Percentage	 of	 female	 directors	 and	 quantile	 regression:	 The	 research	shows	that	the	female	directors	on	a	board	have	significant	influence,	mostly	around	 the	average-	and	higher-performing	banks.	This	 result	 is	 consistent	with	the	 findings	of	Adams	&	Ferreira	(2009);	Carter	et	al	 	 (2003)	 ;	Garcia-Meca	et	al.	(2015)	and	Pathan	&	Faff	(2013	who	argued	that	a	diverse	board	offers	 strong	 monitoring	 and	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 good	 corporate	governance.	Further,	the	way	males	and	females	think	is	quite	different;	the	female	directors	may	add	value	by	bringing	new	ideas	and	bringing	different	perspectives	 to	 the	 board.	 Also	 the	 female	 directors	 are	more	 conservative	
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when	providing	 loans	to	 the	risky	projects,	hence	they	may	request	several	checks	 and	 verifications	 that	 ultimately	 reduce	 the	 risks	 and	 foster	 good	governance	in	the	organisation	(Adams	&	Ferreira,	2009;	Smith	et	al.,	2006).	This	implies	that	incorporating	female	directors	in	the	board	will	potentially	benefit	the	financial	performance	of	the	banks.	Hence,	the	central	banks	and	Nepali	government	should	adopt	policies	to	include	female	directors	on	their	boards.		
8.5 Contribution	to	knowledge		
The	 contribution	 of	 this	 study	 to	 the	 corporate	 governance	 literature	 is	threefold.	First,	this	study	helps	to	fill	the	gap	by	understanding	the	corporate	governance	practices	in	Nepal,	separately	and	comprehensively.	The	research	shows	that	there	is	no	clear	understanding	of	the	corporate	governance	and	performance	relationship	in	a	developing	nation	that	has	just	overcome	war	and	repeatedly	faces	political	turmoil.	
Second,	this	study	has	extracted	knowledge	mainly	from	the	agency	theory	and	less	 from	stakeholder	theory,	resource	dependency	theory	and	stewardship	theory.	 Empirical	 investigation	 into	 how	 corporate	 governance	 practices	enhance	financial	performance,	with	special	consideration	given	to	its	various	categories	 of	 performance	 variables,	 are	 reported.	 This	 study	 has	 used	 the	quantile	 regression	 techniques	where	 the	performance	variables	have	been	categorised	into	various	quantiles.	The	major	advantages	of	dividing	the	data	into	various	quantiles	in	comparison	to	normal	regression	is	that	in	quantile	
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regression	the	performance	of	banks	in	relation	to	their	individual	quantiles	can	be	identified	clearly.		
Thirdly,	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 this	 study	 supports	 the	 emergent	proposition,	 that	 governance	 effectiveness	 influences	 firms’	 performance.	Thus,	it	helps	to	enrich	the	understanding	of	various	governance	variables	that	have	an	influence	on	a	bank's	performance.	Given	that	Nepal	is	a	developing	country,	 the	 governance	 systems,	 their	 variables	 and	 findings	 may	 be	generalizable	to	other	similar	developing	economies.		
8.6 Policy	Implications	and	Recommendations	
The	empirical	findings	of	this	study	have	some	policy	implications	for	banks	in	Nepal,	 and	potentially	other	similar	developing	nations.	 	An	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	board	members	has	a	positive	relationship	with	bank	performance,	so	the	central	banks	should	adopt	directives	and	policies	regarding	increase	in	board	size	along	with	board	diversity	in	terms	of	education,	skills,	experiences,	culture,	etc.,	rather	than	just	diversity	in	terms	of	gender.		While	looking	at	the	composition	of	board	of	directors	for	the	year	2012,	there	is	some	evidence	to	suggest	that	in	terms	of	caste	it	was	found	that	the	majority	of	board	members	are	 Brahmin	 followed	 by	 Newars	 and	 others;	 however,	 the	 records	 are	incomplete.	 	 Incomplete	 data	 concerning	 directors’	 names	 and	 titles	 at	 this	point	 prevents	 a	 reliable	 analysis	 of	 caste	 diversity	 on	 boards.	 	 Potentially	more	 information	will	 become	 available	 and	 this	would	 be	 a	 useful	 area	 of	investigation	in	future	research.		
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The	 findings	 point	 to	 several	 changes	 that	 will	 impact	 positively	 on	performance.	 In	 order	 to	 strictly	 implement	 the	 four	 pillars	 of	 corporate	governance	 (transparency,	 accountability,	 fairness	 and	 responsibility),	thorough	 regulation	 will	 be	 necessary.	 Improvement	 of	 public	 sector	 bank	performance,	especially	through	reduction	in	agency	cost	is	an	obvious	target.		
1. Given	the	commercial	and	social	culture	in	Nepal,	it	is	unlikely	in	the	short	 term	 that	 effective	 changes	 in	 governance	 will	 occur	 without	government	involvement.	So,	the	government	and	central	banks	should	work	collaboratively	 to	 formulate	various	policies	and	guidelines	 for	the	banks	that	help	to	mitigate	the	short-term	problems	as	well	as	long-	term	issues.	2. To	 enhance	 their	 performance,	 different	 corporate	 governance	mechanisms	could	be	developed	for	different	groups	of	banks,	based	on	their	financial	performance.		3. Research	 findings	 show	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 CFO	 has	 a	 positive	influence	 on	 a	 bank’s	 performance.	 	 Formulation	 of	 regulatory	requirements	to	require	there	to	be	a	CFO	for	each	bank	and	suggesting	general	 guidelines	 concerning	 their	 qualifications,	 skills,	 and	knowledge	requirements	has	merit.		4. To	 improve	 the	 accountability	 and	 transparency	 in	 the	 banks,	additional	 directives	 and	 recommendations	 should	 influence	 the	selection	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors.	 Currently,	 they	 have	 only	educational	qualifications	and	job	experience	as	the	selection	criteria;	however,	 there	 are	 many	 other	 skills,	 training	 and	 development	
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programmes	that	might	help	to	enrich	their	experience.		It	is	common	for	the	same	individual	to	be	on	the	board	of	directors	of	various	banks	and	other	organisations,	which	may	give	rise	to	conflicts	of	interest	and,	where	 there	 are	 many	 directorships,	 divide	 focus	 and	 negatively	influence	 the	 quality	 of	 decision	 making.	 	 Regulatory	 guidance	 is	needed	on	the	maximum	number	of	directorships	and	circumstances	where	multiple	 directorships	 of	 financial	 institutions	 are	 acceptable.	The	 membership	 of	 Audit	 Committees	 is	 an	 important	 role	 and	conflicting	 interests	 can	 arise,	 suggesting	 the	 government	 could	enhance	performance	through	providing	guideline	and	monitoring.		
In	Nepal	 there	 is	 no	 professional	 association	 for	 directors.	 	 In	many	countries	 there	 are	 institutes	 of	 directors,	 which	 are	 committed	 to	developing	 the	 professional	 competency	 of	 directors.	 	 Government	support	for	the	formation	of	an	institute	of	directors	is	recommended.			A	viable	approach	would	be	to	approach	a	 friendly	donor	country	to	sponsor	 a	 joint	 initiative	 between	 its	 institute	 and	 local	 directors	 of	enterprises,	 including	 banks.	 Regulation	 may	 be	 required	 and	 this	should	 be	 considered	 by	 parties	 involved.	 The	 formulation,	implementation,	 monitoring	 and	 advancing	 of	 good	 corporate	governance	 processes	 in	 Nepal	 will	 help	 attract	 investment	 from	foreign	and	local	investors,	building	confidence	in	the	sustainability	of	enterprises.	 	 The	 government	 needs	 to	 be	 proactive	 in	 developing	policies,	guidelines,	boards’	capacity	and	regulations	as	required.	The	government	could	also	introduce	a	requirement	for	board	members	to	
191		
undertake	continuing	professional	development	through	attendance	at	institute	of	director’s	seminars	and	programmes.	Building	capacity	in	the	 pool	 of	 directors	 and	 increasing	 professionalism	 may	 prove	valuable	in	enhancing	the	quality	of	governance	and	performance.		
8.7 Limitations	and	Suggestions	for	Future	Research	
Despite	the	contribution	of	this	study,	it	has	some	limitations;	however,	these	indicate	some	positive	avenues	for	future	research.	The	first	limitation	is	the	availability	of	the	data.	Due	to	the	lack	of	a	good	database,	the	study	could	not	be	conducted	for	a	longer	period	of	time.		Also,	the	earthquake	has	hindered	getting	recent	data.	As	suggested	by	Wintoki	et	al.	(2012),	a	data	set	covering	a	 longer	 period	 of	 time	will	 open	 up	 the	 opportunity	 for	 addressing	 other	questions	regarding	change	and	its	impact.		
This	study	is	based	mainly	on	the	data	extracted	from	the	annual	reports	of	the	banks.	However,	there	are	some	limitations	to	the	financial	reports.	They	are	subject	to	manipulations,	the	assets	might	be	systematically	undervalued,	due	treatment	of	certain	revenues	and	expenditures,	alternation	in	value	due	to	the	method	of	inventory	valuation,	method	of	depreciation	and	so	on.		
The	second	limitation	is	that	rules	and	regulations,	the	variables	relating	to	the	board	 structure,	 will	 change	 over	 time	which	might	 potentially	 reduce	 the	efficacy	of	the	study.		Additionally,	this	research	could	use	one	of	the	popular	variables	in	corporate	governance	research,	‘Tobin’s	Q’,	because	of	the	lack	of	availability	of	the	total	market	value	of	firm.	Using	this	financial	metric,	along	
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with	other	accounting-based	performance	measures,	would	provide	different	conclusions.		
	The	third	limitation	stems	from	the	lack	of	data	on	attributes	relating	to	bank	directors	which	is	readily	available	in	many	countries.	It	would	be	interesting	to	 see	whether	 other	 observed	 diversity	 characteristics	 of	 board	 directors,	such	as	their	qualifications,	age,	education,	background	and	experiences,	play	a	vital	role	in	performance.		In	the	future	these	forms	of	data	may	be	readily	available.		
Future	research	may	have	more	data	with	which	to	work.		A	longer	time-series	is	 the	most	 important	opportunity	 for	 future	 research.	 	The	 introduction	of	inter-quantile	comparisons	to	highlight	changes	in	specific	variables	and	the	importance	between	the	lower	and	upper	quantiles	will	be	interesting.	Stata	sqreg	command	can	provide	standard	errors	via	bootstrapping,	to	estimate	the	results	 for	 the	multiple	quantiles	simultaneously.	This	 facilitates	 comparing	coefficients	of	different	quantiles.		
Additional	 corporate	 governance	 and	 control	 variables	 could	 reveal	 new	relationships	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 bank	 performance.	 In	addition,	 relationships	 between	 board	 members	 and	 the	 audit	 committee,	banking	 efficiency,	 political	 regimes,	 CEO	 characteristics	 and	 executive	compensation	could	also	provide	meaningful	avenues	for	future	research.			
Many	commercial	banks	in	Nepal	have	merged,	or	are	in	the	phase	of	merging	with,	 class	A,	 class	B	and	class	C	 financial	 institutions.	 	These	 changes	may	
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provide	interesting	opportunities	to	analyse	how	governance	pre-	and	post-	restructuring	impacts	upon	returns	of	the	banks	involved.		
Additionally,	the	case	study	approach	to	understand	the	inner	working	of	the	board	would	enable	the	capture	of	shifting	ideas,	paradigms,	social	norms	and	modes	of	thinking	emerging	in	the	prevailing	board.		
8.8 Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 concludes	 the	 thesis	 with	 the	 summary	 of	 the	 findings,	implications	of	results,	and	conclusions	from	empirical	analysis.		
This	 research	 contributes	 to	 the	 corporate	 governance	 literature	 in	 several	ways.	 It	 is	 the	 first	 study	 to	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	 corporate	governance	and	bank	performance	incorporating	all	Nepal’s	banks.		It	has	also	used	 quantile	 regression	 to	 identify	 the	 impact	 of	 various	 performance	variables	to	gain	a	comprehensive	picture.	The	findings	support	the	view	that	there	 is	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 corporate	 governance	 and	 bank	performance.	Additionally,	 this	study	 leads	to	 important	policy	 implications	for	corporate	governance	practices	in	financial	institutions	in	Nepal	and	other	similar	emerging	economies.	Finally,	 this	research	suggests	ample	scope	 for	future	research,	by	expanding	time	periods,	studying	the	non-financial	sector,	using	cased	based	analysis,	and	studying	the	effect	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	in	banks’	performance.		
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Appendix	2:	List	of	Commercial	Banks	in	Nepal	
S.N.	 Name	of	Bank	 Estd.	Date	1	 Nepal	Bank	Ltd.	 15/11/1937	2	 Rastriya	Banijya	Bank	Ltd.	 23/01/1966	3	 Agriculture	Development	Bank	Ltd.	 2/01/1968	4	 Nabil	Bank	Ltd.	 16/07/1984	5	 Nepal	Investment	Bank	Ltd.	 27/02/1986	6	 Standard	Chartered	Bank	Nepal	Limited	 30/01/1987	7	 Himalayan	Bank	Limited	 18/01/1993	8	 Nepal	SBI	Bank	Ltd.	 7/07/1993	9	 Nepal	Bangladesh	Bank	Ltd.	 5/06/1994	10	 Everest	Bank	Limited		 18/10/1994	11	 Bank	of	Kathmandu	Ltd.	 12/03/1995	12	 Nepal	Credit	and	Commerce	Bank	Ltd.	 14/10/1996	13	 Lumbini	Bank	Ltd.	 17/07/1998	14	 Nepal	Industrial	&	Commercial	Bank	Ltd.	 21/07/1998	15	 Machhapuchhre	Bank	Ltd.	 3/10/2000	16	 Kumari	Bank	Ltd.	 3/04/2001	17	 Laxmi	Bank	Ltd.	 3/04/2002	18	 Siddhartha	Bank	Ltd.	 24/12/2002	19	 Global	IME	Bank	Ltd.	 2/01/2007	20	 Citizens	Bank	International	Ltd.	 21/06/2007	21	 Prime	Commercial	Bank	Ltd	 24/09/2007	22	 Sunrise	Bank	Ltd.	 12/10/2007	23	 Grand	Bank	Nepal	Ltd.	 25/05/2008	24	 NMB	Bank	Ltd.	 5/06/2008	25	 Kist	Bank	Ltd.	 7/05/2009	26	 Janata	Bank	Nepal	Ltd.		 5/04/2010	27	 Mega	Bank	Nepal	Ltd.	 23/07/2010	28	 Sanima	Bank	Nepal	Ltd.		 20/09/2010	29	 Civil	Bank	Ltd.	 26/11/2010	30	 Century	Commercial	Bank	Ltd.	 10/03/2011					 	
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Appendix	3:	Definitions	of	Variables	
Variable	 Acronym	 Description	
Dependent	Variables			
Return	on	
assets	 ROA	 This	 ratio	 measures	 how	 efficiently	 the	company	can	manage	its	assets	to	generate	the	profit	during	the	year.		
Non-
performing	
loan	to	total	
loan	
NPL/TL	 An	 indicator	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 bank’s	outstanding	loans.	
Operating	
expenses	to	
interest	income	
OEII	 It	describes	the	banks	operating	efficiency.		
Operating	
expenses	to	
total	loan	
OETL	 It	analyses	the	banks	efficiency.	
Loan	to	deposit	 LTD	 It	 shows	 the	 long	 term	 solvency	 of	 the	banks.	
Deposits	to	
assets	 DTA	 This	ratio	is	used	to	evaluate	the	influence	of	a	bank’s	liability	upon	its	profitability		
		 		 		
Independent	Variables	
Board	size	 BS	 It	refers	to	the	total	number	of	directors	in	the	board.	
CFO	 CFO	 It	 indicates	 the	 existence	 of	 CFO-“1”	 is	allocated	 if	 there	 is	chief	 finance	officer	 in	the	bank,	otherwise	“0”	is	allocated.			
Board	diversity	
%	 of	female	directors	 Percentage	of	the	female	directors	serving	on	the	board	
Percentage	of	
minority	
directors	on	the	
board	
%	 of	minority	of	directors	 Percentage	 of	 the	 minority	 directors	serving	on	the	board	
Percentage	of	
outside	
directors	on	the	
board	
%	 of	outside	directors	 Proportion	of	outside	directors	attendance	in	the	meetings	
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Control	Variables	
Ownership	type	 Owner	 1	 for	 the	 government	 banks,	 2	 for	 the	private	 banks	 and	 3	 for	 the	 joint	 venture	banks	
Firm	age	 Age	 It	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 bank's	establishment	 date	 and	 the	 last	 period	 of	study.	
Number	of	
branches	
No. of 
Branches 
It	is	the	total	count	of	number	of	branches	of	the	bank.	
Gross	Domestic	
Product	 GDP	 An	 indicator	 to	 assess	 the	 country’s	economy	
Real	interest	
rate	
Real	interest	rate	 It	is	an	inflation	adjusted	interest	rate	
Bond	rate	 Bond	rate	 One	year	bond	rate	
Interbank	
settling	rate	
Interbank	settling	rate	 Interbank	 settling	 rate	 is	 the	 interest	 rate	between	 the	 banks	 for	 their	 short-term	borrowings.	
Inflation	 Inflation	 It	 is	an	 indicator	of	 the	rate	of	 inflation	of	the	bank		
